Judith Parker

The defendants, a police detective and the Crown, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for negligent investigation.

The plaintiff, a former police officer, alleged that the detective lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for domestic violence offences and relied on unreliable complainants.

The court found that the detective conducted a comprehensive investigation, consulted with supervisors and the Crown, and met the standard of care of a reasonable police officer.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed, as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff abattoir sued the provincial government for negligence, trespass, and conversion arising from the 19-month suspension of its licence and detention of meat products following an investigation into the processing of uninspected and dead animals.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the provincial regulator did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiff, as its statutory mandate was to protect public health.

Even if a duty existed, the regulator did not breach the standard of care given the extraordinary circumstances of concurrent criminal investigations, nor did its actions cause the plaintiff's business losses.

Mediamix Interactive Inc. appealed a Master's order that upheld the refusal of Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario to produce nine redacted slides from a 24-slide PowerPoint presentation, on the basis of solicitor-client privilege.

Mediamix argued the Master erred in finding privilege and in not finding a waiver of privilege by the disclosure of the other 15 slides.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master correctly determined the redacted slides were protected by solicitor-client privilege and that no waiver occurred, as the disclosed slides were not privileged.

The court affirmed that disclosing non-privileged portions of a document does not waive privilege over genuinely privileged parts.

The defendant requested the dismissal of the proceeding under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff, who appeared to be an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument Litigant, failed to respond to the court's notice.

The court found the claim incomprehensible and lacking any basis, and dismissed the proceeding as an abuse of process.

The moving party, a self-represented litigant previously declared a vexatious litigant in three separate orders, sought leave to bring a motion to reinstate his appeals after they were dismissed for delay.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the moving party failed to perfect the appeals despite being capable of filing voluminous materials.

The court further held that the underlying appeals were entirely devoid of merit and that the interests of justice would not be served by permitting the matter to proceed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's actions, the successful defendants sought costs.

The self-represented plaintiff also sought costs despite being entirely unsuccessful.

The court denied the plaintiff's request and awarded costs to the defendants, noting the plaintiff's unrelenting and vengeful pursuit of doomed litigation.

The court balanced the plaintiff's conduct with the need for costs to be fair, reasonable, and proportionate, awarding $9,500 to the Queen and $3,500 to the defendant Ramage.

The moving party, a declared vexatious litigant, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a supplementary notice of appeal and for case management directions.

The moving party had improperly combined appeals of three vexatious litigant declarations and a dismissed application into a single notice of appeal without obtaining the required leave for the application appeal.

The Court of Appeal struck the application appeal without prejudice for failing to obtain leave under section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

However, recognizing the moving party's clear intention to appeal the vexatious litigant declarations, the Court granted an extension of time to file separate notices of appeal for those orders.

The request for case management was dismissed.

The appellants, owners of private cottages on leased land in a provincial park, appealed a decision declaring them obligated to pay a portion of the grant in lieu of taxes paid by the Crown to the municipality under the Municipal Tax Assistance Act.

The appellants argued that prior lease agreements and correspondence constituted an agreement exempting them from this obligation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that no such agreement existed and affirming the Crown's right to enforce its statutory rights following a change in taxation policy.

Applicants who held private cottage interests on Crown land in a provincial park sought a determination that they were not obliged to reimburse the Crown for payments in lieu of municipal taxes.

The court held that s. 4(3) of the Municipal Tax Assistance Act created a statutory debt owed by tenants unless the parties had agreed otherwise, and no such agreement existed on the evidence.

The lease documents preserved the tenants' liability for taxes, rates, duties and assessments, and no implied variation could arise contrary to the written agreements.

The court also rejected waiver, promissory estoppel, and laches, finding no clear abandonment of rights, no representation altering legal relations, and no detrimental reliance.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his claim without leave to amend and dismissing his action for malicious prosecution and other claims.

He also sought an adjournment and to admit fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment and fresh evidence application, finding the evidence irrelevant.

The Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that the claim was fatally flawed, raised allegations beyond the limitation period, and sought damages for non-existent causes of action.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a defamation action against a conservation officer and the Crown after the officer left a voicemail for the plaintiff's client stating that the plaintiff was 'pretty much incompetent' and had 'mishandled grossly' the client's case.

The defendants conceded the statement was defamatory but argued the defence of qualified privilege.

The court found that the officer did not have a moral duty to make the call, and thus the occasion was not protected by qualified privilege.

Furthermore, even if privilege applied, the officer exceeded its scope by making gratuitous comments about the plaintiff's competence.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's Second Amended Statement of Claim, which alleged malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and various other torts against numerous police officers and Crown attorneys.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, also sought to rely on a Draft Fresh as Amended Claim.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, and constituted an improper collateral attack on the plaintiff's prior criminal convictions.

Leave to amend the claim was denied.

The appellant, a non-party to the proposed action, appealed an order directing it to produce certain documents to the respondent.

However, the documents were produced before the appeal was launched, rendering the appeal moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, noting that the issue was not one that would evade appellate review in the normal course and that the order under appeal was discretionary based on specific facts.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.