Jaan Lilles

The plaintiff underwent an incisional hernia repair surgery performed by the defendant general surgeon.

Following the surgery, the plaintiff developed a bowel leak requiring emergency repair and subsequent treatment for a fistula and wound infections.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the surgeon breached the standard of care by failing to order bowel preparation, failing to 'run the bowel', and improperly repairing the bowel perforation.

The court dismissed the action, preferring the evidence of the defendant's expert witness and finding that the surgeon's conduct met the standard of care in all respects.

The court also found that causation was not established.

In a delayed-diagnosis medical malpractice action, the defendant physician appealed findings on liability only.

The court reviewed the trial judge’s negligence and causation analysis and found no reversible error.

The appeal was dismissed and the liability determination stood.

The plaintiff moved to disqualify Norton Rose Fulbright LLP (NRF) from acting as lawyers of record for the K2 defendants.

The plaintiff argued that it was a current client of NRF for patent applications, and that NRF's representation of the K2 defendants in this litigation, which involved allegations that the plaintiff's core technology did not exist, created a disqualifying conflict of interest.

The court found that the two mandates were substantially related and that the bright line rule applied, rendering the advance waiver in NRF's engagement letter ineffective.

The motion to disqualify NRF was granted.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The plaintiff underwent a laparoscopic hysterectomy performed by the defendant gynaecologist, during which her colon was perforated, requiring subsequent reconstructive surgery.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action alleging the defendant failed to obtain informed consent, failed to review prior operative reports, lacked the skill to perform the surgery given her anatomy, and negligently caused the perforation.

The court dismissed the action, finding the defendant met the standard of care in his pre-operative advice and surgical technique, and that the bowel injury was a known complication likely caused by abnormal anatomy rather than negligence.

The appellant underwent a laparoscopic colectomy performed by the respondent surgeon, during which her left ureter was injured, ultimately necessitating removal of her left kidney.

The trial judge found that the surgeon breached the standard of care and that the breach caused the injury requiring the kidney's removal.

The Court of Appeal majority set aside the trial decision, holding the trial judge erred in law in identifying and applying the standard of care.

The dissenting judge found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's approach and conclusions.

The Supreme Court unanimously restored the trial judgment, adopting the reasons of the dissenting judge.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial summary judgment claiming the defendant breached a non-solicitation covenant in a share purchase agreement by accepting former clients at his new firm.

The defendant brought a cross-motion for summary judgment on a counterclaim for payment of a $400,000 promissory note.

The court found the restrictive covenant did not prohibit the mere acceptance of former clients who transferred their accounts independently without encouragement.

The court also granted judgment on the promissory note, finding no legal or equitable set-off available, but stayed execution of the judgment pending the resolution of the main action.

Following an earlier decision granting regulatory relief, the court addressed the appropriate costs award in a compliance application brought by a professional regulatory college against an individual practitioner.

The respondent argued for reduced costs based on partial success, the importance of legal issues under recently enacted legislation, and financial hardship.

The court held that the applicant had effectively obtained the relief sought and that the respondent’s circumstances did not justify reducing the presumptive costs award.

The court emphasized that inability to pay is rarely relevant absent clear evidence of permanent inability to satisfy costs.

Costs were fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity basis payable by the respondent.

The regulatory college applied for injunctive relief under the Health Professions Procedural Code alleging that the respondent unlawfully practised traditional Chinese medicine and held herself out as a practitioner after the profession became regulated.

Evidence showed that the respondent, who was not registered with the college, examined an individual, communicated a traditional Chinese medicine diagnosis, used restricted titles, and represented herself through business materials as qualified to practise acupuncture.

The court found that the respondent communicated a diagnosis and held herself out as a practitioner contrary to the Traditional Chinese Medicine Act, 2006 and the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991.

The court concluded that providing health advice in these circumstances created a foreseeable risk of serious bodily harm and also breached statutory restrictions on the use of the title “Doctor.” The requested injunction was granted.

The applicant sought remedies under Part VII.1 of the Competition Act after the respondents advertised that their wireless service had fewer dropped calls than competitors without conducting adequate and proper testing beforehand.

The court previously found the respondents engaged in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b) for making an untested performance claim, although the applicant failed to prove the claim was false or misleading under s. 74.01(1)(a).

In determining remedies, the court assessed proportionality and the factors in s. 74.1(5), including market reach, financial position, and the fact that later testing substantiated the claim.

The court held that post-claim substantiation does not excuse the statutory requirement for prior testing but is relevant to penalty quantum.

An administrative monetary penalty of $500,000 was imposed, while the request for a 10‑year prohibition order was denied.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action following the sudden death of Emilio Spirito at Trillium Health Centre.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligence, specifically the failure to insert a nasogastric tube, caused the deceased to aspirate fluids and die.

The court found that the defendant doctors and nurses met the standard of care in their treatment and monitoring of the deceased.

Furthermore, the court accepted expert pathology evidence that the deceased died from bilateral lobar pneumonia acquired from air-borne bacteria, meaning there was no causal connection between the alleged negligence and the death.

The action was dismissed.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under s. 74.01(1)(b) of the Competition Act, the respondents sought leave to call eight expert witnesses despite the five‑expert limit imposed by s. 7 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The applicant opposed the request, arguing that some expert evidence was duplicative and that certain proposed opinions concerning the “general impression” of advertisements were inadmissible.

The court held that the proposed expert evidence was not unnecessarily duplicative and would not unduly prolong the hearing.

The court also determined that the admissibility of portions of the challenged expert evidence, including survey evidence and analysis of advertisements, could be addressed during trial if relied upon.

Leave was therefore granted to the respondents to call eight expert witnesses.

In an application alleging misleading advertising under ss. 74.01(1)(a) and (b) of the Competition Act regarding claims of fewer dropped calls by a wireless provider, the court addressed discovery disputes involving communications between the Competition Bureau and industry participants.

The respondents sought disclosure of communications between the applicant and several wireless competitors, as well as internal investigative notes.

The court held that public interest privilege did not apply to communications with two competitors that had publicly promoted their role in the investigation, and ordered disclosure of communications occurring before litigation became the dominant purpose.

However, documents created after litigation was contemplated were protected by litigation privilege.

Communications involving another competitor and internal notes relating to discussions with a federal department remained protected by public interest privilege.

The Commissioner of Competition brought an application against Rogers and Chatr alleging that their advertising claims of 'fewer dropped calls than new wireless carriers' and 'no worries about dropped calls' were false, misleading, and made without adequate and proper testing, contrary to the Competition Act.

The court found that the applicant failed to prove the claims were false or misleading.

However, the court found that the respondents failed to conduct adequate and proper testing in certain cities prior to launching the advertising campaign, thereby engaging in reviewable conduct under s. 74.01(1)(b).

The court also dismissed the respondents' constitutional challenges, finding that s. 74.01(1)(b) is a justified limit on freedom of expression and that the administrative monetary penalty does not engage s. 11 of the Charter.