Andrew J. Heal

The plaintiffs and defendants entered into Minutes of Settlement to resolve a dispute over the construction of a residence.

The plaintiffs subsequently brought a motion for summary judgment, alleging the defendants breached the settlement terms regarding electrical, plumbing, HVAC, and roofing work, and sought damages.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to enforce the settlement, arguing they had fully complied.

The court reviewed the evidence and found that the defendants had completed all required work to the plaintiffs' satisfaction and that the settlement funds had been properly released.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, granted the defendants' motion to enforce the settlement, and dismissed the underlying action and counterclaim.

Following a settlement of the principal amount in a long-standing construction contract dispute, the court conducted a "mini-trial" to determine the applicable pre-judgment interest rates on the settled funds and the award of costs.

The court found that $116,000 of the settlement, attributable to architect fees, was payable under the Construction Contract, thus attracting the contractually stipulated interest rate of prime plus 2%.

The remaining $30,300 for miscellaneous expenses was subject to the standard Courts of Justice Act interest rate due to insufficient evidence linking it to the contract.

The court awarded the plaintiff substantial costs, noting that while both parties contributed to the litigation's longevity, the plaintiff was entirely successful on the issues before the court and the defendant's evidentiary case was weak.

The appellants appealed a decision setting aside a stay of proceedings granted by a Justice of the Peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the officer's conduct might have justified a finding of abuse of process, a stay of proceedings was not the only remedy available.

The court emphasized that a stay is a prospective remedy of last resort, and lesser remedies, such as disregarding the officer's testimony or addressing disclosure issues, were sufficient to remove any prejudice.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a decision reversing a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had stayed the proceedings for operating a public garage contrary to a municipal by-law, finding the prosecution was an abuse of process based on the by-law officer's evidence.

The appeal judge reversed the stay and ordered a new trial.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal under s. 131 of the Provincial Offences Act, finding the case raised significant questions of law regarding the laying of charges by enforcement officers that met the public interest requirement.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision denying their request to amend their pleadings to add a new cause of action against the respondent town regarding building permit inspections and foundation suitability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence supported the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants discovered the new claim years earlier.

The Court also agreed that the town suffered actual prejudice due to the demolition of the premises and that the proposed amendment constituted a fundamentally different claim.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a motion judge's dismissal of its motions for summary judgment and determination of a question of law.

The underlying action involved claims of misfeasance and negligence related to the closing of zoning applications.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the municipality was immune from suit under s. 20(1)(a) of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, finding there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and that the issue was of general importance.

Leave to appeal on the limitation period issue was denied.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their claim for delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's decision, noting that the appellant did nothing to pursue his claim for 10 years and offered no explanation or excuse.

The court also noted there was no evidence of steps taken to gain entry into Canada to comply with a previous order, and the appellant did not have a strong prima facie case.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

A police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) that dismissed his appeal from a Hearing Officer's finding of misconduct.

The officer argued the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction because the Notice of Hearing was served outside the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that OCCPS applied an incorrect legal test to determine when sufficient facts came to the Chief's attention, rendering its decision unreasonable.

The Court further held that the officer's guilty plea did not waive his right to appeal the jurisdictional defect, as consent cannot confer jurisdiction on a statutory tribunal.

The appellant police officer appealed convictions for discreditable conduct and deceit, as well as the penalty of dismissal, arising from a false affidavit she swore regarding a parking ticket.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer lacked jurisdiction because the Notice of Hearing was served more than six months after the investigators had a sufficient body of factual information to support the allegations, violating the mandatory limitation period in s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The convictions and penalty were quashed.

The appellant police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services, which had dismissed his appeal of a hearing officer's interlocutory ruling on the basis that the notice of appeal was out of time.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing officer's ruling was interlocutory and could not be appealed until a decision on the merits was made.

Since the notice of appeal was filed within 30 days of the decision on the merits, it was timely.

The matter was remitted to the Commission to determine the appeal on the merits.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing their application for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner order.

The Commissioner had ordered the disclosure of records containing the Ministry's evaluations and scores of consultants who submitted tenders for highway construction projects.

The appellants argued the records were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court of Appeal applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Commissioner's findings that the scores did not constitute 'advice or recommendations' under section 13, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm under sections 17 and 18.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Court of Appeal issued an endorsement regarding costs following an appeal.

The respondents were awarded costs of $10,000 against the appellant Wyndham Street Investments Inc. Although the appellant City of Guelph achieved success on the appeal, the court found its conduct played a key role in fostering the dispute.

Consequently, the City was awarded reduced costs of $3,000 against the respondents.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that declared a Committee of Adjustment decision a nullity, invalidated a building permit, and awarded damages for nuisance, trespass, and a new roof.

The Court of Appeal upheld the nullity of the Committee's decision due to lack of notice to the respondents.

However, the Court reversed the finding that the building permit was invalid, noting it dealt with building standards rather than land use.

The Court affirmed that the constructed structure did not comply with the original decision or permit, upheld the damages awards for the roof and punitive damages, and dismissed the appellant's counterclaim for adverse possession of the party wall.

The Ministry of Transportation and the Consulting Engineers of Ontario sought judicial review of an order by the Information and Privacy Commissioner requiring the disclosure of evaluation scores awarded to consulting engineering firms bidding on highway construction projects.

The applicants argued the scores were exempt under sections 13, 17, and 18 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, finding that the Commissioner's interpretation and application of the exemptions were reasonable and that there was insufficient evidence to establish a reasonable expectation of harm from disclosure.

The moving parties brought a motion to have four applications heard together.

The applications all involved the interpretation of section 13 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act regarding 'advice or recommendations' in different factual contexts.

The court found that hearing the applications together would be in the interests of justice and would not cause substantial prejudice or inconvenience.

The motion was granted and the applications were ordered to be heard together.

The plaintiff employer settled a claim arising from its employee's fraudulent issuance of a performance bond, providing a release to the third-party contractor.

The release promised not to sue anyone who might claim contribution or indemnity from the contractor.

The plaintiff subsequently sued the employee, who then third-partied the contractor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to stay the plaintiff's action and the third-party claim as an abuse of process, finding that the plaintiff's undertaking not to seek amounts recoverable from the contractor was an impermissible unilateral amendment to the clear terms of the release.