Loretta P. Merritt

The appellants appealed an order striking portions of their statement of claim against the respondents, which included claims related to religious indoctrination at a private school.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there is no tort of religious indoctrination and that certain claims were non-justiciable.

However, the Court granted the appellants leave to amend their pleadings to clarify a theory of breach of fiduciary duty based on the respondents' alleged failure to educate the students in accordance with Anglican faith and values.

The Court also restored several paragraphs that had been struck for being redundant, irrelevant, or argumentative.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant was convicted of sexually assaulting the respondent.

The respondent subsequently brought a civil action for damages and successfully moved for summary judgment on liability based on the criminal conviction.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment and the dismissal of his cross-motion for production of the respondent's pre-assault medical records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the criminal conviction established prima facie proof of liability and the appellant raised no genuine issue for trial.

The Court also held that while the medical records were not privileged, the appellant had not established their relevance for production at this stage.

The applicant, a retired 63-year-old, was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received non-income weekly benefits until the insurer terminated them.

The applicant sought ongoing benefits under section 13 of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule, arguing he suffered a substantial inability to perform his essential tasks.

The arbitrator defined 'essential tasks' as activities connected to the ongoing business of living, excluding casual social activities and informal volunteering.

The arbitrator found that while the applicant's physical abilities were significantly modified initially, his condition had improved by October 6, 1992, such that he was no longer substantially disabled.

The applicant was awarded benefits for the closed period from November 11, 1991, to October 6, 1992, along with interest and arbitration expenses.

The employer applied to terminate the union's bargaining rights under section 60(2) of the Labour Relations Act, alleging the union failed to commence bargaining within 60 days of giving notice.

The union gave notice to bargain in July 1992 but did not pursue negotiations despite the employer's attempts to schedule dates.

The Board found the union's explanation of internal re-alignment unsatisfactory but noted the union continued to actively represent employees in grievances.

The Board exercised its discretion to order a representation vote.