Kimberley Julia Walker

The appellant appealed convictions for assault with a weapon, assault causing bodily harm, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose arising from a road rage incident.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence and erred in rejecting the defence theory that the altercation was a consensual fight.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and conclusion that the appellant was the aggressor were entitled to deference and were supported by the evidence.

Although the appellate judge identified speculative reasoning regarding whether the complainant’s wound was caused by a sharp-edged instrument, the error was immaterial because the trial judge properly concluded the altercation was non‑consensual.

Applying Kienapple principles, the conviction for assault with a weapon was stayed but the appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The Crown appealed a provincial court ruling granting a judicial stay of impaired driving charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter for unreasonable delay.

The trial judge had attributed portions of delay to the Crown and institutional causes and concluded the appropriate time to trial was eight months, resulting in a stay after approximately 372 days from charge to trial.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the trial judge erred in assessing inherent intake time, improperly characterized certain periods as Crown delay, and overstated prejudice to the accused arising from disclosure-related attendances.

The court also found insufficient consideration of the strong societal interest in prosecuting impaired driving offences.

Rebalancing the Morin factors, the court concluded that systemic delay was within acceptable administrative guidelines and that the stay was unwarranted.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction decision finding him not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder for assault and uttering threats after spitting on and threatening a bus driver.

The trial judge had accepted psychiatric evidence diagnosing schizophrenia and concluding that delusional beliefs rendered the appellant incapable of knowing his actions were wrong under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the appellant argued the NCR finding was unreasonable because the expert did not explicitly ask whether he knew his actions were wrong and because he testified that he did.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge reasonably relied on the psychiatric evidence and the appellant’s disorganized testimony to conclude that his delusions prevented him from knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The evidentiary record supported the NCR finding on a balance of probabilities.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing to attend court contrary to s. 145(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused had a lawful excuse for failing to attend a scheduled court appearance after admitting the actus reus of the offence.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge misapprehended evidence relating to whether his retained counsel had appeared with him on an earlier date, which allegedly affected the credibility assessment.

The appeal court acknowledged that a misapprehension occurred but held that it related to a collateral issue and did not play an essential role in the trial judge’s reasoning process.

The conviction and sentence appeals were therefore dismissed.

In a judge-alone retrial involving historical allegations of sexual abuse by a mother's intimate partner against two child complainants, the court separately assessed the allegations because evidence of collaboration undermined the force of similar fact reasoning.

The court found the evidence relating to one complainant insufficiently reliable to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, given inconsistencies, frailties in disclosure, and surrounding family dynamics.

However, the allegations of the other complainant were accepted as credible and reliable, supported by circumstantial evidence and, most significantly, a surreptitious tape-recorded conversation treated as containing implicit admissions.

Convictions were entered on two counts, with acquittals on the remaining two.

The accused, a 13-year-old youth, was arrested for robbery and placed in a police cruiser.

The arresting officer read him standard adult rights to counsel but failed to advise him of his enhanced rights under s. 146 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

After 36 minutes in custody, the youth made two spontaneous inculpatory statements.

The Crown sought to admit the statements under s. 146(3) of the YCJA.

The court found the statements were voluntary and spontaneous, but ruled them inadmissible because the officer had a reasonable opportunity to comply with s. 146(2) during the 36-minute period but failed to do so due to a lack of awareness of the YCJA provisions.