L. Sossin

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon after the complainant was stabbed in the torso.

The sole trial issue was identity of the assailant.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the trial judge erred in treating a post-offence apology as consciousness of guilt.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasons, though brief, were adequate when read in light of the whole record and counsel's submissions.

The court further held that the trial judge did not err in using the apology as confirmatory evidence, as no alternative explanation for it appeared on the record.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed from summary judgment dismissing negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against a lawyer retained to draft a deceased relative’s will.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because, even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim failed on duty, causation, and limitation grounds.

It declined to recognize a novel duty of care to a non-client who was not an intended beneficiary under the will, and found no ad hoc fiduciary undertaking.

The court further held that the alleged losses flowed from prior judicial findings concerning beneficial ownership of trust property, not from the respondent’s conduct, and that the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent.

In a defamation appeal arising from newspaper and social media publications targeting the respondent, the appellants challenged liability, damages, costs, and the scope of a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal held that statute-barred earlier publications were admitted only for background and context, that the proceeding properly continued under the ordinary procedure after the defence objected to Rule 76, and that damages in defamation were presumed once the elements of the tort were established.

However, the court found the permanent injunction impermissibly broad, disproportionate, and insufficiently precise for enforcement.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part only to set aside and remit the injunctive term for properly defined wording, with appeal costs awarded to the appellants.

The youth appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault.

At trial, the judge disbelieved the appellant's exculpatory testimony and concluded he had fabricated his account to deflect blame, using this disbelief as circumstantial evidence of guilt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to identify independent evidence of fabrication before using the disbelieved testimony as circumstantial evidence of guilt, contrary to the framework in R. v. Iqbal.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found that the individual appellant, who was the sole officer and employee of the corporate appellant, had serially engaged in vexatious litigation since 2017, including bringing proceedings outside the court's jurisdiction and failing to pay significant costs awards.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's application of the relevant factors and concluding that the order against both the corporation and the individual directing its litigation was entirely justified.

The appellants appealed an order declaring them vexatious litigants under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The application judge found the respondent had standing and applied the Lang Michener test, noting the appellants' history of meritless litigation against a former client who is a party under a disability.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error and dismissed the appeal, confirming the vexatious litigant order applies to the appellants in their personal capacity.

The appellant appealed an order setting aside a separation agreement and fixing the date of separation as July 31, 2018.

The application judge set aside the agreement under s. 56(4) of the Family Law Act because the appellant failed to disclose a pending $4,000,000 investment in his company.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the non-disclosure warranted setting aside the agreement on fairness grounds.

The Court also upheld the application judge's factual determination of the separation date, finding it was supported by the evidence of the parties' ongoing interactions.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following an appeal that was allowed in part with divided success, the parties made written submissions regarding costs in the court below.

The appellants sought to set aside a $20,000 costs award against them, while the respondent argued the costs order should remain.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success on appeal informed the appropriate disposition of costs below.

The court set aside the $20,000 costs award and ordered no costs of the motion in the court below.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his application to challenge the validity of his deceased mother's will.

The motion judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to comply with a previous order requiring him to serve a notice of change of solicitor or a notice of intention to act in person within 30 days.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the dismissal was a final order.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the proceeding under Rule 15.04(9) given the appellant's pattern of delay and non-compliance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the respondent builder.

The appellants had purchased a newly built home but failed to transfer the closing funds until 9 minutes past the 5:00 p.m. deadline on the extended closing date.

The respondent terminated the agreement relying on a 'time is of the essence' clause, but subsequently offered to revive the agreement for an additional $113,000, which the appellants paid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the 5:00 p.m. deadline was unambiguous, the termination was not unconscionable, the revival fee was part of a new contract rather than an impermissible penalty, and the appellants did not act under economic duress.

The self-represented moving party sought a panel review of an appeal management direction in a high-conflict family matter.

The direction had imposed a deadline for ordering transcripts and affirmed the requirement that documents be filed in English.

The Court of Appeal stayed the motion under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding it frivolous and vexatious.

The court noted that panel reviews of appeal management directions are not explicitly permitted and that the motion was premature, as the moving party could still seek relief from transcript requirements by bringing a motion for directions to the appeal management judge.

The moving party sought a panel review of a single judge's order dismissing her motion for an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The Court of Appeal, acting on its own initiative under Rule 2.1.02, dismissed the motion for panel review as an abuse of process.

The court noted the moving party's history of bringing meritless motions and attempting to re-litigate settled issues, concluding this was the clearest of cases warranting a Rule 2.1 dismissal.

The moving party was also prohibited from bringing further motions in the proceeding without leave.

The appellant appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement agreement reached in open court regarding an estate and property dispute.

He argued the settlement should be set aside due to unconscionability, mutual mistake, and misrepresentation, claiming he did not understand the terms and was tricked by his former counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the test for unconscionability and concluding there was ample evidence that the appellant, who was represented by counsel, understood and agreed to the settlement.

The appellants commenced an action for fraudulent misrepresentation and oppression, which an associate justice stayed under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991, based on arbitration clauses in the parties' agreements.

The appellants appealed to a Superior Court judge, who dismissed the appeal on the merits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, noting that under s. 7(6) of the Arbitration Act, there is no appeal from a court's decision to stay a proceeding under s. 7(1).

The appellant appealed a summary judgment ordering it to pay $338,984.20 in unpaid licence fees for sports fields that were closed or restricted due to COVID-19.

The appellant argued the agreements should be interpreted as 'pay-if-available', while the respondent argued payment was required for bargained-for times regardless of use.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no extricable errors of law or palpable and overriding errors in her application of contractual interpretation principles.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Following an appeal and a fresh evidence motion, the court issued a costs endorsement.

Costs were awarded to the successful respondent on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $5,000.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of causing death while driving with excess blood-drug concentration (THC) and dangerous driving causing death, following a fatal collision with a horse and buggy.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent on the basis that the Crown failed to prove a causal nexus between the respondent's impairment and the collision, and failed to establish a marked departure from the standard of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code does not require proof that the impairment itself caused the death, only that the accused caused the death while committing the predicate offence.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the modified objective standard for dangerous driving.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a coalition of landlords, appealed the dismissal of its application to quash a municipal residential rental licensing by-law enacted as a pilot project.

The appellant argued the by-law was arbitrary, enacted in bad faith, and ultra vires due to alleged violations of the Charter, the Residential Tenancies Act, and privacy legislation.

The Court of Appeal applied a deferential standard of review to municipal decisions and found the by-law was passed in good faith for valid health and safety purposes.

The court dismissed all constitutional and statutory challenges, concluding the by-law did not restrict marketing, permit unlawful entry, interfere with subletting, encroach on criminal law powers, or require disclosure of protected personal information.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences arising from a traffic stop.

He argued the stop and subsequent search were the result of racial profiling, violating his Charter rights, and that the trial judge erred in admitting the firearm under s. 24(2) despite finding a s. 10(b) breach.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the stop was based on driving behaviour, not racial profiling, and that the subsequent investigative steps were lawfully based on observations made during the stop.

The court found no error in the trial judge's Grant analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims of substantial interference with an easement and nuisance against the respondents, while granting a permanent injunction preventing parking in the right-of-way tunnel.

The respondents cross-appealed the scope of the parking injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the easement, application of the substantial interference test, or the tailored scope of the parking injunction.

The trial judge's costs award was also upheld.