Michael Joseph Venturi

The appellant appealed a sentence for impaired driving, arguing the sentencing judge erred by departing from a joint submission.

The original sentence was a 6-month conditional sentence and a 12-month driving prohibition, while the joint submission proposed a $2000 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, found that the trial judge applied the incorrect "fitness test" instead of the "public interest" test from R. v. Anthony-Cook for rejecting joint submissions.

The court determined that the joint submission was not "so unhinged" as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering mitigating factors like an early plea, lack of prior record, and the importance of certainty in resolutions.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to the originally proposed $2000 fine and 12-month driving prohibition.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, renewed his application for judicial interim release based on a material change in circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic and new sureties.

The court acknowledged COVID-19 as a material change but found its impact on the tertiary ground of detention minimal given the specific measures at the detention facility and the lack of specific evidence of the applicant's heightened vulnerability.

The court also found the proposed new sureties unsuitable due to evasive testimony.

Ultimately, the court concluded that continued detention was necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, considering the gravity of the offence, the circumstances of its commission, and the strength of the Crown's case.

The accused was charged with child luring and making child pornography involving his 13-year-old daughter.

The daughter took photographs of herself in a bra and panties, which she sent to her father, allegedly at his suggestion for modelling work.

The court found that the photographs, while inappropriate, did not meet the legal definition of child pornography as they lacked a dominant characteristic of sexual purpose or intent to cause sexual stimulation.

Regarding the child luring charge, the court found the accused's conduct selfish and underhanded in encouraging his daughter to take and send photos and to conceal these communications from her mother.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's purpose was to facilitate the making of child pornography or that he repeatedly pressured her via telecommunication.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty on both counts.

The applicant, Robert Steven Wright, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release.

The court considered the application under the reverse onus provisions of the Criminal Code, specifically focusing on the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

While the secondary ground (public safety/reoffending) was not met due to the applicant's lack of criminal record and stable employment, the tertiary ground (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice) was central.

The court found the Crown's case, based on DNA and fingerprint evidence, to be very strong, bordering on overwhelming.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the violent circumstances, the potential lengthy imprisonment, and concerns regarding the proposed surety and release plan, the court concluded that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was dismissed.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, uttering threats, and breach of probation arising from events on May 30, 2017.

The complainant alleged the accused inflicted bruises on her body during a twelve-hour period at his residence.

The accused raised a self-defence claim, asserting he restrained the complainant to prevent her from harming herself and to protect himself from her aggressive conduct while highly intoxicated.

The court found the complainant's evidence unreliable due to her extreme intoxication and inconsistencies with her prior statements to police.

The court accepted the accused's version of events and found his use of force was reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances.

The accused was found guilty of breach of probation but acquitted of assault causing bodily harm and uttering threats.

The Crown appealed an acquittal, arguing the trial judge erred in law by failing to conclude that a recording of the complainant was made for a sexual purpose and misapprehended evidence regarding sexualized conversations.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge acquitted the accused based on a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused intended to make *any* recording, not merely whether the purpose was sexual.

The court held that the trial judge's misapprehension of evidence was not material to the outcome and that the factual findings and inferences drawn were reasonable, warranting deference.

The accused, Sean Leblond, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay in his trial for five sexual offences.

The total delay from information sworn to estimated trial end was 1305 days (43 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for superior courts as per R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed six periods of potential defence delay and exceptional circumstances.

After deducting 341 days of defence delay and 95 days for an unexpectedly prolonged preliminary inquiry (characterized as a discrete event), the net delay was calculated at 869 days (28.5 months), falling below the presumptive ceiling.

The court found the Crown failed to prove readiness to proceed for one period of alleged defence delay.

Consequently, the application for a stay was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with careless driving contrary to section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a head-on collision on Highway 11 south of Temagami on January 18, 2012.

The defendant's southbound vehicle crossed into the northbound lane and collided with the victim's vehicle.

The court conducted a new trial following an appeal.

The defendant was acquitted after the court found that while the vehicle crossed into the opposing lane, the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's driving fell below the standard of a reasonably prudent person in the circumstances.

The court found that slippery road conditions and the rapid unfolding of events, combined with gaps in the evidence regarding speed, braking, and the pre-collision event, created reasonable doubt as to careless driving.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault entered by a trial judge sitting without a jury.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge erred in law by considering both parties' failure to climax as part of his credibility assessment; and second, that the trial judge failed to consider potential collusion between the complainant's family members who testified.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the evidence against common sense understanding of human behaviour was not an error, and that collusion was neither alleged at trial nor had any air of reality.

The accused was charged with two counts under s. 253(1) of the Criminal Code: operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The accused was found asleep in the driver's seat of a running vehicle parked on a residential street.

The trial judge found that the accused had rebutted the presumption of care and control by establishing she had no intention to drive.

However, the court found that a realistic risk of danger existed under the second prong of the Boudreault test—that an impaired person behind the wheel may unintentionally set the vehicle in motion.

The court convicted on the impaired count and stayed the over-80 count pursuant to Kienapple.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference with a minor occurring between ages 9 and 15, involving escalating contact from touching to oral sex, vaginal intercourse, and attempted anal intercourse.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's credibility findings and argued the judge failed to consider the full context of evidence and made speculative findings of fact.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding the trial judge provided cogent and detailed reasons thoroughly anchored in the evidence, with the allegations powerfully corroborated by social media statements the trial judge found were made by the appellant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief under $5000, following a marital dispute where he was acquitted of assault charges.

The trial judge had found the appellant guilty of mischief, sentencing him to a conditional discharge.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in applying the principles from R. v. W.(D.) by failing to adequately explain why the complainant's evidence was preferred over the appellant's denial regarding the mischief charge, especially after stating that neither party was lying.

The conviction was quashed, and an acquittal was entered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of having care and control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal raised issues regarding the investigating officer's belief in the proper working order of an Approved Screening Device (ASD), whether breath tests were administered "as soon as practicable," a Section 8 Charter violation, and the trial judge's Section 24(2) Charter analysis.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge erred in law on all grounds, specifically in requiring the officer to perform a self-test on the ASD, misapprehending evidence regarding delays in breath test administration, and consequently, erred in finding a Charter breach and in the Section 24(2) analysis.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Raymond Roy, was found guilty on count one.

The court imposed a sentence of three years' jail, with 740 days credited for pre-trial custody, leaving an additional 355 days to serve.

A three-year probation period was ordered, including statutory conditions, complete abstention from alcohol and drugs for the first year, and a condition not to be in the company of his father if either is consuming alcohol for the remaining two years.

A lifetime weapons prohibition under section 110 of the Criminal Code, with an exception for hunting for sustenance under section 113, was imposed.

Roy was also ordered to provide a DNA sample and report to a probation officer within seven days of release, taking recommended counselling.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and over 80mgs.

The trial judge had found that breath samples were not taken "as soon as practicable" because the respondent had waived his right to counsel, making police efforts to facilitate counsel contact an unreasonable delay.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by engaging in a minute-by-minute assessment of delay and misapplied the "as soon as practicable" standard.

The court also determined that the respondent's initial responses regarding counsel were ambiguous, not a clear and unequivocal waiver, and thus the police acted reasonably in facilitating counsel.

The appeal was granted, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction for over 80mgs was substituted, remitting the matter for sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to comply with a demand for a roadside breath sample, arguing that the trial judge failed to consider material evidence regarding the equivocal nature of his refusal.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a careful analysis of the evidence, including the officer's cross-examination, and was entitled to conclude that the appellant's final response constituted a clear and unequivocal refusal, despite earlier potentially conditional statements.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to recite every piece of evidence or make a finding on exact words, as long as the reasons are intelligible and allow for meaningful appellate review.

The accused was charged with impaired driving contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused drove with more than 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath test results on Charter grounds and argued the instruments were unreliable and inaccurate.

The trial spanned 18 days over approximately two years.

The court found the police lawfully stopped the vehicle based on speeding, had reasonable and probable grounds to demand breath samples, and properly administered the breath tests.

Expert evidence from the Crown's toxicologist established the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 8000 C results.

The defence expert's theory of instrument drift was rejected as unscientific and based on incomplete data.

The accused was convicted.

The applicant brought a Charter motion under sections 10(b) and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that she was not afforded contact with counsel of her choice and did not receive adequate legal advice.

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving and given her right to counsel.

She selected three lawyers from a provided list.

The police attempted to contact her first two choices without success and successfully connected her with her third choice, with whom she spoke for approximately eight minutes.

The applicant subsequently complained to police that the lawyer was rude and hung up on her, and that she received no advice.

The court found that the police took reasonable steps to facilitate contact with counsel of choice and that the applicant did not diligently and reasonably indicate that the advice received was inadequate.

The accused was charged with luring contrary to section 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused pleaded guilty to the offense and subsequently raised the defense of entrapment.

The court found that the police officer conducting the investigation was engaged in a bona fide, proactive investigation with reasonable suspicion that the accused was engaged in prohibited activity.

The court determined that the police did not induce the commission of the offense but merely provided an opportunity, which the accused freely pursued on multiple occasions without coercion.

The entrapment defense was rejected and a conviction was registered.

The accused brought an application under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code seeking severance of three counts of historic sexual offences involving two complainants who were sisters.

The accused argued that the counts lacked a sufficient factual nexus and that a joint trial would create moral and reasoning prejudice.

The court considered the severance factors outlined in R. v. Last, including prejudice to the accused, the legal and factual nexus between counts, complexity of evidence, multiplicity of proceedings, and the potential use of similar fact evidence.

The court found a sufficient factual and legal nexus between the allegations and determined the risk of prejudice was minimal in a judge-alone trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that the interests of justice required severance.