Howard Goldblatt

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

A school board principal accessed and photographed private communications stored on a cloud-based personal log that was open on a board-owned laptop.

The teachers' union grieved the resulting written reprimands, alleging a breach of privacy rights.

A labour arbitrator dismissed the grievance applying the arbitral balancing-of-interests framework without conducting a s. 8 Charter analysis.

The Supreme Court held unanimously that the Charter applies to Ontario public school boards under the first branch of the Eldridge framework, as public education is an inherently governmental function.

The majority held the arbitrator fatally erred by failing to apply the s. 8 framework, and quashed the award.

The concurring minority would have applied a reasonableness standard and found the arbitrator's reliance on the contents of the log to assess the biographical core was unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

Two teachers' unions sought judicial review of Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions regarding collective bargaining with the Crown.

The OLRB had dismissed OSSTF's claim of bad faith bargaining, finding the Crown did not misrepresent its position on grid movement grievances.

The OLRB upheld ETFO's claim of bad faith bargaining but declined to award monetary damages, instead ordering a declaration and notice to members.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard and dismissed both applications, finding the OLRB's factual findings, inferences, and remedial choices were logical, transparent, and entitled to deference given its labour relations expertise.

The applicant sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision regarding the calculation of 'full net pay' for disabled firefighters under the collective agreement.

The arbitrator had ruled that the employer could deduct notional OMERS pension plan contributions from the calculation of full net pay, even when the employee had a disability waiver in place, to ensure continuity of take-home pay rather than providing a windfall.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was justified and unassailable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued supplementary reasons regarding the remedy and costs following its prior decision (2023 ONCA 139) which declared s. 37.10.1(2) of the Election Finances Act unconstitutional.

The appellants sought to invalidate additional provisions, including the definition of "political advertising" s. 37.0.1, s. 37.10.1(3)-(3.1), and s. 37.10.2.

The court declined this request, finding these provisions were not inextricably linked to the previously invalidated section and were not independently shown to infringe section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court also noted that the election period spending limits (s. 37.10.1(1)) were not challenged and remain in force.

No disposition was made as to costs, as the parties had reached an agreement.

This appeal concerned the constitutional validity of Ontario's third-party election spending limits, specifically the extension of the pre-writ restricted period from 6 to 12 months without increasing the spending cap.

The appellants argued this infringed the informational component of the right to vote under s. 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause (s. 33).

The Court of Appeal found that while s. 33 was properly invoked, the extended spending restrictions were not "carefully tailored" and did not permit a "modest informational campaign" thereby infringing the s. 3 right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the impugned provision invalid and suspended the declaration for 12 months.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

Purolator brought an application for judicial review and a motion for a stay of a British Columbia arbitrator's procedural decision refusing to bifurcate a grievance arbitration regarding a COVID-19 vaccine policy.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Divisional Court) dismissed the application and the motion, finding that it lacked jurisdiction simpliciter as there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

In the alternative, the court held that Ontario was forum non conveniens, as the parties, witnesses, and the arbitration itself were located in British Columbia.

This appeal concerned whether public school teachers are protected from unreasonable search and seizure by section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when the search is performed in the workplace by their employers.

The case involved a school principal reading and taking screenshots of a private, password-protected log maintained by two teachers on their personal Google account, accessed via a workplace laptop, which was then used by the school board for disciplinary action.

The Court of Appeal found that the labour relations arbitrator and the Divisional Court erred in their interpretation and application of section 8, concluding that the teachers had a reasonable expectation of privacy in their log, which was violated by the principal's actions.

The appeal was allowed, and the arbitrator's award was quashed.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a second Charter challenge to Ontario's election advertising spending restrictions (Bill 307), which the Attorney General successfully defended.

The Attorney General sought $580,652.54 in costs.

The Applicants argued against a costs award, citing the public importance of constitutional litigation and access to justice, and challenged the quantum of costs.

The court rejected the Applicants' access to justice argument, noting their financial capacity, and found the Attorney General's choice of external counsel and the work performed to be reasonable.

The court awarded the Attorney General $500,000 in all-inclusive costs, apportioned among the Applicant groups.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

This was a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application challenging provisions of election finance legislation under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that partial indemnity remained the appropriate scale because the respondent government's conduct was professional and did not justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

In fixing a fair overall award, the court emphasized that four applicant groups had advanced identical legal challenges in a consolidated proceeding, and that economies of scale had to be reflected in the result.

The court reduced the aggregate request from approximately $690,000 to $500,000 and apportioned that amount among the successful applicants.

No costs were awarded for or against the Chief Electoral Officer or the intervenor.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision dismissing a grievance regarding kindergarten class sizes.

The arbitrator had interpreted O. Reg. 132/12 under the Education Act as requiring class size caps to be determined only on a specified date in September, allowing sizes to fluctuate thereafter.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the arbitrator's interpretation, based on the text, context, and purpose of the regulation, was internally coherent and justified.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The City of Brockville applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner adjudicator's decision ordering the disclosure of redacted legal fee invoices related to collective bargaining.

The city argued the records were entirely excluded from the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the labour relations exclusion in s. 52(3)2.

Applying the Vavilov reasonableness standard, the Divisional Court upheld the adjudicator's decision, finding it was reasonable to conclude that the connection between labour relations and accounting documents detailing public expenditures was insufficient to trigger the exclusion.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing a grievance over a school principal's search of a classroom laptop.

Two teachers had maintained a private log documenting their complaints about colleagues on a personal Google account accessed via the school computer.

The principal discovered the log when he touched the mousepad of the open laptop after hours.

The arbitrator found the teachers had a diminished expectation of privacy and the principal had reasonable cause to search under his duty to maintain order under the Education Act.

The Divisional Court (majority) dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decision reasonable.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the application, finding the search disproportionately impaired the teachers' section 8 Charter rights.

The applicants, including the Elementary Teachers' Federation of Ontario and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, brought applications for judicial review challenging the Ontario government's decision to withdraw the 2015 sex education curriculum and replace it with the 2010 curriculum.

They argued the directive infringed teachers' freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, and students' rights under ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Divisional Court granted the applicants public interest standing but dismissed the applications on the merits.

The court found no infringement of s. 2(b) because teachers remained free to address topics from the 2015 curriculum, and no infringement of ss. 7 or 15(1) because the 2010 curriculum did not inherently deprive students of security of the person or substantively discriminate against protected groups.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Registrar of the Ontario College of Teachers refusing to remove a 2014 finding of professional misconduct and reprimand from the public register.

The applicants argued that because the remedial course condition had been fulfilled, only the reprimand remained, entitling the teacher to its removal after three years under the College's by-laws.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Registrar's decision, finding that the initial penalty imposed included both a reprimand and a course, meaning it was not 'limited to a reprimand' as required by the by-law for automatic removal.