Suzy Kauffman

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 25.11 to strike out portions of the plaintiff's Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The plaintiff's claim alleged breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith contractual performance following the termination of his exclusive service contract.

The defendant argued that certain paragraphs were scandalous, irrelevant, or pleaded evidence rather than material facts.

The court granted the motion in part, striking out allegations relating to the defendant's treatment of other contractors and the termination of another employee, finding them irrelevant and prejudicial to the fair trial of the action.

However, the court refused to strike out paragraphs pleading the precise words of conversations on the day the plaintiff was told to leave the building, finding them relevant to the allegations of malice and bad faith.

This decision concerns a motion for judicial approval of a class action settlement and class counsel's legal fees in the Body Sealing Products action, part of a larger series of auto parts price-fixing class actions.

The plaintiffs sought approval of a $5.75 million settlement with the Nishikawa defendants, which also included cooperation.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, falling within the established 'zone of reasonableness' benchmarked against U.S. settlements.

Class counsel's request for a 25% contingency fee plus disbursements and taxes was also approved, consistent with prior jurisprudence on class action fee approvals.

The plaintiffs sought judicial approval of two settlement agreements in class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The first settlement with T.Rad was for $1,167,452, and the second with S-Y Systems was for $50,000.

The court found both settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting they fell within a zone of reasonableness.

The settlements and requested legal fees were approved.

Indigenous peoples from Ecuador obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation for environmental devastation caused by oil exploration.

After failing to enforce the judgment in the United States due to findings of fraud by the plaintiffs' counsel, they sought to enforce it in Ontario against Chevron Canada, a seventh-level subsidiary.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible under the Execution Act and that the corporate veil should not be pierced.

The appellants appealed, arguing both that the Execution Act permitted seizure of Chevron Canada's assets and that the corporate veil should be pierced in the interests of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits but reduced the costs award, recognizing the litigation as public interest litigation.

The Ecuadorian plaintiffs sought to enforce a judgment of approximately 9.5 billion dollars from an Ecuadorian court against Chevron Corporation and its subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited, in Ontario.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's affirmation of Ontario's jurisdiction to hear the enforcement action, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron and Chevron Canada, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims on the basis of separate corporate personality.

The plaintiffs appealed.

Chevron and Chevron Canada brought a motion for security for costs.

The court held that security for costs was warranted because the plaintiffs were ordinarily resident outside Ontario, had not demonstrated impecuniosity, and had not established a good chance of success on appeal.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that a new approach to security for costs should apply to foreign judgment enforcement actions, finding that comity does not require foreign litigants to be treated more favorably than domestic litigants.

The plaintiffs sought to enforce a US$9.5 billion Ecuadorian judgment against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada Limited.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against Chevron Canada, arguing it was a separate legal entity not liable for the judgment.

The plaintiffs argued Chevron Canada's assets were exigible under the Execution Act or that the corporate veil should be pierced.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the claim against Chevron Canada, finding the Execution Act does not override corporate separateness and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil absent allegations of wrongdoing by the subsidiary.

The plaintiffs also moved to strike Chevron's statement of defence.

The court struck defences relating to retroactive legislation and international law, but permitted defences alleging the Ecuadorian judgment was procured by fraud, bribery, and a denial of natural justice to proceed to trial.

This decision approves two class action settlements against Furukawa and Fujikura defendants for price-fixing in the automotive wire harness systems (AWHS) industry.

The court certified the class actions for settlement purposes, finding that the requirements of the Class Proceedings Act were met.

The settlements, for $2.3 million (Furukawa) and $1,083,280 (Fujikura), were deemed fair and reasonable and in the best interests of the class, based on detailed affidavit evidence from class counsel.

The court also approved class counsel's legal fees, calculated as a 25% contingency plus disbursements and taxes, consistent with retainer agreements and prior jurisprudence.

The defendants, Lubrizol Advanced Materials Canada, Inc. and Lubrizol Advanced Materials, Inc. (LZAM), sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for partial summary judgment.

The original motion concerned IPEX's claim to recover settlement funds paid in class actions related to defective Kitec Pipe, alleging breach of contract and contribution/indemnity from LZAM for supplying defective resin.

The court dismissed LZAM's motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, and no issues of public importance.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its motion to compel the respondent to seek answers and documents from its non-party insurers regarding their participation in a class action settlement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the request was overbroad and tantamount to requiring an affidavit of documents from a non-party.

The court held that the proper procedure for seeking such extensive production from non-parties is a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to preclude the defendants from advancing certain grounds in a second summary judgment motion that largely repeated arguments previously rejected by another motions judge.

The defendants argued that a renewed motion was justified in light of the Supreme Court of Canada’s clarification of the summary judgment framework in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Hryniak applies retroactively and does not permit parties to reopen prior summary judgment determinations where appeal routes have been exhausted.

The court also found that issue estoppel and abuse of process barred relitigation of the same issues, particularly where the alleged “new” evidence had been available at the time of the first motion.

The plaintiff’s motion was granted, limiting the scope of the defendants’ pending motion for summary judgment.

In a foreign judgment recognition and enforcement appeal, the Court held that an enforcing forum need not establish a real and substantial connection between itself and either the dispute or the judgment debtor.

The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that the foreign court issuing the judgment had proper jurisdiction under the real and substantial connection framework or traditional grounds.

The Court also held that traditional presence-based jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is established where the corporation carries on business in the province and is served there.

Questions about ultimate enforceability against related corporate entities were left for later procedural stages.

The defendant, AT Plastics Inc., sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its appeal of a Master's discovery ruling.

The Master had ruled that the plaintiff, IPEX Inc., was not required to answer certain questions or produce documents regarding its insurers' involvement in a prior $125 million class action settlement.

The court found reason to doubt the correctness of the decision, noting that the private insurance exception may have been incorrectly applied as a complete bar to obtaining relevant information from the insurers.

Finding the issue to be of general importance, the court granted leave to appeal.

Shareholders sought an order requiring the appointment of an auditor and the production of audited financial statements for certain fiscal years under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The applicants argued that a limitation period had not expired for the claim relating to audited financial statements for the 2011 fiscal year.

The court accepted that the limitation period for the 2011 claim had not expired but held that the application sought the appointment of an auditor rather than merely delivery of statements.

Because shareholders were aware by the statutory annual meeting deadlines that auditors had not been appointed, the limitation period for those claims began running in 2010 and 2011 and expired before the application was commenced in 2014.

The endorsement was revised only to clarify the limitation analysis, and the claims remained barred.

The corporate respondent requested that the Tribunal defer consideration of the applicant's human rights application pending the conclusion of a civil wrongful dismissal claim filed by the personal respondent against the corporate respondent.

The applicant opposed the deferral.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, finding that the legal issues in the two proceedings were distinct and there was no significant risk of inconsistent decisions of fact or law.

The appellants, indigenous Ecuadorian villagers, obtained a multi-billion dollar judgment in Ecuador against the respondent corporation for environmental pollution.

They brought an action in Ontario to recognize and enforce the judgment against the corporation and its Canadian subsidiary.

The motion judge found that Ontario had jurisdiction but stayed the action on his own initiative, finding the corporation had no assets in Ontario and the corporate veil of the subsidiary could not be pierced.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the stay, holding that the motion judge erred in granting an unrequested discretionary stay and prematurely deciding the merits of the enforcement action.

The Court dismissed the respondents' cross-appeal, confirming that a real and substantial connection between the subject matter of the litigation and Ontario is not required to establish jurisdiction for an action to enforce a foreign judgment.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment in an action regarding the supply of defective pipes.

The defendants argued the motion judge erred in interpreting supply agreements, limitation periods, and the effect of settlement conduct.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the issues were particular to the parties, did not raise conflicting decisions on matters of principle, and did not involve matters of broad public importance.

The applicant held debentures issued by the respondent and applied for an oppression remedy under the Business Corporations Act to prevent the respondent from converting the debentures to common shares.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked standing under the trust indenture.

The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The respondent brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing jurisdiction lay with the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, holding that the dismissal of the oppression application was an order made under the Act, and therefore the appeal must be heard by the Divisional Court.