Brian Gover

The applicants in a constitutional application requested leave to file factums exceeding the 30-page limit prescribed by the Practice Direction.

The Attorney General opposed the request.

The court denied the request, emphasizing that the 30-page limit is a serious policy intended to focus counsel on the issues, and that leave is exceptional and granted sparingly.

The court noted that since there was still a week before the factums were due, counsel had sufficient time to produce shorter, more focused versions.

During an appeal involving allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant's trial counsel retained his own lawyers.

Trial counsel's lawyers inadvertently disclosed a letter between trial counsel and themselves to the appellant's appeal counsel.

Trial counsel brought a motion for the return of the document, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the letter was privileged, the inadvertent disclosure did not constitute a waiver, and the innocence at stake exception did not apply to abrogate the privilege.

Following a request for clarification and further submissions respecting costs in relation to an initial disciplinary hearing, the Court of Appeal ordered that the costs for that hearing be reserved to the Tribunal presiding over the re-hearing.

The parties made written submissions regarding costs following an appeal.

The Court of Appeal determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale rather than an elevated scale.

The court awarded the respondent a total of $61,000 in costs, which included amounts for proceedings before the professional discipline appeal panel, the lower court stay motion, the lower court appeal, and the appellate proceedings, after setting off a previous costs award in favour of the appellant.

The Law Society and the respondent lawyer brought separate appeals from a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Law Society Appeal Panel's order upholding a finding of professional misconduct and disbarment.

The Divisional Court had remitted the matter to a new hearing panel due to breaches of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

It held that the Hearing Panel breached natural justice by refusing a brief adjournment to allow the lawyer to be represented by counsel, and by proceeding immediately to the penalty phase without adequate notice.

The Court also upheld the Divisional Court's refusal to stay the proceedings for undue delay, binding the new hearing panel to the original findings on delay up to the start of the first hearing.

The applicants sought a stay of a ruling by the Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry and a Divisional Court decision pending an application for leave to appeal.

The Commissioner had ruled he had jurisdiction to hear evidence from two witnesses regarding alleged police failure to respond to a sexual assault complaint.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm to the applicants' reputation if the evidence was heard publicly before the appeal, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was granted and the leave application expedited.

The appellant sought a publication ban on the name of its employee, who had been acquitted of historical sexual abuse charges, in relation to evidence given at the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

The Commissioner refused the ban, finding the public interest in openness outweighed the employee's privacy interests.

The Divisional Court dismissed an application for judicial review, applying a reasonableness standard.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court correctly identified reasonableness as the standard of review and that the Commissioner reasonably applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test in balancing the protection of innocence against the public interest in an open inquiry.

The appellant, a lawyer and undischarged bankrupt, pleaded guilty to fraud and breach of trust for misappropriating client funds.

The sentencing judge ordered him to pay compensation to the Law Society, which had partially reimbursed the victims, and to one victim for the balance of his loss.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the compensation order required the prior consent of the bankruptcy court.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that a compensation order under the Criminal Code is a personal order that does not require bankruptcy court consent to be made, though consent is required before it can be enforced against the bankrupt's property.

The Court also affirmed that the Law Society is a 'person aggrieved' through subrogation.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 234.1 of the Criminal Code.

He argued the provision was inoperative because it had not been proclaimed in force in all provinces, allegedly violating equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights and s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the non-universal application was justified by a valid federal objective related to provincial law enforcement priorities and resources.

The Court also held that s. 7 of the Charter could not be used to bypass the delayed implementation of equality rights under s. 15.