P. Leishman

The offender was convicted of counselling to kidnap and extort his former lawyers, whom he blamed for financial losses.

He recruited an accomplice, purchased a shotgun and ammunition, and provided the accomplice with the lawyers' details and money.

The court found the targeting of justice system participants and the purchase of a firearm to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 8 months.

During a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to re-examine the sole eyewitness (the accused's wife) by playing portions of her videotaped police statement.

The defence had cross-examined the witness on prior inconsistent statements made during the interview.

The Crown argued the video was necessary to show the witness's highly emotional state and provide context for the inconsistencies.

The court ruled that the Crown could not play all portions showing the witness in distress, as it would be prejudicial and misleading, but permitted the Crown to play the specific portions upon which the witness was cross-examined to provide full context.

In a second degree murder trial where the accused raised self-defence, the defence sought to introduce an exculpatory audio and video statement made to police shortly after arrest.

The Crown opposed admission on the basis that the statement was a prior consistent statement and not spontaneous.

Applying the principles in R. v. Edgar, the court held that spontaneous out-of-court statements by an accused made upon arrest may be admitted as evidence of reaction to an accusation and as circumstantial evidence relevant to credibility.

The court found the statement had significant probative value in demonstrating the accused’s emotional state, cooperation with police, and consistency with his anticipated testimony, and could rebut evidence of post-offence conduct suggesting guilt.

The post‑arrest statement was therefore admitted.

During a criminal jury trial, the Crown sought to introduce expert evidence from a police officer regarding a 'code of silence' within a Toronto neighbourhood, which allegedly discouraged witnesses from cooperating with police due to fear of retaliation.

The proposed evidence was tendered after key witnesses had testified and was intended to explain an eyewitness’s earlier reluctance to identify the shooter.

Applying the Mohan framework and the two‑stage admissibility analysis described in Abbey, the court found the proposed evidence met the threshold requirements of relevance and expert qualification.

However, the court concluded the evidence was not necessary because the eyewitness had already testified about the alleged code of silence and the jury could assess credibility without expert assistance.

The court held the potential prejudice—particularly the risk of implying gang involvement without supporting evidence—outweighed the probative value.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused following arrest, while the accused applied to exclude them on the basis of alleged breaches of s. 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and lack of voluntariness.

The accused argued that police failed to properly provide right to counsel warnings and that subsequent questions improperly expanded the scope of the investigation toward a search of his residence.

The court found the officer’s evidence credible that the accused was cautioned and advised of his right to counsel before questioning and that the accused declined to contact counsel.

The statements were held voluntary and the questioning did not constitute a new investigative focus requiring renewed Charter warnings.

Even if a breach had occurred, exclusion under s. 24(2) would not be warranted.