M. Forestell

The Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence in a jury trial involving multiple domestic violence and sexual assault allegations.

The proposed evidence concerned prior convictions involving a former partner and included incidents of choking, threats, confinement, and sexual violence.

The court applied the analytical framework for similar fact evidence and assessed whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, focusing on whether the evidence demonstrated a distinctive pattern of conduct relevant to the actus reus and consent.

The court found that two of the four prior incidents demonstrated a distinctive pattern involving jealousy-triggered violence, choking, and sexual violence, and that their probative value outweighed the risk of prejudice.

Evidence relating to the other incidents was excluded as insufficiently distinctive and overly prejudicial.

A young person was tried for second degree murder, attempted murder, discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, careless use of a firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm following a lobby shooting that resulted in a death and injury.

The accused admitted firing the gun but asserted self‑defence after being struck on the head with a baseball bat during a group attack.

The court found the accused had a reasonable belief of a threat and a defensive purpose, but concluded that firing multiple shots at retreating attackers was objectively unreasonable.

The court held the Crown failed to prove the intent required for murder or attempted murder.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without a licence.

In a trial for second degree murder, the Crown and defence brought pre-trial applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The defence sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased to support a claim of self-defence.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the deceased's good character, the accused's bad character, and ante-mortem statements made by the deceased.

The court ruled that evidence of the deceased's prior violent acts was admissible.

The Crown's application to introduce the deceased's good character was largely dismissed, except for evidence of his non-violent disposition at work.

The Crown's application to introduce the accused's bad character was dismissed due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

Most of the ante-mortem statements were ruled inadmissible hearsay, save for a statement of intention and lay opinion regarding the accused's tone of voice.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude evidence under the Charter.

They alleged arbitrary detention, unreasonable search, and right to counsel violations.

The court found that the initial investigative detentions and arrests were lawful and that the examination of the accused's shoes did not violate section 8.

However, the court found a section 9 violation for both accused because the police deliberately delayed bringing them before a Justice of the Peace within 24 hours in order to obtain statements.

Consequently, the statements made at the police station were excluded under section 24(2).

The expert evidence regarding gunshot residue and footwear impressions was ruled admissible.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder arising from a home invasion robbery, sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a criminologist regarding the statistical likelihood of death resulting from firearms-related robberies.

The court applied the Mohan/Abbey framework for expert evidence and the elements of s. 229(c) of the Criminal Code as set out in R. v. Shand.

The court held that the proposed evidence was not logically relevant to the specific dangerous act in this case (pointing a loaded, cocked firearm) and that its potential to confuse the jury outweighed any probative value.

The application to admit the expert evidence was dismissed.

During a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to re-examine the sole eyewitness (the accused's wife) by playing portions of her videotaped police statement.

The defence had cross-examined the witness on prior inconsistent statements made during the interview.

The Crown argued the video was necessary to show the witness's highly emotional state and provide context for the inconsistencies.

The court ruled that the Crown could not play all portions showing the witness in distress, as it would be prejudicial and misleading, but permitted the Crown to play the specific portions upon which the witness was cross-examined to provide full context.

The offender was found guilty of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother to death.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court considered the profound breach of trust in a domestic relationship, the brutal nature of the attack involving multiple weapons, and the offender's criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the Crown sought to introduce statements made by the accused to police during a lengthy interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework to assess voluntariness.

While the initial portions of the interview were voluntary, the court found that the police crossed the line by suggesting the accused needed to 'spin' his story for the courts and that his lawyer would not investigate his side.

This constituted an improper inducement that overbore the accused's will.

The statements made after this point were ruled involuntary and inadmissible.

During a murder trial, the applicant sought to introduce the police statement and examination-in-chief of an unavailable witness from a previous related trial under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The applicant did not seek to introduce the cross-examination from the previous trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that without the cross-examination or an adequate substitute, the threshold reliability of the statements was not established due to significant inconsistencies and credibility issues.