James Patrick Coulter

The accused was charged with six counts of sexual abuse against a child complainant: two counts of invitation to sexual touching, two counts of sexual interference, and two counts of sexual assault.

The Crown alleged that the accused, who was in a relationship with the complainant's mother and living in the home, sexually abused the child on multiple occasions in the bathroom and principal bedroom when the mother was at work.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and reliable on the core elements of the abuse, rejected the accused's evidence as not credible, and found that DNA evidence (semen on the complainant's underwear) corroborated the complainant's account.

The accused was found guilty on all six counts.

The accused brought Charter applications challenging the lawfulness of General Warrants and Search Warrants executed in a drug trafficking investigation.

The General Warrants, issued for covert surveillance of two residential locations, failed to include the statutorily required notice provision under section 487.01(5.1) of the Criminal Code, constituting a facial invalidity and breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Search Warrants were subsequently obtained using information derived from the facially invalid General Warrants.

The court found that while the General Warrants were facially invalid due to the missing notice provision, the Search Warrants could otherwise have been issued based on the totality of the evidence, including amplified tracking data.

The court also addressed allegations of arbitrary detention and breach of the right to counsel.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the Charter applications, finding that despite the breaches, the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under the section 24(2) analysis.

The applicant brought a motion to determine the timing of an application to declare section 172.1 of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The applicant sought relief under section 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The court dismissed the motion and determined that the constitutional challenge should be heard after the conclusion of the trial, if necessary.

The court applied the two-policy framework from R. v. DeSousa, which discourages fragmentation of criminal proceedings and requires a factual foundation for constitutional challenges.

The appellant, Vernon Terwilligar, appealed his convictions for child luring and making child pornography, and sought leave to appeal a sentence order under section 161 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence and upholding the search warrant’s breadth.

The court also upheld the section 161 order, holding that such orders are available even where the “child” is an undercover officer, as the protective purpose of the provision is best served by a purposive interpretation.

The defendant, facing impaired driving charges, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained by police.

The application alleged unreasonable delay in administering a Standard Field Sobriety Test (SFST) and an unlawful vehicle search, arguing breaches of sections 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(c) of the Charter.

The court found that the delay in administering the SFST was reasonable due to a public safety distraction involving an irate third party.

While acknowledging an unlawful vehicle search occurred, the court determined that no evidence from that search was relevant to the impaired driving charges.

Consequently, the court denied the application to exclude the evidence, finding no Charter breach regarding the impaired driving investigation.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for aggravated sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his mens rea analysis by requiring evidence of the complainant's communication of non-consent, which was irrelevant given that no defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was raised.

This legal error materially impacted the acquittal.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, entered a conviction for aggravated sexual assault, and remitted the matter for sentencing before a different judge.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for an offence under s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes agreeing or arranging to commit enumerated sexual offences against a person believed to be under a certain age.

The respondent had communicated with an FBI agent posing as a mother of young girls, discussing sexual acts and travel arrangements.

The trial judge acquitted, finding the Crown failed to prove the respondent intended to follow through with the plan, characterizing the communications as fantasy role-play.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in interpreting the mens rea, clarifying that the mens rea is the intent to agree, not the intent to carry out the underlying offence.

The court further clarified that the actus reus requires a "true consensus" or genuine agreement on the part of the accused, even if the other party is an undercover officer.

As the trial judge's reasons were unclear on whether the actus reus was proven under the correct legal test, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on the relevant count.

The accused, J.U., brought an application to exclude evidence (firearms and a crossbow) seized from his matrimonial home, alleging a breach of his Section 8 Charter right against unreasonable search and seizure.

Police entered the shared home at the invitation of J.U.'s estranged wife, A.U., and seized firearms found in J.U.'s private bedroom, gun cabinets, basement, and garage without a warrant.

The Crown conceded a Charter breach but argued for admission under Section 24(2).

The court found that A.U. could not waive J.U.'s privacy rights in his private areas or jointly owned items, and no exigent circumstances justified the warrantless search and seizure.

Balancing the seriousness of the breach, its impact on the accused's Indigenous cultural practices (hunting), and society's interest in adjudication, the court excluded the evidence, emphasizing the sacrosanct nature of home privacy and criticizing police expediency over Charter compliance.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of communicating with a person believed to be under 16 for the purpose of facilitating a sexual assault, and one count of making child pornography.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, confirming that an intention to meet in person is not required for the "purpose of facilitating" a sexual assault under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and that the trial judge correctly applied the mens rea standard of knowledge or wilful blindness regarding the complainant's age.

The court also found no error in the "making" child pornography conviction, despite a slip in the sentencing reasons, as the appellant directed the complainant to create new sexual images.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, Mark Stordy, was charged with two counts of agreeing or making an arrangement to commit sexual assault with a person he believed to be under 16 years, specifically an 11-year-old and a 7-year-old, contrary to s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on telecommunications between Stordy and an FBI agent posing as a mother with two young daughters.

Stordy claimed he was conducting a private investigation to identify a parent endangering children.

The court rejected Stordy's defence, finding him not credible.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Stordy had the specific intent to actually travel and meet the fictitious individuals, concluding his communications were merely fantasy roleplaying.

The charges were dismissed.

The accused, Mr. Breton, brought an application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, following previous findings of serious section 8 Charter violations by the police.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant, assessing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found the police conduct to be serious and deliberate, including disingenuous warrant applications, warrantless searches of outbuildings, and oppressive personal searches.

The impact on the accused's privacy and dignity was deemed significant.

While the evidence was reliable and critical to the Crown's case, the court concluded that the strong pull for exclusion from the first two Grant factors outweighed society's interest in admission.

Consequently, all evidence obtained after 9:00 a.m. on December 1, 2009, including property seized under three warrants and derivative evidence, was excluded from the trial.

The applicant sought a review of a bail judge's order denying bail pending trial for second-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found that the bail judge erred in principle by failing to adequately consider the proposed release plan, which included strict house arrest, electronic monitoring, and committed sureties, when assessing the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

The court allowed the application, set aside the detention order, and ordered the applicant's release on approved terms.

The applicant, convicted of child luring and making child pornography, sought judicial interim release pending his appeal of conviction and leave to appeal sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the application for bail pending appeal.

The court found that while the appeal was not frivolous, the public interest in enforceability of judgments for serious crimes outweighed the reviewability interest, especially given the weak grounds of appeal.

The court ordered the appeal to be expedited.

The appellant, Kunal Tipu, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board that confirmed a Community Treatment Order (CTO) reissued by Dr. O’Brien.

The appellant argued the Board erred by implicitly concluding the CTO was properly renewed within the statutory timeframe and by not considering the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on his ability to comply.

The court dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the Board.

The court determined the CTO was properly issued/renewed and that evidence supported the appellant's ability to comply with the treatment plan during the pandemic.