Doug Wright

The applicant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding she was not catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident.

At the hearing, the Tribunal admitted the respondent insurer's expert psychiatric reports but refused to issue a summons to compel the expert's attendance for cross-examination due to non-compliance with procedural rules.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's strict application of its rules and refusal to facilitate the cross-examination of a key expert witness on a critical issue breached the applicant's right to procedural fairness.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a new hearing.

The appellant, who sustained a catastrophic impairment in a motor vehicle accident, appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying a special award on housing benefits.

The insurer had unreasonably delayed and withheld benefits but agreed to pay the full amount claimed shortly before the hearing.

The LAT Adjudicator granted a special award on most benefits but denied it for housing benefits because no report on the value of renovations to the existing home was provided under s. 16(4)(c) of the SABS.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Adjudicator erred in law by interpreting s. 10 to require an adjudication of the amount of the benefit when the insurer had already agreed to pay the claimed amount.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying her catastrophic impairment designation and a special award under s. 10 of Regulation 664.

The Divisional Court found the LAT erred in law by concluding it lacked jurisdiction to make a special award for benefits the insurer had delayed but ultimately agreed to pay before the hearing.

The Court also held the LAT breached procedural fairness by admitting and relying on the report of the insurer's psychiatric expert, who refused to attend the hearing for cross-examination.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiff was awarded $677,143, the court determined the costs payable to the successful plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs based on reconstructed dockets due to a contingency fee agreement, including costs for a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) hearing regarding statutory accident benefits.

The court awarded $302,974.37 in total costs, allowing only a portion of the LAT hearing fees that constituted trial preparation for the tort action, and deducting certain disbursements as standard office overhead.

This motion concerned the duration of an assignment of future collateral income benefits under s. 267.8(12) of the Insurance Act, following a jury award for income loss.

The defendant insurer sought assignment until the plaintiff reached age 65, while the plaintiff argued for a limitation to 10 years, consistent with the jury's assessment of future income loss.

The court ruled in favour of the plaintiff, limiting the assignment to the 10-year period determined by the jury, emphasizing the legislative intent to prevent double recovery without under-compensating the injured party.

This ruling addresses a defendant's motion for leave to call more than three expert witnesses at a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff opposed, alleging duplication and disadvantage between the defendant's proposed physiatrist and orthopaedic surgeon.

The court granted leave, finding that the proposed five experts, despite some similar observations in their reports, represented distinct specialties and provided unique perspectives necessary for a full adjudication of damages, particularly in a chronic pain case.

The court found no undue duplication or disadvantage to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to strike the defendants’ civil jury notice in a motor vehicle personal injury action, arguing that pandemic-related suspension of jury trials created unacceptable delay and prejudice.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed the request to strike the jury notice, holding that the moving party had not met the substantial onus of showing that justice would be better served by a judge-alone trial.

The court found the evidentiary record deficient on both sides, noted that civil jury trials in Toronto had an anticipated resumption date rather than an indefinite suspension, and accepted that a wait-and-see approach was appropriate in the circumstances.

The dismissal was without prejudice to a future renewed motion.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a summary judgment decision that found it liable for negligence in failing to keep an inmate reasonably safe while housed at Millhaven Institution, a maximum security penitentiary.

The inmate was assaulted by three other inmates in his cell during a prison strike.

The motion judge granted summary judgment on liability, finding the Crown negligent in its placement of the inmate, failure to maintain surveillance, failure to respond to cell alarms, and failure to prevent cell access.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge exceeded his authority by making unjustified findings of fact on an inadequate evidentiary record and applying an incorrect legal standard for causation.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his detention, search, and arrest in connection with a series of street robberies in the York Village area.

The court found multiple Charter violations: an unlawful detention without reasonable grounds, an illegal search, and a failure to inform the accused of his right to counsel without delay.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these violations, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant Attorney General of Canada moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' negligence claim arising from a severe assault on the plaintiff inmate by three other inmates at Millhaven Institution.

The court found that Correctional Service Canada (CSC) breached its duty of care by placing the non-violent plaintiff with highly violent offenders, failing to enforce cell door protocols, ignoring the plaintiff's emergency cell alarm, and lacking adequate video surveillance.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability because the evidence overwhelmingly established CSC's negligence and causation.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs on liability, with damages to be determined at a subsequent trial.

A young person, age 19, pleaded guilty to conveying a false message contrary to s. 372 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant called 911 reporting a false armed threat at a community centre, describing himself as the armed individual, with the intention of provoking police to shoot him ("suicide by cop").

The Crown sought a nine-month conditional sentence followed by three years probation.

The defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with three years probation, finding that despite the seriousness of the offence, the defendant's youth, first-offender status, genuine remorse, strong pro-social character, and the mental health crisis underlying the offence warranted rehabilitation-focused sentencing rather than incarceration or conviction.

In a pedestrian–streetcar collision action, a transit authority brought a summary judgment motion seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim against its municipal co‑defendant.

The moving party argued that it would assume responsibility for maintenance of trees on a median that allegedly obstructed the streetcar operator’s view and relied on statutory provisions of the City of Toronto Act.

The court held that the summary judgment rules could permit a defendant to seek dismissal of a claim against a co‑defendant, but the evidentiary record revealed genuine issues requiring a trial regarding responsibility for the median and trees.

Ownership of the land remained with the municipality and the statutory provision did not bar claims where the property was not the transit authority’s.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The accused, charged with five indictable offences including assault, mischief, threatening death, and breaching bail conditions, sought release on bail.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court found that the accused had failed to meet his onus under the reverse onus provisions.

The proposed plan of release, involving three sureties and house arrest, was deemed inadequate given the serious nature of the allegations, the accused's apparent disregard for court orders, and the sureties' lack of knowledge regarding the accused's activities and lifestyle.

The court concluded there was a substantial likelihood the accused would commit further criminal offences endangering public safety, particularly that of the vulnerable complainant.

The plaintiffs brought an action alleging negligence and breach of contract arising from the failure to commence a personal injury action within the limitation period after an automobile accident.

They sued a paralegal firm and a law firm alleged to have promoted a partnership relationship with the paralegal provider.

The lawyer defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the claim on the basis that the plaintiffs were not their clients and that the individual lawyers were protected as members of a limited liability partnership.

The court struck the claims against the individual lawyers without leave to amend, finding they were not partners in the alleged partnership and had no viable claim against them.

However, the court held it was not plain and obvious that the law firm owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs given representations suggesting a partnership relationship, and granted leave to amend the pleading to pursue claims against the firm for vicarious liability, professional negligence, and negligent misrepresentation.

The employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision finding that it failed to properly accommodate a paramedic who suffered a workplace injury.

The arbitrator held that under the collective agreement and the Human Rights Code, the employer was required to accommodate the paramedic by allowing him to 'ride third' in an ambulance once his medical restrictions permitted it, and that the employer failed to establish undue hardship.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and application of human rights principles to be reasonable.

The plaintiff's action arising from a motor vehicle accident was administratively dismissed for delay under Rule 48.14.

The status notice and dismissal order were sent to the plaintiff's former counsel due to a court error, despite a notice of change of solicitor having been filed.

The motion judge dismissed the plaintiff's motion to set aside the dismissal, finding unexplained delay, prejudice to the defendants, and relying on the principle of finality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the delay, prejudice, and finality, particularly given the defendants' continued participation in discoveries for a related action.

The appellant appealed an order enforcing a settlement agreement to discontinue his action against the respondent.

The appellant argued the offer to settle had expired and the release was not an agreed-upon part of the settlement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the respondent's counsel had expressly extended the time for acceptance, and the appellant's counsel accepted the offer with the draft release in hand.

The motion judge's discretion to enforce the settlement was upheld.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their medical malpractice action for being commenced outside the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge found that the appellant knew she had suffered an injury from an unconsented surgical procedure on September 3, 2004, and immediately sought legal advice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the limitation period began to run on that date and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiffs sued their insurer for terminating statutory accident benefits based on reports from health care professionals retained by the insurer under s. 42 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

On discovery, the plaintiffs sought to ask questions that amounted to cross-examining these experts.

The motion judge held that the experts were not 'experts' within the meaning of Rule 31.06(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and thus the prohibition against cross-examination did not apply.

The Divisional Court allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the clear wording of Rule 31.06(3) covers experts engaged by a party for a purpose other than litigation, including s. 42 assessors.