Wade Morris

The appellants sought an application for prohibition to prevent a provincial offence prosecution under the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the prohibition application as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The motion judge granted the motion and dismissed the application.

The appellants appealed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that prohibition is a remedy for jurisdictional issues only, and the appellants' arguments were non-jurisdictional matters properly decided at trial in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appeal was dismissed with costs to the respondent.

This is an appeal concerning a fraudulent conveyance claim.

The appellant sought to enforce a default judgment against properties held in the name of the respondent's deceased wife, alleging a beneficial interest and fraudulent conveyance.

The trial judge found no fraudulent conveyance of real property but concluded that the respondent had a beneficial interest in cash transferred to his wife, which was used for mortgage payments, attributing half of the unexplained funds ($217,000) to fraudulent conveyances based on an adverse inference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge erred in attributing only 50% of the unexplained deposits to the respondent, as the adverse inference should have applied to the entire unexplained amount given the wife's failure to disclose sources.

The Court increased the amount of fraudulently conveyed cash to $434,000.

The appellant, Muhammad Jawaid, appealed a trial judgment in a mortgage action.

The appellant argued that he was not adequately informed about the scope of the trial, was denied procedural fairness, and that the trial judge's decision constituted a collateral attack on an earlier interlocutory order setting aside a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant was aware of the trial's scope, was not denied procedural fairness, and that an interlocutory order setting aside default judgment is not binding on a subsequent trial judge as it only determines procedure, not the rights of the parties.

The court found no error of fact or law in the trial judge's decision.

The plaintiff, Rosetta Conte, sought to enforce a 2010 default judgment against Gerald Pettle by claiming a beneficial interest in properties held by his deceased wife, Susan Pettle, and alleging fraudulent conveyance.

The court found no fraudulent conveyance of real property or resulting trust regarding the properties themselves, as they were always registered in Susan's name and Gerald did not contribute to the original purchase.

However, the court found that Gerald's cash transfers to Susan after the 2010 judgment constituted fraudulent conveyances of personal property under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, intended to defeat creditors.

The court attributed $217,000 of unidentified funds in Susan's accounts to these fraudulent transfers and declared them void against the plaintiff, allowing execution against Susan's estate.

The claim was not statute-barred as the two-year limitation period for personal property fraudulent conveyances ran from discovery, which occurred within two years of the action's commencement.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding her termination.

After her position became redundant, the parties agreed to ten weeks of working notice.

The employer breached this agreement after five weeks, alleging job abandonment, and the trial judge awarded the appellant the remaining five weeks' pay.

On appeal, the appellant argued the agreement lacked consideration and its breach constituted rescission entitling her to common law notice.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the agreement valid and the breach a repudiation rather than rescission, as the appellant had already received half the benefit of the contract.

The respondent moved to dismiss the applicant's application and notice of objection as statute-barred.

The applicant argued her prior filings constituted a "proceeding" within the limitation period or that she was self-represented and unaware of the need to issue an application.

The court found the limitation period began at the date of death or notice of objection, and that neither a notice of objection nor a notice of appearance constituted a "proceeding" under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also rejected the argument that the claims were solely for declaratory relief to avoid the limitation period.

The respondent's motion was granted, and the application was dismissed.

No costs were awarded due to the applicant's impecuniosity and the difficult result.

The 89-year-old applicant widow moved into an assisted-living facility and sought interim dependant's support from her late husband's estate under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The deceased's will provided her a life interest in a residence, but did not contemplate her need for assisted living.

The respondent residual beneficiary opposed the motion, citing a marriage contract waiver.

The court granted interim support of $4,635 per month from the estate, finding the applicant was a dependant and the deceased's intention was to provide for her accommodation expenses.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of two consolidated motions to disqualify counsel, Mr. Suvendu Goswami, for alleged conflicts of interest.

The court had initially recommended substantial indemnity costs but invited an apology from the applicants' lawyers and a request for partial indemnity.

Despite one lawyer's "paltry apology" and the other's refusal, the court ultimately awarded partial indemnity costs, acknowledging Mr. Goswami's acceptance of the apology.

The court also clarified that the two groups of applicants were complicit in the conduct justifying a punitive costs award, but the final award was based on normal principles due to the apology's acceptance.

The applicants in two related applications concerning the governance of a religious organization brought motions to disqualify the respondents' lawyer of record.

The applicants alleged that the lawyer was unfit to practice law, was a potential material witness, and had personal and client conflicts of interest.

The court dismissed the motions, finding no merit to any of the grounds for disqualification.

The court held that the lawyer's fitness to practice was not in issue, he was not a material witness, and he had no disqualifying conflicts of interest.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the respondents, noting that the applicants' lawyers had overreacted and made unfounded allegations.

Deloitte, a forensic expert, brought a motion for costs against Daniel Sherk for an outstanding account, following a prior ruling that established Sherk's responsibility for the balance.

Sherk had agreed to judgment for the amount owed but disputed the basis and quantum of costs.

The court found Sherk's opposition was not "reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous" to warrant substantial indemnity costs or sanctions.

The court awarded Deloitte costs on a partial indemnity basis, reducing the requested amount from $27,546.00 to $17,500.00, considering proportionality and Deloitte's failure to respond to Sherk's offer.

The defendant Daniel Sherk moved for the plaintiffs (Verge Insurance Brokers Limited et al.) to pay the total costs incurred by Deloitte Forensic Inc. for recreating, preserving, and analyzing 79 backup tapes.

The court reviewed previous orders by Quinn J. and Turnbull J., which stipulated that while Verge had an obligation to produce relevant documents from the tapes, Daniel's subsequent audit by Deloitte was generally at his own expense.

The court found that Verge had already paid for Deloitte's analysis of the initial 13 tapes as ordered by Turnbull J. due to Verge's initial non-compliance.

However, Daniel's motion for Verge to cover the additional costs for the remaining 66 tapes (approximately $280,000) was dismissed, with the possibility of rearguing these costs as disbursements at trial.

The court also denied Deloitte's claim for interest on the $67,613.99 already paid by Verge, as Deloitte had failed to cash the cheque promptly.

A case conference was held to resolve several procedural issues in an estates action.

The court set a schedule for an upcoming costs hearing and ordered the defendants to answer discovery questions they had improperly taken under advisement, noting that counsel's lack of instructions does not excuse failing to answer proper questions.

The court also set a timetable for the plaintiff's proposed motion to strike a new action commenced by the defendants, deferring issues regarding the deemed undertaking rule and a potential judicial bias motion.

In a supplementary endorsement, the court clarified a statement made in a previous endorsement regarding the defendants' counsel and his law clerk.

The court confirmed that the counsel had not sent his law clerk to appear before the court and that he committed no act of unprofessionalism.

The court noted that the plaintiff decided not to seek costs against the defendants' counsel under Rule 57.07 and encouraged the parties to focus on resolving the issues between the clients.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking several orders, including the exclusion of parties from examinations for discovery, the return of an insurance policy to the estate, the exclusion of the defendants' daughter from discoveries, and the striking of certain allegations from the defendants' affidavit material.

The court granted all relief sought by the plaintiff, finding compelling evidence to exclude parties from discoveries due to credibility concerns and ordering the return of the insurance policy.

The court also struck scandalous and irrelevant evidence from the defendants' affidavit.

Costs were reserved for later determination.

The court issued case management directions to compel the defendants to comply with previous orders for an accounting and production of documents in an estate litigation matter.

The defendants had repeatedly delayed and failed to comply with orders from 2012.

The court set strict deadlines for affidavits of documents, examinations for discovery, expert reports, and pre-trial conference memoranda, emphasizing that there would be no further delays.

The court also warned of potential striking of pleadings if non-compliance continued.

The defendants, Ludovico Minicucci and 2181860 Ontario Limited, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action by Windrock Associates Ltd. for a success fee of $97,350.

Windrock claimed the fee was owed under an agreement for advisory services related to the purchase of a one-half interest in real property, or alternatively, under quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

The defendants argued that the agreement contravened the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 (REBBA) because Windrock was not registered under the Act, and therefore, the claim for remuneration was barred.

The court found that Windrock's services were "in connection with a trade in real estate" and that the success fee, calculated as a percentage of the sale price and conditional on the transaction closing, gave Windrock a direct pecuniary interest in the sale.

Consequently, the court held that Windrock's claims under the agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment were all barred by section 9 of REBBA.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

Application and cross‑application concerning the validity of a life insurance change‑of‑beneficiary form executed shortly before the insured’s death.

The applicant sought a declaration that the 2011 form reallocating most of the insurance proceeds to her was valid, or alternatively rectification of the form.

The court held the form was not a valid declaration under the Insurance Act because the allocation percentages were altered after signing and the applicant failed to prove the insured signed the form as altered.

The court also found numerous suspicious circumstances surrounding the preparation of the document, rebutting the presumption that the insured knew and approved its contents.

The applicant failed to establish knowledge and approval or that the form reflected the insured’s true testamentary intentions.

Following a successful application for rectification of the Land Titles Register to reflect a historical right-of-way, the applicant sought costs.

The respondent argued that no costs should be awarded because the registration omission resulted from an administrative error and because the applicant had not previously provided notice of reliance on the right-of-way registered under the Registry Act.

The court rejected these submissions and held that the successful party was entitled to its costs.

The applicant’s bill of costs was found to be fair and reasonable and was granted.

The plaintiff sought costs of $26,318.02 on a partial indemnity basis after successfully defeating the defendants' motion to stay the action on jurisdictional grounds.

The defendants did not dispute entitlement but argued the quantum was excessive, suggesting a range of $10,000 to $14,000.

The court found the time expended by the plaintiff was excessive for a partial indemnity award and fixed costs at $21,000 all inclusive.