Davies Bagambiire

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits for a physiotherapy treatment plan and a driver/passenger assessment.

The respondent denied the benefits.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found that the applicant failed to prove the physiotherapy treatment plan was reasonable and necessary, noting a lack of clear goals and timelines for recovery, as well as pre-existing conditions.

The Tribunal also found the driver/passenger assessment was not reasonable and necessary, as a psychological progress report indicated the applicant felt she could manage on her own.

The claims for an award and interest were also dismissed.

The plaintiff sought an extension of time to serve a Statement of Claim, filed in 2017 for a 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the delay of over five years to be extreme and inexcusable.

The plaintiff's explanations, including inability to locate parties, a negligent associate, and COVID-19, were deemed without merit.

The court found actual and presumed prejudice to the defendants due to the passage of time, loss of evidence, and compromised ability to investigate and bring third-party claims.

The decision emphasized counsel's ultimate responsibility for prosecuting the action.

This is an appeal from a motion judge's order allowing a medical negligence claim to proceed in the Superior Court, despite the plaintiff being a professional football player subject to a collective agreement with an arbitration clause.

The appellant, a radiologist, argued the claim fell under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that the "essential character" of the dispute was medical negligence by an independent third-party physician, not a dispute arising from the collective agreement.

Furthermore, the arbitration process under the collective agreement would not provide effective redress for a medical malpractice claim, particularly regarding costs and expert fees.

The appellant appealed a decision of an Associate Judge dismissing her motion to extend the time to file a statement of claim and serve an amended notice of action in a medical negligence case.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Associate Judge's conclusions that the appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the respondents would suffer prejudice if the extension were granted.

The court declined to decide whether intentional delay by a plaintiff is determinative, as the other findings were sufficient to dispose of the appeal.

The plaintiff brought a motion to correct a misnomer, identifying 'John Doe 1' as Benjamin Elliott, and to amend his statement of claim in an action alleging police assault and racial profiling.

The court granted the misnomer correction, finding the 'litigating finger' clearly pointed at Elliott despite the plaintiff's delay.

The court also permitted most of the proposed amendments, finding they provided particulars of the existing claims for assault, battery, and racial profiling.

However, the court denied an amendment alleging the police board failed to properly train its officers, ruling it asserted a new cause of action after the limitation period had expired.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order dismissing his motion to dismiss the claim based on an arbitration clause in a collective agreement.

The Divisional Court directed the parties to consider whether the order was final or interlocutory.

The parties agreed the order was final.

The Divisional Court found it lacked jurisdiction and transferred the matter to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to amend her notice of action, extend the time to file a statement of claim, and extend the time to serve the amended notice of action and statement of claim in a medical malpractice case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff's deliberate decision to put her case on hold for 20 months, without contact with her lawyer, demonstrated a lack of intention to pursue the claim.

The court also found that the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer significant prejudice due to the passage of over four years since the events, leading to memory loss among medical professionals and loss of opportunity for timely investigation by the hospital.

The appellant tenant sued the respondent landlord for negligence after a fire damaged its leased premises.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding no evidence of the landlord's negligence and holding that expert evidence was required to prove causation.

On appeal, the appellant argued that common sense inferences and the landlord's spoliation of evidence (destroying a space heater) should suffice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that expert evidence was necessary given the technical nature of the building's electrical system, and noting that an adverse inference from spoliation cannot serve as positive proof of negligence.

The plaintiff employee brought an action for wrongful dismissal against his employer, alleging constructive dismissal after the employer unilaterally added significant IT and software administration duties to his original role as a field service technician.

The employer argued the changes were a natural extension of his duties and that the employee failed to mitigate by refusing to return to work.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the employer fundamentally altered the employment contract and created a hostile work environment, constituting constructive dismissal.

The plaintiff was awarded $55,000, representing 12 months' notice, but his claim for bad faith damages was dismissed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal, which was deferred pending a grievance arbitration.

Over three years after the grievance was withdrawn, the applicant requested to re-activate her application at the Tribunal.

The applicant argued the delay was due to her responsibilities caring for an autistic child and confusion over representation.

The Tribunal found these were not good reasons for the extraordinary delay and noted prejudice to the respondents.

The request to re-activate was denied and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, a not-for-profit organization serving newcomers from Mainland China, alleged that the Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration and its officials discriminated against it on the basis of ethnic origin and place of origin by reducing and ultimately denying its Newcomer Settlement Program (NSP) funding.

The applicant claimed that a Ministry official from Hong Kong was biased against the applicant because it was operated by individuals from Mainland China.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissed the application, finding that the Ministry conducted a thorough and fair evaluation process and that the applicant failed to satisfy the mandated eligibility criteria for NSP funding.

The Tribunal concluded there was no evidence connecting the funding decisions to the prohibited grounds.

The respondents requested the dismissal of a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin and place of origin regarding the denial of funding.

The respondents argued the application was time-barred and an abuse of process.

The Tribunal found that while some earlier funding decisions were time-barred, the allegations pertaining to the termination of funding for the 2002/2003 and 2003/2004 years were filed in a timely manner or formed part of a series of incidents.

The Tribunal also rejected the argument that the application was frivolous and vexatious, noting it did not have the express statutory authority to dismiss on that basis under the amended Code, and the application did not constitute an abuse of process.

The respondents' request to dismiss the application was denied, and the Tribunal narrowed the issues for the hearing.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging racial profiling by police.

He had previously commenced a civil action seeking damages for racial profiling and Charter violations arising from the same incident.

The Tribunal held that section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code bars an application where a civil proceeding has been commenced seeking remedies for a Code infringement based on the same factual context, even if section 46.1 is not expressly pleaded.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The complainant, a Black woman, was detained by a store security guard for allegedly stealing a bra.

A Peel Regional Police officer was called to investigate.

During the investigation, the officer asked if the complainant spoke English, called her a 'fucking foreigner', threatened to take her to jail, and subjected her to a heightened and prolonged investigation despite weak evidence.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found that the officer and the police service discriminated against the complainant on the basis of race in the provision of a service.

The Tribunal awarded $20,000 in general damages and ordered the police service to develop a specific anti-racial profiling directive and provide comprehensive training to its officers.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action based on a release executed in a prior action.

The appellant argued the release did not cover the current claims or protect respondents who were not parties to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the release was unambiguous and barred the action, as the appellant knew the essential elements of the claims when he signed it.

The Court also agreed that the release protected the non-party respondents because it applied to agents and the claims shared the same factual underpinnings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

In an interim decision during a human rights hearing alleging racial profiling by a police officer, the adjudicator ordered the respondents to produce the officer's employment record, original notebook, and human rights training manuals.

The adjudicator also qualified Professor Norman Scot Wortley as an expert witness on racial profiling in the criminal justice system and police investigations, finding his proposed evidence relevant and necessary to provide context for the tribunal.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and claimed income replacement benefits.

The insurer argued that the applicant's request for arbitration was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act and the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator found that the insurer's initial assessment forms did not constitute a clear and unequivocal refusal to pay benefits, as they requested further information to calculate the benefits.

The limitation period did not begin to run until the insurer explicitly denied the claim later.

Therefore, the applicant was not precluded from proceeding to arbitration.

Expenses were awarded to both parties for different hearing dates due to counsel's failure to attend.