James L. McDonald

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by Mary McInnis, acting in person, for an extension of time to perfect her appeal in estate litigation, and a cross-motion by Sharon Hartin to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court found that transcripts were required for the appeal and that the perfection deadline had not yet begun, rendering the extension motion moot.

The court declined to dismiss the appeal for delay, citing the appellant’s self-represented status, confusion over the rules, and lack of prejudice to the respondent.

The court imposed a deadline for the appellant to order transcripts or seek relief, failing which the respondent may move for dismissal for delay.

The applicant, Sharon Hartin, objected to the accounts of the respondent, Mary McInnis, in her capacities as attorney for property and estate trustee of Anna Evelyn Hartin's estate.

The applicant alleged undue influence, improper transfers, failure to keep proper records, and breach of court orders.

The court found a presumption of undue influence arose due to the deceased's dependency on the respondent, which the respondent largely failed to rebut.

The court also found the respondent acted as attorney for property and failed to keep adequate records.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the estate $127,167.70, revoked her Certificate of Appointment as Estate Trustee, and denied her compensation.

The plaintiff sought an injunction to prevent the defendants from terminating their franchise agreement.

The court noted that the agreement was set to expire in April 2024 with no automatic renewal clause.

Finding that an injunction would unfairly extend the agreement indefinitely pending litigation, and that the plaintiff could seek monetary damages, the court dismissed the motion.

The Municipality of Mississippi Mills brought an application seeking a declaration that Steven Maynard is a vexatious litigant under ss. 140(1)(a) & (b) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.

C.43, due to his persistent and groundless court proceedings and vexatious conduct.

The Municipality sought orders to stay pending actions and prevent further proceedings without leave.

Maynard denied his actions were vexatious, claiming to act as a responsible citizen ensuring municipal compliance with planning laws.

The court granted the application, finding Maynard to be a vexatious litigant, and imposed orders to stay existing proceedings and require leave for future actions, with a specific exclusion for a slip-and-fall small claims case.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that awarded damages and other relief to the respondents in a land development dispute.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's reasons lacked sufficient analysis for various causes of action, including fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, and duty of honest performance.

The appellate court also identified factual findings that were not supported by the evidence, particularly concerning drainage responsibilities.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeal noted problematic judicial conduct during the trial, including an ill-advised bifurcation of the trial and comments that suggested a lack of impartiality.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment below was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) to extend the deadline for setting the action down for trial.

The action, commenced in 2014 to enforce a 2013 default judgment, had seen no steps taken by the plaintiffs for 30 months between 2016 and 2019.

Applying the conjunctive test for delay, the Master found that while the defendants would not suffer significant prejudice, the plaintiffs failed to provide an adequate explanation for the lengthy delay.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction and damages of $50,000, alleging an actionable nuisance caused by the defendants' commercial equipment (a compressor and coffee roaster flue) emitting noise, smell, smoke, and heat.

The defendants asserted that summary judgment should be granted in their favour, dismissing the action.

The court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding both the existence of an actionable nuisance and the appropriate remedy, given conflicting evidence from witnesses and experts.

The court emphasized that summary judgment is a blunt tool for balancing interests, especially when permanent injunctive relief is claimed, and that a full appreciation of evidence from a trial is necessary for a fair and just adjudication.

The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the defendants' request for "boomerang summary judgment" was also declined due to procedural unfairness.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment on their claims, grounded in contract and misrepresentation regarding "resale on-site guarantees" for their park model trailers, and dismissal of the defendant's counterclaim for business interference, breach of confidence, and conversion.

The court declined to grant summary judgment, finding that there were multiple triable issues and significant evidentiary gaps.

These gaps included the absence of key witness testimony from Brett Coleman, concerns about the authenticity of original documents, and insufficient evidence for a confident assessment of damages for both the main action and the counterclaim.

The court invited the parties to confer on a more efficient path forward, possibly a tailored trial procedure.

A non-profit corporation operating a residence for families of children receiving medical treatment sought exemption from municipal property taxation under s. 3(1)11 of the Assessment Act.

The respondents disputed that the organization provided the “care of children” required by the statutory exemption.

The court held that although the organization did not directly provide childcare, its primary function constituted a “house of refuge” by offering shelter and support to families experiencing hardship while their children received medical treatment.

Interpreting the statutory language in its ordinary meaning and legislative context, the court concluded the facility provided refuge from distress and therefore qualified for the exemption.

The application for tax exemption was granted.

Following an earlier ruling on a motion, the court addressed a dispute concerning the allocation of agreed costs.

The parties agreed that $9,000 in costs would be payable to two respondents, but the applicants argued that additional respondents should share liability for those costs.

The court found that the additional respondents had been present only on a watching brief and were not part of the bifurcated application.

The court rejected the applicants’ position and ordered that those respondents should not share liability.

Instead, the applicants were ordered to pay additional costs to those respondents for having to participate in the costs submissions.

The applicants sought declarations that neighbouring landowners had no interest in their waterfront property and requested removal of a notice registered under s. 71 of the Land Titles Act claiming an unregistered right-of-way to the St. Lawrence River.

The respondents relied on historical deeds granting a 66‑foot right-of-way and a quitclaim deed confirming the easement.

The court held that the applicants’ predecessor had actual notice of the easement because the relevant instruments were registered within the 40‑year chain of title under the Registry Act.

The court further held that the description of the right-of-way was sufficiently certain and constituted a valid local description.

The applicants’ challenge to the easement therefore failed.

The plaintiff parents brought a motion for summary judgment against their defendant son for defaulting on a 1992 farm transfer agreement.

The son had agreed to purchase the family farm and related assets via promissory notes payable over 20 years, but ceased making payments in 2010.

The son raised defenses of contractual ambiguity, lack of understanding, and the expiry of the limitation period.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contract unambiguous, noting the son had independent legal advice, and ruling that the limitation period for the delayed-demand promissory notes only began when the parents made a formal demand in 2013.

The plaintiffs were awarded $532,337.16.

Following dismissal of an appeal concerning a municipal dispute over property use, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The respondent municipality sought substantial indemnity costs based on allegations of misconduct made by the appellant and the procedural complexity caused by the self-represented litigant.

The court held that elevated costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and declined to award substantial indemnity.

However, the court accepted that the appellant’s conduct significantly prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

After reducing certain disbursements and adjusting fee amounts, the court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by the appellant.

A municipality brought an application seeking declarations and an injunction against a salvage yard operation alleged to contravene municipal zoning by-laws and site plan requirements.

The respondents argued their use complied with the zoning by-law, that it was grandfathered prior to an interim control by-law under the Planning Act, and that municipal conduct and representations created estoppel or bad faith issues requiring trial.

The court held the matter could properly be determined under Rule 14 because the material facts were not in dispute and the central issue was legal interpretation of the zoning by-law.

Interpreting the by-law purposively, the court found that a lawful salvage yard required a principal building or structure and could not operate solely as open storage on bare land without site plan approval or building permits.

The respondents’ use was therefore unlawful and could not constitute a prior legal non‑conforming use.

Allegations of municipal bad faith and estoppel were unsupported by evidence and could not defeat statutory obligations.