Matthew John Diskin

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's debt would be released by his discharge from bankruptcy.

The respondent had acted as a 'straw borrower' and co-signed a mortgage application, unaware that the primary borrower had made fraudulent misrepresentations.

The appellant argued the debt should survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act due to false pretences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 178(1)(e) requires a causal connection between the bankrupt's false pretences or fraudulent misrepresentation and the obtaining of the property.

The trial judge correctly found the mortgage funds were advanced based on the primary borrower's misrepresentations, not the respondent's.

The plaintiffs' action was subject to a status hearing under Rule 48.14 after failing to set the matter down for trial.

The individual defendants sought a dismissal for delay.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the extensive delays in the litigation, noting that the evidentiary record provided by the plaintiffs' counsel's legal assistant was inadequate and failed to explain significant gaps in time.

As the plaintiffs failed to meet the first branch of the conjunctive test to show cause, the action was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, founders of a family-owned welding supply business, sued for wrongful dismissal after the business was sold to the manufacturer whose products they distributed.

The manufacturer argued that a term should be implied that the plaintiffs would retire upon the sale of the business given their senior age.

The court rejected this argument, finding that a term of reasonable notice is implied by law in employment contracts.

The court awarded 18 months' notice based on the plaintiffs' actual compensation, resulting in a joint and several damages award of over $1.1 million against the manufacturer and the business.

The appellant sought to enforce a letter of request from a U.S. court to obtain documents and viva voce testimony from the respondent, a federal Crown corporation, for use in a U.S. action.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the respondent enjoyed Crown immunity and the appellant failed to meet the criteria for enforcing letters rogatory.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 60 of the Ontario Evidence Act is a rule of practice and procedure that binds the Crown under section 27 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The Court further held the application judge erred by treating the factors for enforcing letters rogatory as strict pre-conditions and by concluding that alternative disclosure under the Access to Information Act provided evidence of the same value.

Following the dismissal of its application for the enforcement of letters rogatory, the applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the application raised novel issues of law.

The court rejected this argument, finding that the applicant was a commercial entity pursuing its own private interests in foreign litigation, not a public interest litigant.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful respondent but reduced the quantum claimed from $32,647.71 to $18,189.46, noting that the respondent had already received a substantial costs award on an earlier, nearly identical application.

The applicant, an American pharmaceutical company, sought to enforce amended letters rogatory issued by a United States District Court to compel testimony and documentary evidence from the respondent, a federal Crown corporation, for use in foreign litigation.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that it enjoyed Crown immunity.

The court held that the presumption of Crown immunity under s. 17 of the federal Interpretation Act prevented the enforcement of letters rogatory against a Crown agent, as the provincial Evidence Act does not bind the federal Crown.

Furthermore, the court found that the applicant failed to satisfy the legal standard for enforcing letters rogatory, as the evidence sought was not necessary for trial and had already been obtained through an Access to Information Act request.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the lower court judge, and awarded costs to the respondent in the fixed amount of $10,000.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that it had repudiated a contract by indicating it would no longer pay the agreed contract price.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's factual inference that the appellant's conduct, including repeatedly seeking lower quantities and prices, demonstrated an intention not to honour the contract price going forward.

The Court also upheld the finding that the respondent accepted the repudiation by cancelling a shipment and pursuing litigation, and effectively communicated this acceptance.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering specific performance and purchase price abatements for two real estate transactions.

The trial judge found the appellant vendors were not ready to close, failed to bargain in good faith, and committed an anticipatory breach, while the respondent purchasers were ready, willing, and able to perform.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or his interpretation of the abatement clauses.

The respondents (defendants) moved for security for costs of an appeal and the proceeding below.

The appellants (plaintiffs) are foreign residents with no assets in Ontario, have unpaid costs from the lower court, and are pursuing parallel proceedings in other jurisdictions.

The court granted the motion, ordering the appellants to post security for costs totaling $191,980.59 before taking any further steps in the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its motion to set aside a default judgment.

The motion judge found that the statement of claim was properly served, the appellant made a tactical decision not to defend, and the appellant failed to raise an arguable defence on the merits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, noting the appellant failed to explain its failure to defend under Rule 16.07(a) and did not respond to the respondent's allegations regarding the mortgages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the respondent was entitled to terminate an agreement of purchase and sale based on an environmental condition.

The condition allowed the respondent to terminate the agreement in its sole and unfettered discretion based on its satisfaction with the property's physical condition.

An environmental assessment revealed soil permeability issues that affected the respondent's plans to develop a scrap metal facility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the respondent acted reasonably and in good faith in exercising the termination clause.

The moving party brought a motion for an extension of time to perfect its appeal from an order dismissing its motion to set aside a noting of default.

The responding party had previously obtained default judgments discharging mortgages and awarding possession of the property.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension of time, noting that the moving party had formed a timely intention to appeal and the deficiencies in its initial filing were minor.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to stay the action on the ground that India was the more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, noting she correctly articulated and applied the governing legal principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action by a Master.

The Master had dismissed the action due to the appellant's failure to execute unlimited medical authorizations, relying on the appellant's overall conduct in the action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that interlocutory dismissal is a remedy of last resort and the appellant's conduct was not contumelious.

Furthermore, the Master erred by relying on grounds not specified in the responding party's notice of motion, contrary to Rule 37.06.