Brendan Haynes

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed a directed verdict application in a case where the accused, Ryan Vernaza-Vinces, was charged with flight from a police officer contrary to section 320.17 of the Criminal Code.

The key legal issue was whether the Crown must prove that the police were operating a motor vehicle while pursuing the accused under the new section 320.17, which replaced the older section 249.1(1).

The court held that the current statutory language does not require proof that police were in a motor vehicle during pursuit, overruling obiter dicta from prior Superior Court decisions.

The decision clarifies the essential elements of the offence under the updated provision.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to extend the time for leave to appeal and a motion for leave to appeal the orders of Shin Doi J. The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding parties in the total amount of $8,575.

The appellant, a de-designated firearms instructor, appealed a costs order from a motion that struck and stayed parts of his second action (2022 Action) as duplicative of an earlier action (2018 Action).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the cumulative costs award fell below the $50,000 threshold specified in the Courts of Justice Act, which applies when the costs order itself is the subject of the appeal.

The plaintiff, Gregory Paul Hlady, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking $5 million in damages for trespass and alleged breaches of agreements related to land management.

The defendants, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and several Ministry of Natural Resources employees, argued that the claims were either satisfied or legally invalid due to public policy.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the physical damage from the trespass had been remediated, the plaintiff's claims regarding broader land management agreements were unrealistic and without legal standing, and any agreement purporting to fetter government discretion would be void.

The court also dismissed claims of harassment, intimidation, and other torts against individual defendants as unsubstantiated.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

A Case Management Conference was held to organize the hearing of a claim for compensation brought by the claimant against the respondent under the Expropriations Act.

The Tribunal approved the revised Procedural Order submitted by the parties and scheduled a five-day Merit Hearing to commence on November 4, 2024, by video.

This endorsement follows a case conference in a protracted civil litigation.

The plaintiff, Gregory Paul Hlady, brought a four-volume motion record seeking various forms of relief, some of which the court deemed unavailable (e.g., ordering settlement discussions, default judgment where default was previously set aside).

The court issued procedural directions, including deadlines for the plaintiff to amend his motion to seek summary judgment, for both parties to exchange affidavits of documents, and for the defendants to serve their discovery plan.

A further case conference was scheduled to determine next steps in the litigation.

The applicants, a First Nation and its former Chief, brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) and (h) seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Assessment Act and the Crown's Duty to Consult and Accommodate.

The application arose in the context of the proposed Marten Falls Community Access Road in the Ring of Fire region.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite legislation or provide a de facto reference on how the Crown should discharge its duty in the future without a live factual dispute.

The court held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue and was not properly brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff commenced two actions (in 2018 and 2022) against the Crown and the Firearms Safety Education Service of Ontario containing overlapping allegations regarding the suspension of his firearms instructor license.

The defendants brought motions to strike or stay the 2022 Action.

The court struck the 2022 Action against the Crown for failure to provide statutory notice, struck the claims based on 2017 and 2018 events as statute-barred, and stayed the remaining duplicative claims as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff was granted leave to amend the 2018 Action to incorporate the claims from the 2022 Action.

The parties resolved a draft Procedural Order and Issues List on consent regarding a claim for compensation under the Expropriations Act for the construction of the Highway 6 Morriston Bypass.

The Ontario Land Tribunal issued the Procedural Order to govern the proceedings leading up to a Case Management Conference scheduled for March 1, 2024.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding the interest payable on compensation for expropriated land.

The appellant argued that interest should run from an earlier date based on a redevelopment use and at a higher rate of 12% due to delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings that the productive use of the land was as a rental building and ceased only upon formal expropriation.

The Court also upheld the Tribunal's discretionary refusal to award a higher interest rate, as it had not been pleaded, and declined to consider a new claim for compound interest.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to strike a single paragraph from the plaintiff Jennifer Demers' statement of claim.

The defendant argued the paragraph, which quoted Justice Wright's comments from Demers' prior criminal acquittal describing the police investigation as "deplorable" was argumentative, pleaded inadmissible evidence, and was inflammatory.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the paragraph asserted material facts relevant to a claim for punitive damages and that the admissibility of Justice Wright's decision was a matter best left to the trial judge.

The court also noted the motion was brought late in the proceedings, causing unnecessary delay.

The defendant Anderson moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action and crossclaim against her, arguing the motor vehicle accident was solely caused by the co-defendant Yik.

The plaintiff Pagano opposed, seeking a ruling of at least 1% liability against Anderson or, alternatively, a trial to determine and apportion liability.

The court found conflicting evidence regarding the accident circumstances and drivers' actions, making it impossible to make necessary findings of fact or apply the law without a full evidentiary record and credibility assessments.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the action was ordered to proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her claim against herself for statutory vicarious liability as the owner of a vehicle involved in an accident.

The appellant was a passenger in her own vehicle driven by her daughter when the accident occurred in a private parking lot.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the ground that the accident did not occur on a "highway" as defined in the Highway Traffic Act and therefore section 192(2) of the Act did not apply.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal suggesting the accident occurred at a GO Station parking lot used by the general public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to admit fresh evidence and upheld the summary judgment dismissal.

Third parties brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a defendant’s third party claim and crossclaims arising from injuries sustained during an assault after a community festival where alcohol was served.

The moving parties argued there was no evidence establishing their liability for allegedly serving alcohol to an intoxicated attendee who later committed the assault.

The court held that granting summary judgment would require determinations overlapping with issues scheduled for trial and could create inconsistent factual findings.

The matter also raised a potentially novel duty of care question regarding volunteers organizing events where alcohol is served.

The court concluded that summary judgment was not the most appropriate or just procedure.

The plaintiff brought a pre‑trial motion under Rule 21 seeking a determination of whether an insurer must respond to his claim arising from a motor vehicle collision involving the defendants.

The plaintiff argued that resolving the insurance coverage issue early would facilitate mediation and settlement discussions.

The court held that the plaintiff lacked standing to seek declaratory relief regarding coverage because no cause of action existed against the insurer prior to obtaining judgment against the insured defendants under s. 258 of the Insurance Act.

The court also found the issues raised involved mixed questions of fact and law and were not raised by the pleadings.

The motion was therefore dismissed.

On a summary judgment motion arising from a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured son driving his father's vehicle, the moving defendant sought dismissal of the plaintiff's claim and an insurer's crossclaim on the basis that the vehicle had been taken without consent.

Applying the post-Hryniak summary judgment framework, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial on consent to possession.

The court found that although the father had forbidden operation of the vehicle and the son had signed an excluded driver form, the son retained legal possession because the vehicle and keys remained available to him and had been entrusted for his use.

The owner was therefore potentially vicariously liable under s. 192 of the Highway Traffic Act, with negligence and damages left for trial.