Lucille Shaw

The moving party mother brought a motion to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as the responding party father's representative, arguing he was a 'special party' under the Family Law Rules due to mental incapacity.

The father had previously been found incapable by the Ontario Court of Justice and exhibited ongoing bizarre and delusional behaviour, including wearing protest t-shirts to court and filing unintelligible materials comparing his family law case to residential schools and wartime internments.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the father failed to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decisions and submissions, confirming his ongoing incapacity.

The motion was granted, the PGT was appointed, and the upcoming appeal date was vacated.

The plaintiff, injured in an uninsured motor vehicle accident, sued the Crown for accident benefits and claimed aggravated and punitive damages for bad faith.

The plaintiff moved to compel the Crown to produce an adjuster for examination for discovery, while the Crown cross-moved to strike the bad faith claims for lack of notice under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act (PACA).

The court granted the Crown's cross-motion, finding that the plaintiff's initial letters regarding the accident benefits application did not constitute sufficient notice of a tort claim under s. 7 of PACA.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion for discovery, holding that the Crown is protected by royal prerogative from discovery in actions under the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, as PACA's discovery provisions explicitly do not apply to such claims.

The plaintiff was injured during a soccer game when he was unexpectedly punched by an opposing player after the referee blew the whistle.

The plaintiff sued the opposing player, the soccer clubs, the coach, and the league for negligence.

The soccer club defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them.

The court granted the motion, finding that the assault was a sudden, unprovoked, and unforeseeable event, and that the coach and club defendants did not breach their standard of care.

The parties separated in 2011, and both brought motions regarding financial disclosure and the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The respondent sought an order to list and sell the home, while the applicant sought to purchase the respondent's half-interest.

The court ordered the immediate listing and sale of the matrimonial home, finding no evidence of malicious, vexatious, or oppressive conduct that would justify refusing the respondent's prima facie right to partition and sale.

The court also ordered both parties to provide extensive financial disclosure, including three years of personal and corporate bank statements, to assist in determining whether income should be imputed to the applicant for support purposes.

The plaintiff moved for default judgment against the defendants for breach of a factoring agreement.

The defendants had previously delivered a Notice of Intent to Defend, but the plaintiff noted them in default without further notice or requesting a Statement of Defence.

The court found it unreasonable to note a self-represented party in default without notice after they had indicated an intent to participate.

The motion for default judgment was dismissed, the noting in default was set aside, and a timetable was established for the defendants to file a defence.

The applicant father sought an interim order allowing the children to travel from Germany to Ontario, pending a determination of whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction over custody and access under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant argued the court could make the order under s. 40 of the CLRA or its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The court held that s. 40 only applies after a court has determined it lacks jurisdiction, not before.

The court also declined to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction, finding no situation of necessity.

The request was dismissed pending the jurisdictional hearing.

The defendant in a construction dispute brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff subcontractor.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, claiming impecuniosity resulting from the defendant's failure to pay for work performed.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide robust particularity of its financial situation to establish impecuniosity.

However, recognizing the merit of the plaintiff's claim and the need to balance financial risk against prejudice, the court ordered security for costs on a step-by-step basis, requiring the plaintiff to post $15,000 rather than the $116,571.12 requested by the defendant.

The applicant, a co-estate trustee and the lawyer who drafted the deceased's will, applied to remove the two respondent co-estate trustees (the deceased's sons).

The administration of the estate had stalled for four years due to hostility and lack of cooperation from the respondents, resulting in late tax filing penalties and the estate's main asset (a house) remaining uninsured while the respondents lived there rent-free.

The court found a clear necessity to remove the respondents as estate trustees to protect the estate assets and the welfare of the beneficiaries, particularly a third brother who was a disabled beneficiary of a discretionary trust.

The applicant was appointed as the sole estate trustee.