Mark A. Klaiman

The appellants held first and second mortgages over properties owned by the respondents.

Following defaults, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and an amending agreement providing for a series of payments.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision that $871,345.95 in payments made by the respondents, including proceeds from a judicial sale, should be applied first to retire the first mortgages before reducing the second mortgages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it was open to the motion judge to conclude that the context of the agreements and the ongoing threat of foreclosure on the first mortgages indicated the payments were intended to pay down the first mortgages.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the usage of a full laneway to access the back of her property.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that even if usage could be established, it would merely provide an alternative second way to access the property and did not rise to the level of reasonable necessity for the better enjoyment of the property.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, which found reasonable grounds to believe the appellant's undertakings would not be carried out in accordance with law or with integrity, and that there were problems with technical competence based on past chargeable conciliations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and concluding that the Tribunal's findings of fact were reasonable and supported by ample evidence.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's findings that the respondent was constructively dismissed and that the appellants were motivated by malice when they initiated criminal proceedings against her.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's factual findings were amply supported by the record, including evidence of unilateral changes to employment terms and the appellant's failure to disclose exculpatory information to the police.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed the dismissal of its action for a declaration that the termination of its commercial tenancy was invalid.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to determine the central issue of whether a termination clause had been consensually deleted from the lease.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by relying on improperly admitted information regarding the corporate status of the landlord.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his claim.

The Court of Appeal found no error, agreeing that the appellant willingly assumed the risk of driving on a closed road, which triggered section 4(1) of the Occupier's Liability Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $10,000.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision interpreting an employment agreement to entitle the respondent employee to 13 months' notice upon termination.

The Court of Appeal found that the agreement was ambiguous, as the motion judge's interpretation effectively read out a six-month notice provision, while the appellant's interpretation required reading out other clauses.

The Court allowed the appeal in part, directing a trial on the interpretation of the notice period, but upheld the motion judge's decision that outstanding employee loans stood separate from the employment and required the appellant to prove they were due and owing.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a contract existed between the two individuals, C. Brar and S. Brar.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal, declaring the transfer of assets from the numbered company to SKLF Doors to be a fraudulent conveyance, as agreed by counsel for S. Brar and the numbered company.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that declared a mortgage null and void based on promissory estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that promissory estoppel can only be used as a shield, not a sword, and the respondent had improperly used it to seek a declaration.

The Court set aside the judgment and ordered a new trial to determine whether there was consideration for the mortgage, as the trial judge had failed to make a finding on that issue.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its claim regarding a commercial lease.

The appellant argued that a lease was assigned to it or that an oral agreement for a five-year lease was reached.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that there was no valid assignment in writing as required, and that the evidence did not support an oral agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant challenged an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action against the federal Crown arising from alleged interference with an immigration consulting business conducted outside Ontario.

The court interpreted s. 21(1) of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act and held that the requirement that the claim arise in the province applies to both para. (a) and para. (b), including superior courts in provinces without county or district courts.

Relying on the French version of the provision and the legislative history, the court concluded that Ontario lacked jurisdiction because the claims did not arise in Ontario.

The appeal was allowed, the action was dismissed without prejudice to proceeding in Federal Court, and no costs were awarded.

The applicant appealed an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an Order to Pay for 8 weeks of unpaid salary and vacation pay.

The applicant claimed he was employed on a salaried basis after selling his shares in the respondent restaurant business.

The respondent argued the applicant was retained on a casual commission basis to generate banqueting events.

The Adjudicator found the respondent's evidence more probable, concluding the applicant was not employed on a salaried basis during the disputed period.

The appeal was dismissed, but the respondent was directed to calculate and pay the applicant any outstanding commission earned during that time.