Kevin Wolf

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing his injuries fell outside the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) due to pre-existing rheumatoid arthritis, psychological impairments, and chronic pain.

The Tribunal found the applicant's rheumatoid arthritis was in remission and did not prevent maximal recovery.

The Tribunal preferred the respondent's expert evidence, concluding the applicant did not suffer from a psychological impairment or chronic pain syndrome that would warrant removal from the MIG.

The applicant's physical injuries were deemed predominantly minor.

The disputed treatment plans were deemed reasonable and necessary only up to the remaining MIG limits.

The applicant's claim for a special award was dismissed for failing to provide particulars.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, arguing his injuries, including chronic pain and a pre-existing knee condition, warranted removal from the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG).

The applicant passed away before the decision was rendered, but the Tribunal found the proceeding was not moot as a decision could impact deemed incurred expenses.

The Tribunal held that the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that his injuries fell outside the MIG, noting a significant 14-15 month gap in treatment and compelling medical evidence attributing his worsening pain to degenerative changes.

However, the Tribunal found the respondent failed to deny a February 2017 treatment plan within the required 10 business days under s. 38(8) of the Schedule, precluding it from relying on the MIG to deny that specific plan.

No interest was awarded.

The defendants moved to adjourn a lengthy personal injury trial arising from a 2014 motor vehicle accident, citing late service of expert reports and outstanding productions by the plaintiffs.

The court considered the principles for adjournment, including the objective of a just determination on merits and potential prejudice.

While some late reports for one plaintiff (Khadim) were not sufficient for adjournment, a recently served psycho-vocational report for the other plaintiff (Khan) indicating complete unemployability was deemed significant.

The court found that the defendants would be prejudiced if they could not adequately respond to this new evidence.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on trial scheduling, the motion to adjourn was granted to ensure a fair trial on the merits, vacating the fixed trial date.

This endorsement addresses the costs of two unsuccessful summary judgment motions brought by the Allan Star defendants and Ms. Samuel, which were dismissed due to genuine issues for trial regarding the plaintiff's credibility.

The plaintiffs sought $75,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendants proposed $30,000.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $55,000 in partial indemnity costs, payable two-thirds by the Allan Star defendants and one-third by Ms. Samuel.

The decision considered factors under Rule 57.01, including the result, stakes, complexity, parties' conduct, and the reasonable expectations of costs, noting that the defendants' own costs outlines were an objective indicator of what they could expect to pay.

The plaintiffs, George MacPherson and his minor daughter Sierra, brought an action for damages after George MacPherson suffered a serious back injury falling from a roof.

The defendants, including the homeowner (Samuel) and roofing contractors (Allan Star Roofing Ltd. and Ebrahim Khezri), moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

The court dismissed both summary judgment motions, finding that genuine issues requiring a trial existed, particularly concerning witness credibility regarding the provision of safety equipment and knowledge of unsafe conditions.

The court emphasized that it was not in the interest of justice to grant partial summary judgment due to the risk of duplicative proceedings and inconsistent factual findings, especially given the presence of a jury notice.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal order dismissing its motion for the production of the applicant's pre-accident bank records.

The insurer sought the records to investigate a potential material misrepresentation regarding the applicant's residence, which would affect entitlement to income replacement benefits.

The Vice Chair granted the reconsideration, finding that the Tribunal made significant errors of fact and law by concluding the records were only relevant to quantum and by accepting a lawyer's letter as sufficient evidence of 'best efforts' to obtain the closed account records.

The applicant was ordered to make written inquiries to the bank to obtain the records.

Following an arbitration where the insured was unsuccessful on all issues, the parties requested an expense hearing.

The parties subsequently agreed on the quantum of expenses.

The Arbitrator ordered the insured to pay the insurer's expenses fixed at $12,289.81, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, finding the agreed amount to be reasonable.

The Applicant was catastrophically injured when he lost control of an uninsured motorcycle.

The Insurer denied certain statutory accident benefits under s. 31(1)(a)(i) of the Schedule, arguing the Applicant had purchased the motorcycle that day and knew or ought reasonably to have known it was uninsured.

The Arbitrator found the Insurer failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the Applicant had purchased the motorcycle or that an ordinary rational person in his circumstances ought reasonably to have known it was uninsured.

The Arbitrator also admitted the testimony of the Applicant's cousin despite late disclosure, and admitted a discovery transcript from a related priority arbitration.

The preliminary issue was resolved in the Applicant's favour.

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision dismissing her claims for medical, caregiver, attendant care, and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the arbitrator erred in law by excluding a witness and a document disclosed shortly before the hearing, applying an incorrect causation test, and improperly weighing the medical evidence.

The Director's Delegate rejected the appeal, finding the arbitrator properly exercised his discretion to exclude late evidence to prevent trial by ambush, made reasonable credibility findings, and provided adequate reasons for preferring the respondent's medical evidence.

The appeal was restricted to questions of law, and no such errors were found.

The insurer brought a motion to adjourn the arbitration hearing to consolidate it with two other claims arising from the same alleged motor vehicle accident, which the insurer now claimed was staged.

The applicant opposed the adjournment, arguing prejudice due to the insurer's delay in raising the misrepresentation issue.

The arbitrator granted the adjournment sine die to allow for consolidation, noting the risk of diverging findings if the matters were heard separately.

To address the prejudice to the applicant caused by the late adjournment request, the arbitrator ordered the insurer to pay $5,000 in expenses thrown away, prohibited the filing of further evidence without leave, and made the new hearing dates peremptory to the insurer.

The appellant orthopaedic surgeon appealed a trial judgment finding him negligent in his post-operative treatment of the respondent's fractured femur.

The trial judge found the appellant breached the standard of care by scheduling a follow-up appointment six weeks later instead of monitoring the patient closely, which led to the femur healing in a deformed position requiring invasive surgery.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on standard of care, causation, and the assessment of damages for future loss of income.

The Respondent slipped and fell on ice at a pedestrian access point after parking and disembarking from her vehicle.

The Arbitrator initially found this constituted an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate rescinded the decision, finding that while the vehicle led the Respondent to the location, the injuries were sustained from a new and independent source (snow and ice).

The use or operation of the vehicle was not the direct cause of the injuries.

The parties appealed a master’s decision concerning defence medical examinations in a personal injury action involving a minor who sustained serious injuries after falling from an apartment window.

The master granted leave for a second motion and ordered the plaintiff to attend a defence neuropsychological assessment, with the plaintiff’s mother required to participate by questionnaire and interview.

The master refused to order an in‑home future care cost assessment by a nurse practitioner.

On appeal, the court held the master made no reviewable error, finding the neuropsychological assessment was justified to respond to the plaintiff’s expert evidence and that the second motion was not barred by res judicata or abuse of process.

The refusal to order the in‑home assessment was upheld because the proposed assessor was not a statutory “health practitioner” and the evidence did not demonstrate necessity.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits after slipping and falling on ice while traversing a snowbank immediately after parking and exiting her vehicle.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was compelled to park at the access point due to the snowbank and was still in the process of disembarking when she fell.

The use or operation of the vehicle was a dominant feature and direct cause of her injuries.

The preliminary issue was resolved in favour of the applicant.

The applicant sought a preliminary order to exclude several insurer's medical reports and prohibit their authors from testifying at an upcoming arbitration hearing.

The applicant argued that the insurer was not entitled to request further assessments under section 42 of the Schedule after having previously terminated income replacement benefits based on a WAD II diagnosis.

The arbitrator dismissed the motion, finding that an insurer has an ongoing right and obligation to assess a claim as it progresses, particularly when new medical information suggests the injuries may be more severe than initially diagnosed.

The exclusion of evidence was deemed an extraordinary remedy not justified in these circumstances.

The Applicant, injured in a motor vehicle accident, sought statutory accident benefits and applied for arbitration.

At a pre-hearing, the Applicant requested an order for the production of particulars related to surveillance conducted by the Insurer, regardless of whether the Insurer intended to rely on it at the hearing.

The Arbitrator, bound by a previous appeal decision, held that the Insurer is not obligated to disclose surveillance evidence unless and until it decides to rely upon it at the arbitration hearing.

The request for production was denied.

The applicant was injured when he tripped over a raised hump of asphalt in the roadway after disembarking from a bus that had stopped in a traffic lane rather than at the designated bus stop.

The insurer denied his claim for statutory accident benefits, arguing the incident was not an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the use and operation of the bus was the dominant feature in the incident and a direct cause of the injuries, as the applicant was compelled to exit onto the roadway and was still in the process of disembarking when he fell.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was injured as a result of an accident.

The applicant was injured when he tripped on a raised hump of asphalt in the roadway after disembarking from a TTC bus that had stopped on the roadway instead of the bus bay.

The insurer denied his claim for statutory accident benefits, arguing the incident was not an 'accident' under section 2(1) of the Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the use and operation of the bus was the dominant feature in the incident and a direct cause of the applicant's injuries, as he was compelled to exit onto the dark roadway and was still in the process of disembarking when he fell.

The arbitrator concluded the applicant was injured as a result of an accident.

In a pre-hearing decision regarding a claim for statutory accident benefits, the insurer sought production of the applicant's bank statements from one year prior to the accident to date to verify post-accident income.

The arbitrator dismissed the request, finding that the amount of the weekly income replacement benefit was not in dispute and the insurer had no evidentiary basis to suspect the applicant was employed during the disputed period.

The arbitrator concluded that ordering production based on speculation alone would be unnecessarily intrusive and contrary to the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

The appellant appealed an Arbitrator's decision dismissing his claim for statutory accident benefits and ordering him to pay half of the insurer's arbitration expenses.

The central issue at arbitration was whether the appellant was injured on a TTC bus or a subway train, with the Arbitrator finding his uncorroborated evidence inconsistent and unreliable.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate refused to admit new medical evidence and found no errors of law in the Arbitrator's credibility findings, application of the burden of proof, rejection of the estoppel argument, or award of expenses.

The appeal was dismissed and the appellant was ordered to pay $500 in appeal expenses.