Leonard Ricchetti

The court sentenced Renzo Gomez for dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, following his guilty plea.

The facts established that Mr. Gomez drove at excessive speed, under the influence of alcohol, and with a history of prior driving offences, resulting in a fatal collision and serious injuries.

The court reviewed the impact on the victims and their families, the offender’s personal circumstances, and the applicable legal framework.

After considering aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a custodial sentence of 6 years for causing death (with a 16-year driving prohibition) and 4 years for causing bodily harm (with a 14-year prohibition), to be served concurrently, along with a DNA order.

The defendant, Franklin Kusi, brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude fentanyl evidence obtained from a vehicle search, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown argued the vehicle was "apparently abandoned" and the search was a lawful inventory search under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found the vehicle was "apparently abandoned" and the inventory search was authorized by law and conducted reasonably, thus no s. 8 Charter breach occurred.

Alternatively, if a breach did occur, the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the Grant factors favoured admission.

The defendant's Charter application was dismissed.

This criminal trial concerned charges of impaired driving causing death and bodily harm against Renzo Gomez, who had already pleaded guilty to dangerous driving.

The central issue was whether the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol.

Despite a high-speed collision, the smell of alcohol on the accused's breath, and a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) range of 53-105 mg/100ml, the court found reasonable doubt.

This was primarily due to expert evidence highlighting inter-individual variability in the effects of alcohol and the consistent testimony of three witnesses (a police officer and two paramedics) who observed no signs of impairment in the accused.

The court emphasized that a high BAC alone, especially below 100 mg/100ml, does not automatically prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt for criminal prosecution, and that such a threshold is a matter for Parliament.

The accused was acquitted of the impaired driving charges.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment to void the sale and mortgage transactions of two properties (Bradford and Caledon) previously owned by the plaintiff and sold under power of sale by the defendant Roy D'Mello and his companies.

The court found numerous "badges of fraud" and a strong prima facie case of sham or fraudulent transactions due to lack of documentation, questionable dealings, and evasive testimony from various defendants and related parties.

The court granted partial summary judgment, declaring the current ownership and mortgages on both properties void and directing the Registrar of Land Titles to restore the plaintiff as owner and discharge the fraudulent mortgages.

The plaintiff sought the continuation of an interim Mareva injunction against multiple defendants, alleging fraud and dissipation of assets.

The court found an overwhelming case of fraud by Stephen Lee Heimbecker and Nestig Inc., and a prima facie case of joint participation, willful blindness, or assistance in the fraud by Joanna Marie Heimbecker and Keystone Capital Inc. The court determined that irreparable harm would occur without the injunction and that the balance of convenience favored the plaintiff.

The court granted the interlocutory Mareva Order, including the release of certain frozen funds to the plaintiff.

The court rejected Joanna Marie Heimbecker's requests to open a new bank account for future employment income and to sell jewellery for legal expenses and tuition, citing a lack of complete and accurate financial disclosure and serious inconsistencies.

The court also declined to reduce the living expense exemption for the Heimbeckers at this stage but left open the possibility if disclosure issues persist.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment.

The court refused to hear the motion and temporarily stayed the action, citing the plaintiff's abusive conduct, which included unauthorized recording and posting of court proceedings, filing multiple duplicative actions across different jurisdictions, and improperly noting default against the defendant while a transfer motion was pending.

The court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process and ensure the efficient administration of justice.

The Respondent, Andrew Lambden, brought a motion for an interim order requiring the Applicant, Yessica Pamela Cevallos, to pay $30,000 as security for costs of the litigation.

The court found that the Applicant habitually resides outside Ontario and has no assets in Ontario, satisfying the preliminary onus under Rule 24(13)(a) of the Family Law Rules.

The court expressed serious reservations about the merits of the Applicant's spousal support claim, specifically regarding whether the parties continuously cohabited in a conjugal relationship for the statutory three-year period, citing significant interruptions in their cohabitation and the nature of their financial arrangements.

The court also noted the Applicant's inconsistent financial disclosure and inappropriate threatening statements made to the Respondent.

Despite the Applicant's submission that the order would prevent her from continuing the proceeding, the court found she had the ability to raise funds.

The motion for security for costs was granted in the amount of $20,000.

The applicant, Micheline Boutin, brought a motion to transfer and consolidate a civil proceeding commenced by the respondent, Victor Boutin, and his companies in Toronto with an existing family law proceeding in Brampton.

The Toronto proceeding alleged improvident sale of properties by the applicant, an issue previously addressed by the court as an adjustment to equalization in the family law case.

The court found that the Toronto proceeding's venue choice was unreasonable and that consolidation was desirable to avoid multiplicity of proceedings, promote expeditious resolution, and prevent inconsistent findings, given the substantial factual and legal overlap between the two cases.

This decision addresses multiple motions in a contentious family law dispute marked by the respondent husband's persistent non-compliance with financial disclosure and preservation orders.

The husband sought to vary existing preservation orders, obtain updated financial statements from the applicant wife, and release funds from a Receiver.

The wife sought orders compelling the husband's compliance with prior orders, the release of funds for property expenses, and further disclosure.

The court dismissed the husband's motion in its entirety, citing his long history of deliberate disregard for court orders, including unauthorized asset transfers and a lack of complete financial transparency.

The court granted the wife's urgent motion, ordering the husband to remit proceeds from an undisclosed property sale to the Receiver and directing the Receiver to obtain the relevant legal file.

Additionally, the court ordered the release of $180,000 from the Receiver's trust to the wife for the payment of outstanding expenses related to the matrimonial home and other jointly-owned properties.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the motor vehicle accident was an "inevitable accident" due to the defendant driver suffering a severe anaphylactic shock from an allergic reaction to naproxen (Aleve).

The plaintiff opposed, asserting that genuine issues of fact and credibility required a trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were complex and highly disputed factual issues, particularly regarding the timing of the anaphylactic reaction, the driver's potential negligence in taking a double dose of medication without reading instructions, and when unconsciousness occurred.

The court determined it could not make the necessary factual findings for a fair and just determination without a full trial, even with enhanced fact-finding powers.

The defendants, including Royal Bank of Canada, brought a motion to strike several claims (negligence, negligent investigation, defamation, breach of Charter rights, breach of statutory duty, conspiracy to breach statutory duty, interference with economic relations) and a motion for summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim.

The court dismissed all claims except malicious prosecution due to the expiration of the limitation period and failure to disclose a cause of action.

The defamation claim was also dismissed because it cannot be maintained by an estate trustee.

The court granted summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim, finding that the defendants had reasonable and probable cause to report the matter to the police and did not act with malice.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

This motion concerned the defendants' application to set aside a noting of default in a simplified procedure action.

The court reviewed the defendants' extensive and unexplained delays in filing a defence, noting a pattern of missed deadlines and a two-month delay in retaining new counsel after terminating previous counsel.

Despite the general preference for resolving disputes on their merits, the court found the defendants' conduct demonstrated "shocking laxity" and deliberate delay.

The motion to set aside the noting of default was dismissed, with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim on two grounds: failure to pay three separate cost awards and an alleged fraudulent conveyance by the plaintiff's executor.

The court found that the outstanding cost awards had been paid, and the issue of fraudulent conveyance could not be determined on a motion to strike as it required a trial.

The court also noted that the failure to pass accounts was subject to an appeal and thus could not be relied upon.

Consequently, the motion to strike was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions in a protracted five-year-old action involving alleged fraudulent mortgage enforcement and power of sale transactions.

The court first dealt with a recusal motion brought by the defendant, Mr. D'Mello, alleging conflict of interest and bias against the presiding judge.

The recusal motion was dismissed, with the court finding no evidence of bias and noting Mr. D'Mello's history of unsubstantiated bias claims and attempts to delay proceedings.

The court then largely granted the plaintiff's disclosure motion, ordering Mr. D'Mello and his corporations to provide answers to undertakings and refusals, and produce corporate and trust account records relevant to the alleged fraudulent transactions and piercing of the corporate veil.

Mr. D'Mello's cross-motion for disclosure was dismissed due to lack of supporting evidence and the plaintiff's prior responses.

The defendants by counterclaim, Robert Mammone and S.O.R.A. Real Estate & Insurance Ltd. o/a MIC Financial (the "Brokers"), moved for summary judgment to dismiss Mary Kosta-Cadas's counterclaim against them, arguing it was statute-barred by the applicable limitation period.

Mrs. Kosta-Cadas's claim was for contribution and indemnity in negligence, alleging the Brokers failed to ensure she understood and signed mortgage and renewal documents.

The central issue was the interpretation of section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, specifically whether the discoverability principle could cause the limitation period for an indemnity claim to start before the main action was served on the party seeking indemnity.

The court dismissed the Brokers' motion, holding that the limitation period for Mrs. Kosta-Cadas's indemnity claim commenced when she was served with the main action, not when she first became aware of potential issues with the mortgage.

This endorsement addresses a procedural conference concerning the unilateral cancellation of a motion date booked via Calendly.

The court emphasized that opposing counsel cannot unilaterally cancel a scheduled hearing date without consent, as per the Central West (CW) Notice to the Profession and Parties.

The judge clarified that the court relies on counsel's undertakings in Calendly regarding attempts to agree on mutually convenient dates, and that a consent from opposing counsel is not a prerequisite for booking a motion.

The court strongly condemned the abuse of the Calendly scheduling system, outlining various forms of misconduct, and warned of serious consequences, including cost awards or other sanctions, for non-compliance with scheduling rules and undertakings.

This motion concerned applications by the Dallas Defendants and Mangal Defendants to withdraw deemed admissions arising from their failure to respond to a Request to Admit from the Plaintiffs.

The court applied a three-part test, considering whether the proposed amendments raised a triable issue, if the admission was inadvertent, and if withdrawal would cause uncompensable prejudice.

The court found that the moving parties failed to establish a triable issue regarding property valuation, notice of power of sale, or Ms. Dallas's authority.

While counsel claimed inadvertence, the delay in bringing the motion after being alerted to the issue was unexplained.

Significant prejudice to the plaintiffs, including delays and costs, was identified.

The court also noted the moving parties' inconsistent positions on property valuation in a related proceeding.

Considering all circumstances, the motions to withdraw deemed admissions were dismissed.

The Plaintiffs brought a motion to find Shayna Dallas and 2697909 Ontario Inc. in contempt of court for failing to attend an examination in aid of execution and for failing to produce specified documents.

The court found that the contempt for non-attendance was purged by the subsequent payment of costs.

Regarding document production, despite skepticism about the completeness of disclosure, the court determined that the Plaintiffs did not meet the high burden of proving a "deliberate and flagrant breach" beyond a reasonable doubt.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to renewal on new evidence.

The Applicant Father sought the sale of the matrimonial home and an investment property due to significant financial burden.

The Respondent Mother opposed the sale of the matrimonial home and brought a cross-motion for child and spousal support.

The court ordered the immediate sale of both properties, finding that the financial situation necessitated the sales and that the Mother's opposition was not based on oppressive conduct or substantial prejudice.

The Mother's support motion was adjourned until after the property sales.

The plaintiff, Bradley J. Grant Investments Inc. (Grant), brought a motion for interim Mareva and Norwich orders against Nestig Inc. and Stephen Lee Heimbecker, along with other related parties.

Grant alleged a fraud exceeding $51 million, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty, claiming that Heimbecker induced advances for specific investments but failed to provide documentation or repay funds.

Heimbecker contended the relationship was a simple debt evidenced by promissory notes and denied fraud.

The court found Grant established a strong prima facie case of fraud, breach of trust, and/or breach of fiduciary duty, primarily due to Heimbecker's failure to disclose the use of advanced funds.

The court also found a serious risk of asset dissipation, noting Heimbecker's liquidation of assets (racehorses, farm, home) and potential relocation.

The interim Mareva injunction was granted to preserve assets, and the Norwich order was granted to compel financial institutions to disclose information, as Heimbecker was the only practical source and had refused disclosure.