Linda Lee Fuerst

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act to bring an action against Manulife Financial Corporation and its former executives.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the adequacy of Manulife's risk management practices and failed to disclose its massive unhedged exposure to equity market risk prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable possibility of success at trial, and certified the action as a class proceeding, certifying seven common issues.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a proposed class action for damages pursuant to s. 130 of the Securities Act.

The defendants consented to certification, except for the plaintiff's proposed class definition which included purchasers in the secondary market.

The court held that s. 130(1) of the Act does not provide a statutory cause of action to purchasers in the secondary market, and revised the class definition accordingly before granting certification.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action for secondary market misrepresentation sought leave to appeal a decision quashing their summonses to two Manulife employees and refusing to compel the defendants to file affidavits on the upcoming leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which followed established jurisprudence that defendants are not required to deliver affidavits or be subjected to cross-examination if they do not intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

The appellant, a former employee of a Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) member, appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) which upheld a ruling by Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS).

The OSC found that the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) were enforceable against the appellant for conduct that occurred during his employment, despite his subsequent resignation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it reasonable for the OSC to conclude that the TSE validly adopted the UMIR and that RS had jurisdiction to discipline former employees for misconduct committed while they were employed by a TSE member.

The corporation sought an order approving a proposed arrangement to collapse its dual-class share structure by purchasing for cancellation all outstanding Class B shares for consideration comprising 9 million newly issued Class A shares and US$300 million in cash.

The application judge approved the arrangement.

The opposing shareholders appealed, arguing the application judge erred in finding the arrangement fair and reasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the application judge correctly applied the BCE test.

The corporation was not required to demonstrate with certainty that the benefits of the arrangement would offset the costs, but only a reasonable prospect of clearly identified benefits.

The affirmative vote of the Class A shareholders was important evidence supporting the fairness of the arrangement.

The appellants appealed from a judgment granting summary judgment and dismissing a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there were triable issues regarding margin requirements, the respondent's conduct, and the 'Know Your Client Rule'.

The court also set aside the default judgment against one of the appellants, finding an arguable defence on the merits regarding undue influence and the respondent's obligation to ensure she understood the indemnity.

The appellants, a lawyer and his law firm, appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review.

They challenged the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) to reprimand the lawyer for allegedly making misleading statements while representing a client.

The appellants argued that such conduct must be dealt with exclusively through quasi-criminal proceedings or by the Law Society.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Securities Act provides the OSC with a flexible range of remedial options, including administrative reprimands under s. 127.

The Court also affirmed that the OSC has jurisdiction to reprimand lawyers acting in their professional capacity, provided that solicitor-client privilege is respected.

The applicants, a lawyer and his law firm, sought judicial review to prohibit the Ontario Securities Commission from continuing proceedings against the lawyer under s. 127(1) of the Securities Act.

The Commission alleged the lawyer made misleading statements in a letter during a prospectus review.

The applicants and the Law Society of Upper Canada argued the Commission lacked jurisdiction to discipline lawyers acting in a professional capacity, asserting such power belonged exclusively to the Law Society and that the Commission's exercise of it violated the independence of the bar.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that s. 127(1) applies to lawyers and that the Commission's public interest jurisdiction to control its processes does not usurp the Law Society's role or infringe the rule of law.