Defamation

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice regarding a defamation claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for reasons given in a related file.

The court also noted that a non-party making allegations against the respondent physician had no standing in the appeal.

The appellant appealed an order disposing of a defamation matter on the basis of qualified and common law privilege.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge as there was no triable issue regarding malice, making it unnecessary to determine the truth of the statements complained of.

The appellant, a lawyer, sued the respondents for defamation over a newspaper article reporting on a costs award against him and fraud charges against his former client.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim regarding the costs award report based on common law privilege, but allowed the claim regarding the remaining words to proceed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in bifurcating the claim, but agreed that the report of the costs award was protected by privilege.

The Court further held that coupling the report of the costs award with the report of the client's fraud charges was not capable of bearing a defamatory meaning linking the appellant to the fraud.

The appeal was allowed to set aside the motion judge's order, and the action was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation based on two letters.

Upon discovering the letters had not been published, the plaintiffs brought a motion to dismiss their own action and sought costs against the defendants.

The motion judge treated the motion as a discontinuance and awarded costs to the defendants under Rule 23.05.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a plaintiff cannot move to dismiss its own action to avoid the presumptive costs consequences of discontinuance.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation claim against his former employer.

The claim was based on the employer submitting a statutory form to employment insurance authorities stating the appellant had been 'dismissed' and a follow-up statement that the dismissal was for breach of policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge.

The court held that the statements were protected by qualified privilege and there was no evidence of malice to overcome that privilege.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for defamation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the statements were defamatory and that the defence of fair comment failed because the statements could not be distinguished as opinion rather than fact, and because the trial judge's finding of malice was soundly based in the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his action based on absolute privilege and declaring him a vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that the alleged statements were protected by absolute privilege and that the appellant had persistently and without reasonable grounds instituted vexatious proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant employer appealed a judgment awarding the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal and slander.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's factual findings, including that the dismissal allegations were not sincere and were motivated by a desire to remove long-serving employees, were open on the evidence and answered the employer's arguments.

The court also upheld the defamation finding, concluding that any qualified privilege was defeated by the equivalent of a finding of malice.

The respondent's cross-appeal for increased slander damages, punitive and aggravated damages, and damages for intentional infliction of mental distress was dismissed.

The appellant, the Leader of the Official Opposition, appealed an order striking out parts of his statement of defence in a defamation action brought by the respondent, a Cabinet Minister.

The action arose from statements made by the appellant regarding the respondent's alleged interference in an Ontario Municipal Board matter.

The motion judge had struck out paragraphs relating to fair comment, justification, qualified privilege, and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reinstating the paragraphs detailing particulars of fair comment and justification, finding the motion judge failed to balance oppression against relevance.

The Court also reinstated the defence of qualified privilege, holding it was not plain and obvious that the defence could not succeed given the ongoing public interest in the issue.

Leave to amend the statement of defence was granted.