Alexandra Heine

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that remitted a costs decision back to the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division.

The respondent, a lawyer, had successfully defended against professional misconduct charges and sought costs against the Law Society under Rule 25.01 for 'wasted costs'.

The Hearing Division denied costs, but the Divisional Court found the investigation was procedurally unfair and one-sided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Law Society's appeal, holding that while the Divisional Court erred in applying a procedural fairness framework, the Hearing Division erred in principle by taking a piecemeal approach to the Law Society's conduct and applying an overly rigid standard for wasted costs.

The matter was properly remitted for a holistic assessment of whether the Law Society's conduct caused wasted costs.

The appellant challenged convictions on three sexual assault counts and the custodial and ancillary sentencing orders.

The court held that the trial reasons adequately applied the reasonable doubt framework, addressed credibility and reliability concerns arising from complainant incapacity, and permitted meaningful appellate review.

It further held that the custodial term was fit, declined to admit fresh evidence concerning family caregiving circumstances, and upheld the 20-year SOIRA order as properly imposed under the governing statutory regime at sentencing.

A constitutional remedy request regarding registration obligations was left to a court of first instance due to an insufficient record.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

This criminal sentence appeal under the Youth Criminal Justice Act addressed the proper interpretation of s. 72(1) governing when a young person may receive an adult sentence.

The Court held that under s. 72(1)(a), the Crown must rebut the statutory presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness beyond a reasonable doubt, and that objective offence seriousness is not a proper factor at that first-stage developmental-age inquiry.

Applying that standard, the majority found legal errors in the sentencing analysis and concluded the Crown had not displaced the presumption on this record.

The appeal was allowed, the adult life sentence was set aside, and a youth sentence was imposed with remittal on pre-sentence custody credit and supervision conditions.

The applicant, Jim’s Towing, sought judicial review of the Durham Regional Police Service’s decision to award a towing contract to another company, alleging corruption and bias in the process.

The court found that the decision was a commercial one, not a public law matter, and thus not subject to judicial review.

The application was quashed for want of jurisdiction.

The moving party police services board brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review of its decision to award a towing contract to a competitor of the responding party.

The responding party alleged the procurement process was tainted by corruption and bias involving a senior police officer.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the decision to award the towing contract was a private, commercial decision rather than an exercise of statutory power with a sufficiently public character.

As such, the decision was not amenable to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

This was an endorsement on costs following a motion to strike brought by the moving parties under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although success on the underlying motion was divided, the court found that the respondent's late-in-the-day amendments and late service of materials prejudiced the moving parties and caused them to incur additional costs.

The court exercised its discretion to award costs on a partial indemnity scale to communicate that court processes and deadlines must be taken seriously.

Ultimately, the court ordered the respondent to pay $14,000.00 plus HST and disbursements to each of the two groups of moving parties.

The court considered a motion by several defendants to strike out claims in a civil action involving allegations of mortgage fraud, conspiracy, and related causes of action.

The moving defendants sought to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and as being frivolous and vexatious.

The court granted the motion in part, striking claims of negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence against the moving defendants without leave to amend, but allowed the claim against Mr. Geraci personally to be amended.

The court also addressed the admissibility of late-served motion materials and the requirements for amending pleadings in the face of a motion to strike.

The appellant appealed his first-degree murder conviction for a shooting in a bar, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he was the shooter.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including security video footage and a lay witness who identified an encounter with the appellant on the video.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in admitting the lay witness's testimony identifying the event and the appellant in the video, as it fell within exceptions to the lay opinion evidence rule.

The Court also found the trial judge adequately addressed evidentiary deficiencies and that the verdict was reasonable based on a meticulous video tracing exercise.

The appeal was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses pre-trial applications and rulings made during jury selection for the first-degree murder trial of Umar Zameer.

The court permitted challenges for cause based on publicity, the accused's race/ethnicity/religion, and connections to police officers.

Justice Molloy rejected the defence's request for multiple-choice questions, particularly those probing jurors' opinions on the criminal propensities of racial or religious groups, deeming them inquisitorial and ambiguous.

The judge emphasized an open-ended, conversational approach to questioning jurors to better assess impartiality.

The endorsement also details the reasoning for accepting two specific jurors despite objections from the Crown and defence, respectively, finding them capable of impartiality.

The trial ultimately resulted in a "not guilty" verdict for Mr. Zameer.

This decision addresses an evidentiary ruling made during a first-degree murder trial where the accused was ultimately acquitted.

The defence sought to admit prior consistent statements made by the accused's wife to police at the time of her husband's arrest, arguing they fell under an exception to the rule against prior consistent statements.

The court ruled these statements inadmissible for their truth, affirming that the Edgar exception, which allows for spontaneous statements of an accused upon arrest, does not extend to statements made by a witness, even if made under similar highly emotional and spontaneous circumstances.

The judge also made strong findings regarding the lack of credibility and collusion among certain police officers involved in the arrest.

This decision addresses the admissibility of three exculpatory statements made by the accused, Umar Zameer, who is charged with first-degree murder.

The court ruled that two spontaneous statements made at the scene of the arrest were admissible under the *Edgar* exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, but only if the accused testifies and is subject to cross-examination, and not for their truth.

A third statement made 12 hours later at the police station was deemed inadmissible due to lack of spontaneity and failure to meet any hearsay exception.

The court also clarified the distinction between *res gestae* and the *Edgar* exception, explicitly declining to follow a previous inconsistent decision (*R. v. Tavares*).

The applicant sought to set aside an arbitral award and a costs award, and for leave to appeal, under sections 45 and 46(1)6 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The application alleged procedural unfairness, exceeding jurisdiction by the arbitrator, and insufficient/non-independent reasons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was fair, the parties had ample opportunity to present their cases, the arbitrator did not exceed jurisdiction by not conducting a mediation (as the parties had moved to adjudication), and the reasons for the award were adequate and independent.