G. Gordon Bent

The court determined how to divide $406,000 in insurance settlement proceeds between a mother and son after a fire destroyed their family poultry processing plant.

The parties had rebuilt the plant using a combination of insurance, mortgages, and personal funds, but did not have a clear written agreement on how to divide any insurance settlement.

The court found that both parties contributed roughly equally to the reconstruction and ordered the insurance settlement to be divided equally.

Claims of unconscionability and unjust enrichment were rejected.

Following a judgment awarding the applicant $62,246.68 for a partnership claim, the parties could not agree on the pre-judgment interest rate.

The applicant sought the default rate of 4.8% under s. 127 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The respondents argued for a reduced rate of 1.95% under s. 130, citing lower market rates over the lengthy period, the modest recovery compared to the amount claimed, and the applicant's delay.

The court exercised its discretion under s. 130 and fixed the pre-judgment interest rate at 2.2%.

This was a costs endorsement following an application concerning the dissolution of a partnership and the accounting between former partners.

The applicant had succeeded in obtaining recovery for a share of post-dissolution profits under s. 42 of the Partnerships Act and for the fair market value of his one-third interest, but recovered substantially less than originally claimed.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 57.01, 49.10, and 49.13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that costs should follow the event but reduced the requested amount as disproportionate to the proceeding.

The court found the matter was straightforward and of moderate complexity, identified duplication and excessive hours, allowed the expert-report disbursement, and fixed all-inclusive partial indemnity costs at $48,388.71.

The applicant and respondents operated a chiropractic and physiotherapy clinic as a partnership.

Following the dissolution of the partnership, the respondents continued to operate out of the same premises using partnership assets.

The applicant sought a share of the post-dissolution profits under s. 42 of the Partnerships Act and a determination of the fair market value of his one-third share of the partnership.

The court awarded the applicant a portion of the post-dissolution profits based on the percentage attributable to the use of partnership assets, and determined the fair market value of his share using a capitalized cash flow approach with a minority discount, resulting in a total award of $62,246.68.

The defendant corporation moved for summary judgment dismissing a claim in which the plaintiff sought declarations of ownership of company shares and oppression relief under the Business Corporations Act.

The plaintiff alleged entitlement to common and Class B shares arising from an asset purchase agreement and option agreement connected to the sale of an engineering business.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to comply with the contractual requirements for subscribing to the shares, including payment and exercise of the option price specified in the agreements.

As a result, the plaintiff never acquired shareholder rights and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action in its entirety.

The applicants filed human rights applications alleging discrimination in the termination of child care services.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing to determine if the applications had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicants failed to attend the summary hearing or provide any explanation for their absence.

The Tribunal dismissed the applications as abandoned and confirmed it does not have jurisdiction to award costs.

The applicant, a 59-year-old temporary agency worker, alleged age discrimination when the respondent packaging company hired a younger temporary worker for a permanent machine operator position.

The applicant also alleged that her temporary agency failed to investigate her complaint of discrimination.

The Tribunal dismissed the application against the packaging company, finding it provided a credible, non-discriminatory explanation that the younger worker was better qualified based on speed and accuracy.

The Tribunal also dismissed the application against the temporary agency, finding it was unaware of the applicant's discrimination concerns and had no duty to investigate complaints based merely on seniority.

The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the estate of John Sr., brought two actions alleging that the transfer of a farm property and certain trademarks by the estate to family members and their companies were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat its claims.

The plaintiff relied on the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and the Assignments and Preferences Act, pointing to several 'badges of fraud'.

The court dismissed the actions, finding no fraudulent intent.

The court accepted that the farm property transfer and a related mortgage were legitimate transactions to secure and repay loans made by the son's companies for farm improvements, and that the family genuinely believed the Reliable lawsuit lacked merit at the time of the transfers.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim on a personal guarantee.

The respondent, a bookkeeper, signed a document described to her as being for 'standard credit information' without reading the small print containing the guarantee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's application of the Tilden v. Clendenning principle, finding that the appellant knew or ought to have known the respondent would not read the form and did nothing to bring the guarantee to her attention.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, confining the appeal to the issue of good faith disclosure regarding ongoing negotiations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no obligation or basis for reliance on the information.

Costs were fixed at $30,000, with the court reducing the requested amount based on policy and accessibility concerns rather than questioning counsel's hours or quality.