K.M. Weiler

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking, arguing that the trial judge failed to warn the jury about the dangers of in-dock identification evidence.

The Crown conceded this error for two of the counts, but the appellant further argued that the verdicts were unreasonable and acquittals should be entered.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and ordered a new trial on the two counts, but rejected the argument that the verdicts were unreasonable or that the conviction on the remaining count should be overturned.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for forcible confinement and assault, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his detention in the Secure Forensic Unit of CAMH.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its placement decision, failed to consider a less restrictive unit, and unfairly limited cross-examination of his treating psychiatrist.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable given the appellant's lack of insight, refusal of treatment, and the significant threat he posed to the public.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving.

Following his arrest, he was subjected to a routine strip search before being lodged in cells, which the Crown conceded violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The trial judge refused to grant a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1), finding that the search did not impact trial fairness and that police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the search due to safety concerns.

The summary appeal court dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding no error of law in the trial judge's application of the objective standard for strip searches.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that the trial judge failed to comply with s. 16.1(6) of the Canada Evidence Act by not explicitly asking the child complainant to promise to tell the truth.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that no particular words are required to comply with the provision, and the complainant's agreement after the trial judge explained the importance of telling the truth was sufficient.

The appellants appealed a summary dismissal of their claim that the respondent condominium corporation wrongfully registered liens against their units for unpaid common expenses.

The motion judge dismissed the wrongful registration claim but ordered a trial on the respondent's claim for legal fees related to the liens.

The appellants argued the dismissal might foreclose their ability to contest the legal fees at trial.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal to clarify the order, ensuring the appellants can argue both entitlement and amount of the legal fees at trial.

The motion judge's costs order was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a municipal by-law that restricted the operating hours of licensed body rub parlours.

The appellant argued the City acted unreasonably and lacked sufficient evidence connecting the nuisance to licensed operations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that under section 213 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, the by-law is not reviewable on the ground of reasonableness, and finding no palpable or overriding error in the application judge's evidentiary findings.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the quantum of trial costs payable to the cross-appellant, a lawyer who represented himself at trial.

The cross-appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $49,600, while the respondent suggested $1,000.

Applying the principle that self-represented lawyers are entitled to costs for work ordinarily done by retained counsel that results in an opportunity cost, the court fixed the cross-appellant's trial costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that ordered a new hearing regarding a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order under s. 117.05 of the Criminal Code.

The appeal judge had found that the hearing judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the Crown failed to raise a question of law of public importance or demonstrate a clear error of law requiring leave for the due administration of justice.

The Crown appealed the 90-day intermittent sentence and three years' probation imposed on a first-time offender for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The sentencing judge had erroneously concluded that a conditional sentence was statutorily unavailable for both counts and imposed a single global sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that while a conditional sentence was unavailable for the loaded firearm count, it was available for the defaced serial number count.

The court substituted individual sentences totaling two years less a day, allowing the offender to serve the majority of the sentence in the community to continue her rehabilitation.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing credibility and resolving inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.D. formula or her reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence over the appellant's.

The appeal was dismissed.