Mark Halfyard

The appellants were convicted of breaking into a motel and robbing the occupants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding in-dock identification evidence, the use of a nickname, Vetrovec warnings for unsavoury witnesses, and a prior inconsistent statement.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the jury charge, noting that the instructions adequately warned of the dangers of in-dock identification and correctly applied the law on corroboration between Vetrovec witnesses.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant pled guilty to possession of stolen property after purchasing six tractor trailer loads of stolen commercial goods worth $500,000.

He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment and three years' probation.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by overemphasizing general deterrence and failing to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the appropriate range given the magnitude of the crime and the motivation of greed.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on demeanour, reversed the burden of proof, and misapprehended evidence regarding a dropped wallet and lack of injuries.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not improperly rely on demeanour or reverse the burden of proof, and that any misapprehension of evidence was not material.

On a summary conviction appeal from a conviction for failing to remain at the scene of an accident, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence about the time gap between the collision and the appellant's discovery in the vehicle, that the verdict was unreasonable, and that the reasons were inadequate.

The court held that the trial judge understood the timing evidence and its significance, and that the circumstantial evidence reasonably supported the inference that the appellant was the driver who fled the scene.

Applying the appellate unreasonable-verdict standard and the functional approach to adequacy of reasons, the court found the verdict intelligible, supported by the record, and the reasons legally sufficient.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Convictions Appeal Court, which dismissed an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The trial judge had rejected a joint submission on sentence, concluding it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law, agreeing that the trial judge applied the proper legal test for rejecting a joint submission.

Leave to appeal was denied.

The appellant appealed his conviction for weapons offences, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's attribution of intake and institutional delay, as well as the assessment of prejudice.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge reasonably characterized the initial four months as neutral intake and properly allocated the delay caused by an adjournment.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant failed to establish significant prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed that a factual error occurred but found it immaterial.

The trial judge's finding that the appellant was a party to possession by consenting to the use of a secret compartment for a joint enterprise to traffic drugs was supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was discharged at a preliminary inquiry on several firearm offences due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession.

The Crown successfully applied for certiorari and mandamus, and the application judge quashed the discharge and committed the appellant for trial.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in her consideration of the evidence as a whole, and that any error in assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence was not jurisdictional and therefore not reviewable on certiorari.

The appellant challenged jury convictions for criminal negligence causing bodily harm and aggravated assault arising from a late-night truck pursuit and repeated ramming of a vehicle after an altercation at a bridge.

The court held that unidentified hearsay statements describing a plan to push Asian fishermen into the water were admissible under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established through corroborative surrounding events.

The jury charge, read as a whole, adequately limited the use of those statements to the issue of common intention and motive, and improper Crown cross-examination did not render the trial unfair.

On the Crown's sentence appeal, leave was granted but the sentence of two years less a day, probation, and a driving prohibition was upheld as not manifestly unfit for a youthful first offender.

Crown sentence appeal in a child sexual abuse case involving repeated sexual assault, sexual exploitation, and invitation to sexual touching by an adult in a position of trust over a dependent teenage complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge set the sentencing range too low and reaffirmed that prolonged sexual abuse of a child, including penetration, by a trusted adult will ordinarily attract a penitentiary term of at least five or six years.

Given the grooming, repeated intercourse, threats, dependency, profound breach of trust, and absence of remorse, the three-year sentence was manifestly unfit.

The sentence was increased to seven years and the unauthorized lifetime non-communication order was replaced with a custodial-period order under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his sentence after the trial judge rejected a joint submission.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in finding the joint submission contrary to the public interest.

However, the trial judge failed to account for the appellant's lesser role compared to his co-accused.

Considering the appellant's lesser role, pre-trial custody, house arrest, and compelling fresh evidence, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to 9 months' imprisonment.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The summary conviction appeal judge had held there was insufficient evidence that the approved instrument analyzed the breath samples, rendering the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code unavailable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal and restored the conviction, finding that the trial judge correctly relied on circumstantial evidence—specifically the instrument's readings—to infer that an analysis had occurred.

The summary conviction appeal judge erred in law by failing to apply the applicable statutory presumption and by exceeding the permitted standard of appellate review.

The appellant was convicted of possession of stolen property over $5,000 after being found in possession of stolen specialty refrigerators.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by finding the refrigerators were delivered and paid for in the middle of the night, when evidence suggested delivery occurred during regular business hours.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge's misapprehension of the delivery time was material to his reasoning process and met the stringent test for a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of historical physical and sexual abuse against his step-daughter.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge failed to properly assess the reliability of the complainant's testimony and improperly shifted the burden of proof regarding the absence of corroborating police and school records.

The Court of Appeal (majority) allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by focusing on the complainant's sincerity rather than the reliability of her memories of distant events, and by failing to consider whether the absence of mandatory child abuse reports raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm.

The sentencing judge intended to impose the mandatory minimum sentence of five years, but due to a mathematical error by Crown counsel regarding pre-trial custody credit, the actual sentence imposed was ten months short of the legal minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, adding ten months to the sentence to comply with the mandatory minimum, and quashed the probation order as the total sentence exceeded two years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm, threatening death, and drug offences.

He argued the trial judge failed to address frailties in the complainant's evidence and erred in admitting statements made to police without a caution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the complainant's evidence, finding the trial judge was alive to the issues.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the threatening death convictions, finding the statements to police were not voluntary because no caution was given and the second officer did not testify.

A new trial was ordered for the threatening death charges.

The appellants were convicted of offences arising from a jewellery store robbery.

Police obtained a 'tower dump' warrant for cell phone records near the store without reasonable grounds, violating s. 8 of the Charter.

Using this unconstitutionally obtained information, police secured subscriber warrants and residential search warrants.

The trial judge excluded the tower dump records but admitted the subscriber and residential evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, reasoning that the subscriber records could have been lawfully obtained via a telephone records order under s. 492.2(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission of the evidence and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in finding the actus reus of the offence had been made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's analysis fully supported the finding of dangerous driving.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals on firearms offences, which resulted from the trial judge excluding evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The trial judge delivered a brief oral decision and promised written reasons later that day, but did not release them until 25 months later, after the Crown had perfected its appeal based on the inadequacy of the oral reasons.

The Court of Appeal held that the 25-month delay, combined with the trial judge's repeated unfulfilled promises to release the reasons and her knowledge of the Crown's appeal, rebutted the presumption that the written reasons truly reflected her original reasoning process.

As the written reasons could not be considered and the oral reasons were inadequate, the Court found an error of law, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to find he had a colour of right defence.

The trial judge found the appellant forged time sheets to obtain payments from a company, despite the appellant's honest belief that the company was liable to him in damages for breach of contract.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the mens rea test for fraud from R. v. Théroux.

The Court held that the appellant's personal belief of entitlement to damages did not negative the mens rea, as he intentionally committed a deceitful act knowing it could cause deprivation.