Shelley Hallett

The appellant appealed his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence, arguing he should have been designated a long-term offender.

He also sought to adduce fresh evidence regarding his post-sentence treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly interpreted s. 753.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code as requiring a reasonable possibility that the risk posed by the offender will be controlled within the duration of the long-term sentence.

Given the appellant's pedophilia, cognitive limitations, and need for life-long pharmacological treatment, the trial judge did not err in concluding this criterion was not met.

The fresh evidence was not admitted as it would not have affected the result.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 13 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting a deceased witness's utterance, giving an inadequate instruction on post-offence conduct, and providing unbalanced written materials to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle in setting the parole ineligibility period.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for offences involving the use of a semiautomatic handgun against security guards at a nightclub.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by sentencing him on each count before dealing with Kienapple stays, and that the sentence was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge should have dealt with the stays first, but found no error meriting intervention.

The global sentence of 11 years was upheld as reasonable given the serious nature of the offences, emphasizing general deterrence.

The appellants were convicted of forcible confinement and possession of a prohibited weapon following a jury trial, having been acquitted of robbery, assault, and pointing a firearm.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge failed to properly relate the defence theory to the jury and erred in the W.(D.) instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the jury was properly instructed.

However, the sentence appeal of one appellant was allowed, as the trial judge erred in principle by sentencing him based on an assault for which he had been acquitted.

His sentence was varied to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction on several grounds, including a jury selection irregularity, the use of a co-accused's guilty plea as a prior inconsistent statement, restrictions on cross-examination regarding alleged police beatings, refusal to allow cross-examination of a witness on a KGB voir dire, and alleged improprieties in the Crown's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice or reversible error on any of the grounds raised.

The jury selection issue was a mere irregularity relieved by s. 670 of the Criminal Code, and the trial judge properly handled the evidentiary and procedural issues.

The appellant and the Crown both appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment, three years' probation, and a ten-year s. 161 order for internet luring.

The appellant had communicated explicitly with an undercover officer posing as a 13-year-old girl and was arrested at a pre-arranged meeting location.

The Crown sought to introduce fresh statistical evidence on youth internet usage, which the Court of Appeal rejected for failing the due diligence requirement.

The Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings, including the rejection of an expert's opinion that the appellant did not intend physical contact.

The Court concluded that a conditional sentence was inappropriate for this offence, and while the six-month sentence was lenient, it was not manifestly inadequate.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and sexual touching of a ten-year-old boy.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in his treatment of a dissatisfied juror, in his instructions on assessing the credibility of a child witness, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the juror or his jury charge regarding the child complainant's credibility, and concluding that the evidence reasonably supported the verdict.

The appellant was convicted of discharging a firearm with intent.

At trial, the appellant's girlfriend recanted her videotaped police statement implicating him, and then absconded before cross-examination before the jury.

The trial judge admitted the videotaped statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding necessity and threshold reliability.

The Court of Appeal upheld the admission, finding the trial judge correctly applied the legal criteria and that the transcript of the voir dire cross-examination adequately compensated for the inability to cross-examine before the jury.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon.

He argued that the trial judge erred in denying him an adjournment to obtain new counsel after he discharged his previous lawyer, and that the trial judge failed to provide the minimum assistance required for an unrepresented accused.

The Court of Appeal agreed on both grounds, finding that the trial judge erred in principle in denying the adjournment and failed to provide the necessary guidance to the unrepresented appellant, resulting in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising out of a home invasion.

At trial, two witnesses who had previously given videotaped statements to the police implicating the appellant recanted those portions of their statements.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the videotaping of the statements and the availability of the declarants for cross-examination provided sufficient threshold reliability, despite the absence of an oath or a KGB warning.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the proposed fresh evidence did not meet the Palmer criteria, specifically the due diligence and impact on the result requirements.

The court noted that trial counsel had made a tactical decision not to pursue the evidence.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which quashed the accused's conviction for sexual offences and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence without the benefit of the Court's reasons in R. v. Handy.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a significant commercial fraud involving the conversion of monies.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly instructed himself on the colour of right defence and correctly concluded the Crown proved its absence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the fraud required denunciation, particularly given the lack of restitution.

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud and his sentence of two years less a day.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended appraisal evidence, failed to consider his honest belief in the property's value, and erred in denying a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed the appraisals, correctly applied the elements of fraud, and imposed a demonstrably fit sentence given the breach of fiduciary duty and deliberate deception.

The appellant appealed his sentence and dangerous offender designation.

In light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Johnson, the Crown conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal set aside the dangerous offender finding and indeterminate sentence, and remitted the matter for a new sentence hearing pursuant to section 759(3)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for kidnapping.

He argued that proceeding with the charge in Ontario after a related charge was dismissed in Montreal was an abuse of process, that the trial judge erred in excluding evidence of the complainant's subsequent work as a prostitute, and that the Vetrovec warning was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no abuse of process, that the excluded evidence had no probative value, and that the Vetrovec warning was satisfactory.

The sentence was also found to be fit.

The appellant was convicted of robbery, assault causing bodily harm, kidnapping, and possession of a dangerous weapon after the victim was severely beaten.

At trial, the defence sought to cross-examine Crown witnesses on the theory that the beating was over a drug debt, based on police reports.

The trial judge ruled that defence counsel could only pursue this cross-examination if she provided substantive evidence of the drug debt theory, forcing the defence to call police officers as witnesses and lose the right to address the jury last.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge erred in law by requiring an evidentiary foundation rather than a good faith basis for the cross-examination.

The Court concluded the error fatally impacted the fairness of the trial and could not be saved by the curative proviso, allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence for the forceful sexual assault of a 13-year-old girl.

The trial judge had declined to impose a conditional sentence, finding that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence given the violence, threats, and profound impact on the complainant.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not manifestly excessive, despite the appellant's positive background and family support contributions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations involving an eight-year-old complainant.

The principal issue was whether evidence of two prior sexual assaults on young children was admissible as similar fact evidence.

The majority held that the trial judge set the admissibility threshold too low by framing the issue too broadly, relying on generic similarities, failing to account for significant dissimilarities and remoteness in time, and underestimating moral prejudice.

The probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after stabbing the complainant in a shower.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to instruct the jury on self-defence and by not admitting preliminary inquiry evidence under the principled approach to hearsay.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these grounds, finding no evidentiary basis for self-defence and noting the hearsay issue was not raised at trial.

However, the court found that convictions for both offences offended the rule against multiple convictions, staying the assault with a weapon conviction and affirming the aggravated assault conviction.