John D. Bonn

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a 93-year-old resident of a long-term care facility between October 31, 2012 and October 7, 2015.

The complainant did not testify due to advanced age and frail health.

The Crown sought to introduce hearsay statements made by the complainant to facility staff on October 5-6, 2015 and a videotaped statement to police on October 7, 2015.

The trial judge conducted a blended voir dire/trial to determine the admissibility of these out-of-court statements under the reliability criterion established in R. v. Khelawon and R. v. Youvarajah.

The court found that none of the statements met the threshold reliability test due to significant concerns about the complainant's mental capacity, confusion, and lack of adequate substitute for cross-examination.

The plaintiff sought an order to use a pseudonym in a claim involving historic sexual abuse, citing concerns of irreparable harm and psychological injury if their identity were disclosed.

The court determined that such an order constitutes a form of publication ban and is a discretionary order in civil proceedings, unlike the mandatory nature in certain criminal cases.

The court directed that before the relief could be considered, notice of the request must be given in accordance with Part V of the Court’s Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction, and the motion should be scheduled for an open court hearing.

The plaintiff insurance brokerage sought an interim interlocutory injunction restraining former employee producers and their new employer from soliciting or dealing with certain customers pending a full motion hearing.

The court applied the three‑part test from RJR–MacDonald for interlocutory injunctions.

While there appeared to be a strong prima facie case against one former employee, the evidence against the others was largely speculative, and the alleged harm was found to be quantifiable through damages given the nature of the brokerage business.

Considering the balance of convenience, delay by the plaintiff, and the availability of undertakings proposed by the defendants, the court declined to grant the requested interim injunction and instead accepted undertakings pending the return of the motion.

At a preliminary inquiry into the death of Shane Stone, the Crown sought committal of three accused on charges of second degree murder.

The victim was beaten to death in the accused's bedroom on January 2, 2013.

One accused conceded committal.

The court found sufficient evidence to commit the other two accused to trial on second degree murder, with one accused also facing charges of accessory after the fact and robbery.

The decision turned on circumstantial evidence including DNA findings, forensic evidence, witness testimony, and cell phone records establishing presence and participation in the assault.

The Crown applied to admit evidence of prior discreditable conduct by two of the accused relating to an assault on November 23, 2011, to support a committal on a charge of second degree murder.

One accused conceded committal, but the other objected.

The court found that while some similarities existed between the prior assault and the charged offence, most were generic in nature and present in countless assault cases.

The court held that the probative value of the similar fact evidence was limited and did not outweigh the risk of prejudice.

The Crown's reasoning essentially sought to establish that the accused was the "type of person" who commits serious assaults, which is prohibited reasoning.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant purchased a property at a tax sale and claimed a prescriptive right or easement to use a well located on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the appellant's use of the well was governed by a time-limited well-sharing agreement registered on the respondent's title, which expired in 2010.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, confirming that the non-registration of the agreement on the appellant's title did not render it ineffective and that the express permission in the agreement precluded any prescriptive rights.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages against the municipal employer but failed against several individual defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter because the judgment exceeded the offer.

The court assessed reasonable hourly rates for counsel and reduced excessive paralegal time and rates while disallowing law clerk administrative costs.

The successful individual defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs for their defence.

A Sanderson order was granted requiring the municipal defendant to pay the costs of the successful individual defendants given the unusual and confusing factual circumstances that justified joining all defendants in the action.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his tort claim for negligent misrepresentation against the respondent.

The appellant had advanced mortgage funds on a property and alleged the respondent made a negligent representation regarding the property's consideration in a deed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the evidence showed the appellant did not rely on the representation when deciding to advance the monies.

The appeal was dismissed.