Mark Halfyard

The applicant sought an extension of time to seek a panel review of a 2008 order by a single judge of the Court of Appeal, which had denied his application for an extension of time to appeal his 2002 second-degree murder conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the seven-year delay in seeking the review and failed to demonstrate any basis to interfere with the single judge's discretionary decision.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine and marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the application judge erred in admitting evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Police had entered his apartment after a break-in and searched kitchen drawers to find identifying information, discovering drugs and a gun.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the police conduct was an error in judgment rather than bad faith, and that the evidence should not be excluded under the Grant test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, pleaded guilty to trafficking marijuana after selling approximately 110 grams to an undercover officer via Craigslist.

The sentencing judge imposed a $750 fine.

On appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by focusing too heavily on general deterrence and failing to recognize the appellant's remarkable rehabilitation efforts.

The conviction and fine were set aside, and a conditional discharge was imposed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his restaurant.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence, erred in her treatment of missing original police notes, and engaged in forbidden oath-helping when assessing police credibility regarding alleged fabricated evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence, no error in placing little weight on the missing rough notes given the officers' independent recollections, and no improper oath-helping in the trial judge's consideration of the professional risks officers would face if they fabricated evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal judge's decision dismissing his appeal from a conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 0.80.

The appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no clear error by the summary conviction appeal judge and noting the case involved well-settled legal principles with no broader significance to the administration of justice.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and physical assault against the mother of his daughter.

At trial, the complainant testified she could not recall the incident, and the trial judge admitted her preliminary inquiry testimony for the truth of its contents.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in her use of the complainant's demeanour while recanting and by relying on voir dire evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to consider the complainant's demeanour to determine if her failure to recall stemmed from a wish to reconcile, and that the parties had tacitly agreed the voir dire evidence was admissible at trial.

The appellants appealed their convictions for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing their mid-trial application to cross-examine the complainant about her past sexual activity under s. 276(2) of the Criminal Code, and in failing to provide a limiting instruction on the use of her prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in balancing the probative value and prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence.

The Court also held that a limiting instruction was unnecessary as the prior consistent statements were responsive to the defence's allegation of recent fabrication.

The appellant appealed his conviction for mischief and his 17-month sentence for mischief and sexual exploitation.

The mischief occurred when the appellant pulled the parking brake of a moving vehicle driven by his stepdaughter, who had refused to let him out.

The appellant argued the driver was unlawfully confining him, meaning she was not in lawful use of the vehicle.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the Crown negated unlawful confinement as it requires a significant period of time.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the cumulative sentence reflected no error in principle given the breach of trust and vulnerability of the sexual exploitation complainant.

On a summary conviction appeal from convictions for mischief under $5000 and breach of recognizance arising from a road-rage altercation, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended the complainant's evidence concerning whether she had reviewed a prior written police statement.

The court held that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence, properly distinguished between the written statement and a later video statement, and remained alive to contradictions in the complainant's various accounts.

In any event, applying the governing test for misapprehension of evidence, any possible error was not central to the reasoning process and had no impact on the convictions.

The appeal was dismissed without calling on the Crown.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and seeking to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were responsive to the defence's argument that the complainant attempted to frame the appellant.

The Court also declined to admit the fresh evidence, concluding it could not reasonably undermine the complainant's credibility on material issues.

Crown appeal from an acquittal following a judge-alone trial on charges of accessing and possessing child pornography discovered on a computer owned by the respondent but used by his partner.

The trial judge found the respondent suspicious that his partner may have downloaded prohibited material but concluded he lacked actual knowledge and acquitted him on the basis of “innocent possession.” The Court of Appeal held the trial judge misapplied both the doctrine of wilful blindness and the innocent possession doctrine.

However, the court concluded the factual findings did not establish the knowledge or control required for possession under the Criminal Code.

The acquittal was therefore upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the sole ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant an order under s. 530 of the Criminal Code that his trial be held in English.

The appellant sought this order to challenge jurors for language competency under s. 638(1)(f).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that there was no basis for a s. 530 order because the appellant's trial was already scheduled to be held in English.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault with a weapon, uttering threats, and related offences arising from two incidents involving a former friend and business partner.

He argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi evidence, which included a time-stamped store receipt, and misapprehended evidence regarding contradictions between his and his wife's testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments were entitled to deference, her reasons for rejecting the alibi were adequate, and there was no misapprehension of evidence that played an essential part in the reasoning process.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his stepdaughter, who was six years old at the time of the offences.

At trial, the child refused to testify about the appellant's actions.

The trial judge admitted her videotaped police statement, her preliminary inquiry testimony, and a statement made to an investigating officer.

On appeal, the appellant argued the statements should have been excluded because he could not cross-examine the unresponsive witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statements were properly admitted under the principled approach to hearsay and that the factors for unresponsive witnesses did not favour exclusion.

The appellant, a young person, was convicted of numerous firearms offences after police found loaded firearms in his bedroom.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a 12-day delay in holding his bail hearing, which violated his s. 11(e) rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly applied the residual category of abuse of process and reasonably concluded that the community's interest in seeing the serious charges disposed of on their merits outweighed the need for a stay.

The Court also found that the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant possessed the firearms was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing the trial judge erred in finding reasonable and probable grounds for his arrest and failing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant contended the trial judge misapprehended evidence by reconciling the arresting officer's identification with defence witnesses who testified that a re-enactment showed it was impossible to identify the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly considered the totality of the circumstances, including informant information and the officer's recognition of the appellant's distinctive hairstyle, which had been altered before the defence simulations.

The appellants appealed their sentences after their aggravated assault convictions were set aside, leaving only convictions for common assault.

The Court of Appeal found that deference to the trial judge was not warranted given the changed circumstances.

Noting the appellants' youth, first-offender status, lack of serious injury to the victim, and the time elapsed since the offence, the Court granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeals, and imposed conditional discharges with two years of probation and 200 hours of community service.

The four applicants, who were convicted of various offences including participating in a criminal organization, applied for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for their appeals.

The Crown conceded the applicants lacked sufficient means but argued their proposed grounds of appeal lacked merit.

The court found that only one applicant, Ms. Neeranjan, had an arguable ground of appeal regarding her conviction for participating in a criminal organization.

Her application was allowed, while the applications of the other three were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for fraud, arguing the trial judge erred by not permitting him to address the court before sentencing and by finding a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to allow the appellant to speak was an inadvertent procedural error that would not have changed the outcome, as the judge was already aware of his remorse.

The court further found the sentence was fit given the monetary amount, breach of trust, and lengthy duration of the fraud.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his estranged wife.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable as the evidence did not support findings of planning and deliberation or criminal harassment.

He also argued that a decision tree provided to the jury was misleading and that the trial judge failed to give a proper W.(D.) instruction regarding his testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict on all bases left to the jury, the decision tree was properly contextualized by the trial judge's instructions, and the substance of the W.(D.) principles was adequately conveyed.