Jordan Rowland Douglas Lester

The applicant, The Corporation of the Township of Nipigon, sought a declaration that its Municipal Accommodation Tax By-law 1940 was properly enacted and that the respondents were in contravention of its terms.

The applicant also sought payment of outstanding municipal accommodation tax amounts.

The respondents argued that they should be compensated for the costs of collecting and remitting the tax.

The court found that the by-law was properly enacted pursuant to the Municipal Act, 2001, and that no statutory provision required the municipality to compensate businesses for tax collection efforts.

The court granted the application and ordered the respondents to pay the outstanding amounts plus costs.

The court considered costs following a summary judgment motion in a copyright dispute between the Lakehead District School Board and Anna Mauro o/a 807 ISC Thunder Bay.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing complete success and an entitlement to elevated costs.

The court found the plaintiff was not wholly successful, as punitive damages were not awarded and no valid Rule 49 offer was served.

The court determined the claimed costs were excessive and not proportional, ultimately awarding the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $8,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment brought by Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute.

The court found that the motion did not advance the litigation and that the issues, including the right to set off and the meaning of the contract, required a trial.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce the notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management going forward.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by Caroline Manon Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute involving Browns Clearwater West Lodge Inc. and related parties.

The court found that the motion did not meet the criteria for partial summary judgment, as it would not make the litigation cheaper, faster, or avoid inconsistent findings.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce a notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management issues.

The appellant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, appealed a summary judgment order that awarded the respondent, Karen Dufault, damages for wrongful dismissal.

The core issue was the enforceability of termination clauses in an employment contract under the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the "for cause" termination clause was unenforceable because its definition of "cause" was broader than the ESA's narrow exception for "wilful misconduct." Applying the principle from Waksdale v. Swegon North America Inc., the court held that the invalidity of the "for cause" clause rendered all termination provisions in the contract unenforceable, even though the respondent was terminated without cause.

The appeal was dismissed, upholding the original award of damages.

The Lakehead District School Board (the Board) brought a motion for summary judgment against Anna Mauro, operating as 807 ISC Thunder Bay, alleging copyright and moral rights infringement.

The Board claimed Mauro produced and sold clothing featuring names, mascots, logos, and colour schemes of its schools without authorization.

Mauro argued the works were not registered, not original, and her designs were sufficiently different.

The court found that copyright subsisted with the Board, was infringed by Mauro, and granted declarations, a permanent injunction, delivery up of infringing works, and damages representing disgorgement of profits.

The Board's claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Lori Van Santvoort-Jansekovich, sued the estate of her mother's former husband, John ("Jack") Lundstrom, for unjust enrichment, seeking $469,164.05 in restitution for alleged unpaid services.

Lori claimed she provided extensive property management and business services to Jack from 1991 to 2004, based on an oral agreement that she would inherit a quarter of his estate.

The court found Lori's claims of work exaggerated and untruthful, and that she had been adequately compensated by 22 years of rent-free housing, the gifting of a house, and free accommodation and meals.

The court also concluded that no agreement to make Lori a beneficiary was proven, that the claim was statute-barred, and barred by the doctrine of laches due to significant delay and the loss of crucial witness evidence (Jack's testimony).

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of $25,358.33 after successfully obtaining a summary judgment of $157,071.57.

The plaintiff had made a Rule 49 Offer to Settle for $120,000, which was less than the judgment amount.

The defendant made no offer to settle and refused mediation.

Despite the plaintiff's entitlement to substantial indemnity costs due to the Rule 49 offer, the court found the plaintiff's bill of costs excessive given the procedural simplicity of the matter, lack of factual disputes, and minimal time required.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $6,500, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff sought summary judgment for wrongful dismissal from a fixed-term employment contract, arguing the termination clauses were unenforceable under the Employment Standards Act (ESA).

The court found the 'for cause' clause violated the ESA by using a common law standard broader than the statutory exemption and allowing withholding of statutory pay.

The 'without cause' clause also contravened the ESA by limiting compensation to base salary and asserting absolute termination discretion.

Consequently, the termination clauses were deemed unenforceable, and the plaintiff was awarded damages for the unexpired term of the fixed-term contract, consistent with the principle that fixed-term contracts without enforceable early termination provisions obligate payment for the full term.

The applicant, Brown’s Clearwater West Lodge Inc., brought two motions: one to consolidate two related actions (a share purchase action and a mortgage action) and another to set aside default judgments obtained by the respondent, Caroline Manon Labonte, in the mortgage action.

The court granted both motions, finding that the default judgments were irregularly obtained and should be set aside as of right without imposing terms.

The court also found that consolidation was appropriate given the interwoven issues and common questions of fact and law stemming from the same share purchase agreement, promoting judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The appellant, Robert Collette, appealed a motion judge's order that, while striking out most claims under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, allowed a claim for harassment and intentional infliction of emotional harm to proceed.

The core issue on appeal was whether a successful s. 137.1 motion requires dismissal of the entire action or permits dismissal of only specific claims.

The Court of Appeal found that, based on the motion judge's finding that the entire action was motivated to silence public interest expression, the entire action should have been dismissed.

The appeal was allowed, and the entire action was dismissed.

This appeal concerned a dispute over the purchase price of a property.

The appellant (vendor) claimed the agreed price was $80,000, while the respondent (purchaser) asserted it was $40,000, which he had already paid.

The trial judge found in favour of the purchaser, interpreting the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) contextually.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's contextual interpretation of the contract, consistent with the principles set out in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., and deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact and assessment of evidence.

The plaintiff, Finn Way General Contractors Inc., brought a motion seeking leave to admit a late-served expert report concerning construction delays and costs.

The defendant, Lakehead University, opposed the motion, arguing the report was served late and that expert opinion evidence was unnecessary.

The court found a reasonable explanation for the late service and no prejudice to the defendant.

However, the court ultimately dismissed the motion, ruling that the expert report was not necessary to assist the trier of fact, as its observations were conclusions lacking discernible analysis and usurped the role of the trial judge.

The appellants, Robin and Jennifer Lacey, appealed a decision dismissing their application for declaratory relief and a Writ of Possession concerning a 99-year lease held by the respondent, Kakabeka Falls Flying Inc., over a portion of their property.

The appellants argued the lease violated the Planning Act.

The application judge found the lease commenced prior to May 2, 1968, thus exempting it from the Planning Act's subdivision prohibition, and that the appellants' claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld these findings, dismissing the appeal and awarding costs to the respondent.

This motion concerned an application for security for costs on appeal, brought by the respondent (Gauthier Estate) against the appellant (White) pursuant to Rule 61.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying appeal stemmed from a dispute over a real estate agreement of purchase and sale.

The moving party argued for security based on the appeal being frivolous/vexatious, an unpaid costs order, and low prospects of success coupled with difficulty in collecting costs.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous/vexatious and the paid costs order was insufficient on its own.

However, the court granted the motion, finding a low prospect of success on appeal and compelling evidence that it would be nearly impossible to collect costs from the appellant, citing his illiquid assets and history of non-payment of prior costs and mortgage obligations.

Security for costs was ordered in the amount of $15,000, and the appeal was stayed until payment.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) brought a motion for direction regarding the return of property purchased by Kristina Munson, former attorney for property for Jean Cherneyko, and third parties (Munson's father and common-law partner) using Cherneyko's funds.

A previous court order had terminated Munson's power of attorney and ordered her to repay over $334,000.

The PGT argued that the "doctrine of knowing receipt" applied to the third parties who received property purchased with these funds.

The court found the doctrine applicable, obliging the third parties to return the property or its value, even if initially received innocently, as they were now aware of the breach of trust.

This case involved a dispute over a real estate transaction where the plaintiff sought specific performance and the defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and conversion of a trailer.

The parties had an informal agreement for the sale of property for $40,000, which the plaintiff paid in installments and began renovations.

The transaction failed to close due to the defendant's later assertion that the price was $80,000, influenced by an unexpected mortgage amount.

The court found the defendant's claim of an $80,000 purchase price incredible and dismissed the counterclaim regarding the trailer due to insufficient evidence.

The court ordered specific performance, vesting title in the plaintiff.

The applicants, Robin and Jennifer Lacey, brought an application seeking declarations that a 1968 lease held by Kakabeka Falls Flying Inc. (KFFI) was void ab initio due to contravention of the Planning Act, and sought mandatory orders for possession of the land.

KFFI argued the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, barred by laches, and that the lease was valid due to part performance and proprietary estoppel.

The court found the applicants' claims (except for property taxes) were statute-barred as they had knowledge of their claim in 2010 but did not commence the application until 2017, and they sought consequential relief, negating the no-limitation period for declarations.

The court also found the claims barred by laches due to the applicants' delay and acquiescence (accepting rent).

Furthermore, the court found persuasive evidence of an oral lease and part performance prior to the Planning Act changes, and that proprietary estoppel applied given the applicants' knowledge of the lease upon purchase and their acceptance of rent.

The application for declaration and possession was dismissed, and the discrete issue of property taxes was converted to an action to proceed to trial.

The Plaintiff brought a motion to strike portions of the Defendant's Statement of Defence and Counterclaim, arguing they disclosed no reasonable cause of action (Rule 21.01(1)(b)) or were scandalous, frivolous, and/or vexatious (Rule 25.11(b)).

The Defendant sought leave to amend its pleading to incorporate an abuse of process claim.

The court found that the Defendant failed to properly plead the essential elements of the tort of abuse of process, specifically lacking special damages.

As a result, the Plaintiff's motion to strike certain paragraphs, including a claim for punitive damages based on abuse of process, was granted, and the Defendant's proposed amendments related to the abuse of process claim were denied.

The Plaintiff was deemed the successful party on the motions and entitled to costs.