Daniel I. Reisler

In this personal injury trial, the plaintiffs sought to have the jury quantify damages for past attendant care and housekeeping.

The court denied this request, ruling that such claims were barred due to the male plaintiff's prior settlement of his Family Law Act claim for services provided to his wife, which would result in impermissible double recovery.

Additionally, the court found there was insufficient evidentiary foundation to put these specific questions to the jury, as the plaintiffs failed to provide adequate evidence regarding the hours of services rendered by third parties or the value of non-monetary compensation, and the proposed methodology of valuing damages based on need rather than services actually received was incorrect in law.

The appellants, Michael Taylor and The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company, appealed a judgment declining to enforce a settlement in a motor vehicle accident action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the enforcement of a settlement under Rule 49.09.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion to conditionally strike the jury notice for a trial scheduled to commence on January 17, 2022, due to COVID-19 pandemic developments suspending jury selections.

The defendants opposed the motion.

The court considered factors such as court resources, local pandemic impact, prejudice to parties (especially the plaintiff due to financial implications and case age), and history of adjournments.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, ordering that the trial proceed without a jury if juries are not being impaneled, and awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action, arguing it was brought outside the one-year limitation period set out in the Insurance Act and the standard automobile insurance policy.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not for breach of contract, but for breach of the insurer's independent duty of good faith, which is subject to the basic two-year limitation period.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that based on the pleadings, the bad faith claim is separate and distinct from a claim under the insurance contract, and therefore falls outside the one-year limitation period.

The moving party sought approval of a settlement dismissing a third party claim without costs.

The court found multiple deficiencies in the motion record, including failure to properly cite the grounds for the motion, failure to include pleadings, and failure to address whether the third party defended the main action, which would trigger the requirement for court approval under Rule 7.08 due to a plaintiff being under disability.

The court also noted the draft order was deficient.

The motion was adjourned with directions to file a proper motion record.

The court apportioned costs between the defendants following a 39-day trial where the plaintiffs were awarded approximately $12 million in damages.

The Jantzi defendants were found 80% at fault for a motor vehicle accident, and All Star Tap & Grill 20% at fault for over-serving alcohol, with the plaintiff Wesley Hummel 25% contributorily negligent.

The Jantzi defendants argued All Star should bear 80% of post-offer costs due to their refusal to settle, while All Star argued costs should follow the trial's liability apportionment (75% Jantzi, 25% All Star after contributory negligence).

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01 and Section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, including offers to settle and policy limits.

Ultimately, the court ordered the Jantzi defendants to pay one-third of the plaintiffs' costs and All Star Tap & Grill to pay two-thirds, based on their respective insurance policy limits ($1 million for Jantzi, $2 million for All Star).

The appellant, a passenger injured in a motor vehicle collision, appealed a trial judgment that resulted in a nil award after the jury verdict of $50,000 in non-pecuniary damages was reduced by a statutory deductible and an advance payment made by the defendants.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's qualification of expert witnesses, aspects of the jury charge, and the costs award.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits and the costs appeal, finding that the trial judge properly admitted non-party expert evidence, provided a balanced jury charge, and correctly applied the costs rules given the nil judgment.

This case involved three concurrent motions: Aviva Canada Inc. sought to strike portions of the defendants' statements of defence and counterclaims, while the defendants (1843538 Ontario Inc., Fady Rony Warda, Rony Amanuel Warda, and Michael Wetzel) sought to dismiss Aviva's claim under Rule 21 and Michael Wetzel also sought summary judgment under Rule 20.

The defendants argued that Aviva's claim should be precluded by the doctrine of ex turpi causa and/or as an abuse of process, including a civil equivalent of entrapment, stemming from Aviva's 'sting' operation involving intentionally damaged vehicles and fictitious insurance claims.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions to strike/dismiss Aviva's claim, finding it was not 'plain and obvious' that ex turpi causa or abuse of process applied to prevent Aviva's action for compensatory damages.

Wetzel's motion for summary judgment was also dismissed due to genuine issues for trial regarding liability and damages.

Aviva's motion to strike was granted in part, specifically striking an itemized list of repairs as evidence from Wetzel's pleading and striking allegations of civil entrapment from the Warda defendants' pleading, but otherwise dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a Rule 49 settlement agreement concerning a motion for particulars and to set aside their noting in default.

The core dispute revolved around the interpretation of the phrase "we will comply with the Rules" regarding the delivery of the statement of defence.

The court found that the plaintiff's understanding (delivery within 20 days under Rule 18) was objectively reasonable, while the defendants' undisclosed intention to bring a motion to strike, which would defer defence delivery, was not within the plaintiff's reasonable contemplation.

Consequently, the court determined that the plaintiff had accepted the defendants' repudiation of the settlement, meaning there was no settlement agreement to enforce.

However, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the noting in default, finding that the defendants had consistently demonstrated an intent to defend and moved promptly.

The motion to enforce the settlement was dismissed, but the noting in default was set aside, with specific terms imposed for future procedural steps.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and tactical conduct by both parties.

The plaintiff, Rosemary Sheldon, succeeded in her personal injury action against the defendant, Manuel Reyna, following a 15-day judge-alone trial.

This endorsement addresses the plaintiff's requests for correction of a damages award for gardening services, prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, costs on a partial indemnity basis, and an order for periodic payments.

The court confirmed the total judgment amount, awarded prejudgment and postjudgment interest, and granted partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff, with a minor reduction in disbursements.

An order for periodic payments was also made.

During a personal injury trial, the plaintiff's counsel brought a motion under Rule 53.01(3) to recall the plaintiff as a witness after new documents were produced during the cross-examination of the plaintiff's family doctor.

The documents, which had not been disclosed prior to trial, contained notes and handwriting suggesting the plaintiff was attempting to manage her medical case.

The court granted the motion, finding that the interests of justice and trial fairness required giving the plaintiff an opportunity to explain the newly produced documents, and imposed restrictions on counsel's communications with the plaintiff prior to her recall.

On appeal from a trial judgment, the appellant House challenged the trial judge's findings regarding municipal liability for winter road maintenance, apportionment of fault, and the discount rate applied to damages.

The trial judge found that the Township of Wilmot was not liable for the accident despite unanticipated ice formation on Huron Road, as the municipality met its statutory defences under the Municipal Act.

The trial judge apportioned fault equally (50/50) between House as driver and Baird as vehicle owner, whose defective tires contributed to the loss of control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed House's appeal on all three issues and also dismissed Baird's cross-appeal regarding costs.

The appellants appealed a judgment from the Superior Court of Justice rendered by Justice Paul B. Kane following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and awarded the appellants costs of the appeal in the amount of $22,000.

The costs of the trial were reserved to the discretion of the judge presiding over the re-trial.

The plaintiff was rear-ended in a motor vehicle accident and claimed soft tissue damages, chronic pain, anxiety, and depression.

The defendant admitted liability, and the sole issue at trial was damages.

The trial judge qualified a defence psychiatrist as an expert despite serious reservations about his methodology and independence.

The expert's testimony focused primarily on alleged inconsistencies between what the plaintiff told him and her medical records, essentially attacking her credibility rather than providing independent psychiatric assessment.

The jury awarded only general damages of $23,500 and rejected all other heads of damages.

On appeal, the court found the trial judge failed to properly discharge his gatekeeper duty by not conducting a cost-benefit analysis at the qualification stage and failed to exercise his ongoing gatekeeper function when the expert's lack of impartiality became apparent during testimony.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss a social host liability claim arising from a party where an underage guest became intoxicated and was seriously injured in a car accident after leaving.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact that could not be fairly and justly determined on summary judgment.

The court also held that the established law on social host liability, particularly *Childs v. Desormeaux*, did not preclude a duty of care in this case, especially given the presence of underage drinking and the host's supervisory role.

State Farm insured a property damaged by fire and issued a cheque to Alfedany.

A person purporting to be Alfedany cashed the cheque at Money Mart.

Alfedany later claimed he had not received the cheque and disputed the endorsement as forged.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss Money Mart's action seeking payment as a "holder in due course." The court found the cheque's negotiation was affected by fraud or illegality, meaning Money Mart was not deemed a "holder in due course" under s. 57(2) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

Furthermore, Money Mart failed to prove it was a "holder in due course" under s. 55(1) due to its wilful disregard of multiple discrepancies in the customer's identity, which indicated a lack of good faith.

The court also noted that even if Money Mart were a holder in due course, it would be barred from enforcing payment by s. 48(1) of the Act due to the forged signature, as State Farm was not estopped from raising this defence.

State Farm's motion for summary judgment was granted, and Money Mart's claim was dismissed.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the defendants sought to deduct Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) previously settled by the plaintiff.

The court held that the defendants met the strict burden of proving subject-matter and temporal matching between the jury's future care awards and the SABs settlement categories.

However, the court ruled that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by a pro-rata share of the legal fees the plaintiff incurred to obtain the SABs settlement, preventing the tortfeasors from unfairly benefiting from the plaintiff's expense.

Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $1,837,500 for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident, the court determined whether the defendants could deduct a prior $1,423,323.49 Statutory Accident Benefits (SABs) settlement from the tort award.

The court found that the defendants met their burden to show subject matter and temporal matching between the SABs settlement and the jury's awards for future medical/rehabilitation and attendant care needs.

However, the court held that the deductible SABs amounts must be reduced by the legal fees incurred by the plaintiff to obtain the SABs settlement, as well as certain quantifiable expenses incurred after the settlement.

Following a ten‑day motor vehicle accident trial in which the plaintiffs’ damages claims were dismissed, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $250,000.

The defendant relied primarily on prior settlement offers to justify the elevated costs scale.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not warranted because there was no reprehensible conduct and the parties’ settlement positions were reasonable given the contested medical causation and income loss issues.

Exercising discretion under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $170,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff sought damages for personal injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident where liability was admitted.

The plaintiff claimed damages for pain and suffering, past income loss, and future income loss, alleging the accident caused chronic neck, back, and shoulder pain, as well as carpal tunnel syndrome.

The court found that the carpal tunnel syndrome was not caused by the accident.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the statutory threshold for non-pecuniary damages, as the impairments were neither permanent nor serious, relying heavily on medical evidence of reversible muscular imbalance and extensive video surveillance showing the plaintiff engaging in vigorous physical activities.

The claims for past and future income loss were also dismissed, as the plaintiff's decision to leave work was deemed unreasonable and the contingencies for future loss were not established as real and substantial possibilities.

The action was dismissed.