Jessica Gagne

The applicant brought a motion regarding an international child abduction claim.

The court noted that the Children's Lawyer had not been notified and a first meeting had not been held, as required by the Family Law Rules.

Given the issues of credibility and the need for expert evidence on foreign law, the court adjourned the motion, ordered the involvement of the Children's Lawyer, and scheduled a trial of the issues.

The appellant, a kin caregiver for a First Nations child, appealed an order dismissing a child protection proceeding and denying her motion to be added as a party.

The motion judge had dismissed the proceeding based on a customary care agreement signed by the biological parents, the child's aunt, the First Nation, and the Children's Aid Society, which excluded the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant met the statutory definition of a 'parent' under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and was entitled to party status.

The Court further held that the proceeding could not be dismissed on consent without the appellant's participation and a proper analysis of the child's best interests.

The appellant father appealed a trial judge's order placing one child in extended Society care and two children in the custody of their paternal aunt.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the test for care and custody under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and made evidentiary errors regarding treatment records, hearsay evidence, and case notes.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding errors or errors in principle in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed, subject to a consent variation regarding access.

The appellant children's aid society appealed an order granting the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness disclosure of child protection records.

The Minister sought the records to make submissions under s. 50(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act regarding a pending removal order against the respondent mother.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister had a legitimate interest in determining whether a genuine lis existed in the child protection proceedings, and that the Ontario Court of Justice had jurisdiction under the Family Law Rules to order disclosure to a non-party to ensure a fair procedure.

The court also rejected arguments that the motion judge demonstrated bias during a case conference.

The appellant mother sought continued access to her two-year-old child who was placed in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

The trial judge granted access at the society's discretion, applying a broad best interests analysis under the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The appeal judge overturned this decision, applying the restrictive test from the predecessor legislation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal and restored the trial judge's order, holding that the CYFSA fundamentally changed the access test to a holistic best interests analysis, which properly includes consideration of future benefits such as access to medical information.

The mother appealed a trial judge's decision finding her child, who has Down Syndrome, in need of protection and making him a Crown ward without access.

The appeal was allowed.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred by failing to hold a bifurcated hearing, improperly admitting disposition evidence during the protection phase.

Furthermore, the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors by failing to consider evidence supporting the mother's position and by finding the child was at risk of physical and emotional harm without sufficient evidence, including a lack of expert evidence regarding emotional harm.

The court ordered the child to be returned to the mother's care.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society apprehended a two-year-old child from non-biological caregivers who had cared for the child since birth.

The biological mother, who has profound hearing loss and other impairments, had placed the child with them.

The biological father, who is also hearing impaired, was largely kept out of the child's life by the caregivers.

The Society, the father, the maternal grandmother, and the caregivers all proposed plans for temporary care and custody.

The court found that the caregivers did not have legal 'charge' of the child prior to apprehension, as they had established their status quo by extra-legal means and by taking advantage of vulnerable parents.

The court ordered that the child be placed in the temporary care and custody of the biological father, finding it in the child's best interests.

On a motion to set aside portions of a default final family law order, the court applied the default judgment set-aside principles and held the moving party acted promptly, provided an adequate explanation for the default, and showed arguable merit on custody and child support.

The court emphasized that sole custody had been granted on an uncontested basis without a sufficient best-interests record and that the support order may have exceeded the relief claimed and overstated income.

The interests of justice favoured allowing participation in the proceeding, particularly given the age of the children, the ongoing dispute about parenting arrangements, and the potential prejudice arising from equalization claims.

Paragraphs dealing with custody and child support were set aside, enforcement was halted, and the moving party was permitted to file responding materials.