Defamation

The plaintiff brought a motion for civil contempt against the defendant for failing to comply with a previous court order that required the defendant to remove defamatory social media posts, refrain from further defamation, and publish a retraction.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the order was clear and unequivocal, the defendant had actual knowledge of it, and the defendant intentionally breached all three directives.

The court found the defendant in contempt and scheduled a second-stage hearing for sentencing, giving the defendant an opportunity to purge her contempt in the interim.

The plaintiffs brought a defamation action against the defendants regarding statements made during a union organizing drive where the plaintiffs sought to displace the incumbent union.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3)(a), arguing the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) had exclusive jurisdiction.

Applying the Weber analysis, the court determined the essential character of the dispute concerned alleged misrepresentations during a displacement campaign, which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the OLRB under the Labour Relations Act, 1995.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to find the defendant in contempt of a previous court order requiring him to publish an apology for defamatory statements on social media.

The defendant failed to properly publish the apology until the hearing itself.

The court found the defendant in contempt but noted he had purged it during the hearing.

The defendant was sentenced to a conditional discharge with 12 months of probation, prohibiting him from repeating defamatory statements, and was ordered to pay costs on a full indemnity scale.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the defamation action against him.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that partial summary judgment was inappropriate because the issues were intertwined with claims against other defendants and a trial was already scheduled.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that partial summary judgment could lead to inconsistent findings and would not achieve a proportionate, cost-effective, and timely dispute resolution given the upcoming trial.

The plaintiff, a university instructor, brought a motion for default judgment in a defamation action against a former friend who posted false and malicious tweets accusing her of being a sexual predator.

The defendant did not defend the action.

The court found the tweets were highly defamatory, widely published, and motivated by malice.

The court awarded $75,000 in general and aggravated damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and ordered a permanent injunction and a 60-day retraction on the defendant's Twitter account.

The applicants, six individuals with ongoing litigation against the respondent, brought an application under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant and stay all her proceedings.

The respondent had initiated over 50 proceedings, many involving allegations of sexual assault and defamation against former romantic partners.

Despite finding that the respondent exhibited many badges of vexatious conduct, the court dismissed the application, emphasizing the importance of allowing civil claims of sexual assault to be adjudicated on their merits rather than being summarily stayed.

The defendants, a national broadcaster and its employees, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The plaintiff, a student travel company, alleged that the defendants' reporting on the death of a student during a trip was defamatory.

The court found that the expression related to a matter of public interest and that the plaintiff failed to show there was no valid defence, specifically the defence of fair comment.

The court also found the balance of harms favoured protecting the expression, and dismissed the action.

The defendants submitted a requisition to stay a defamation action under Rule 2.1.01, arguing the self-represented plaintiff was an alias for a declared vexatious litigant.

The court declined to stay the action, noting that evidence is inadmissible on a Rule 2.1.01 requisition, making it impossible to conclude the plaintiff was an alias.

Furthermore, the court found the statement of claim was not clearly frivolous or abusive on its face, leaving the defendants to seek dismissal through other procedural means.

The moving parties (defendants by counterclaim) brought a motion for summary judgment on their counterclaim for defamation and loss of business reputation against the responding party (plaintiff).

The responding party had previously brought an action claiming ownership of a classic Ferrari, which was dismissed.

After the moving parties purchased the vehicle and sold it to a third party, the responding party's counsel sent an email to an auction house falsely claiming the vehicle was stolen.

The court found the statements were defamatory, false, and not protected by qualified privilege.

The court awarded $500,000 in damages for loss of business reputation due to the abrupt end of a profitable business relationship caused by the defamatory statements.

The claim for punitive damages was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a contempt motion against the self-represented defendant for allegedly violating a permanent injunction prohibiting defamatory statements.

At a case conference, the defendant requested an adjournment to retain counsel and apply for legal aid.

The court explained the serious nature of the contempt proceedings, including the potential for a jail term, and adjourned the case conference to allow the defendant time to secure legal representation.

The defendant brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice.

The plaintiffs, an osteopathic federation and its president, sued the defendant insurer for defamation after the insurer delisted their services.

The court applied the five-factor test from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children and found that the complexity of the issues, the need for expert evidence, the need for discovery, and the general importance of the matter favoured a transfer.

The court also noted the plaintiffs sought mandatory orders beyond the Small Claims Court's jurisdiction.

The motion to transfer was granted.

The self-represented plaintiff moved for leave to amend his statement of claim to add several new causes of action and for further documentary production from the defendant bank.

The court denied most of the proposed amendments, finding them to be statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, or untenable based on prior court rulings.

However, the court allowed amendments related to bad faith referencing, intentional interference with economic relations, breach of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court also ordered the defendant to produce certain documents related to the allowed claims, while denying production of other requested documents.

No costs were awarded due to divided success.

The plaintiffs and defendants, former business partners in the security surveillance equipment industry, brought competing motions for interlocutory injunctive relief following a bitter separation.

The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from using a disputed trademark, accessing the plaintiffs' computer systems, and making defamatory statements.

The defendants cross-moved to enjoin the plaintiffs from competing and soliciting customers.

The court dismissed the trademark injunction, finding damages were an adequate remedy, but granted the injunctions regarding computer access, website redirection, and defamation.

The defendants' cross-motion was dismissed as premature and lacking evidence of irreparable harm.

The plaintiff's motion to add Ken Rubin as a defendant in a defamation action based on his freedom of information requests was previously dismissed.

In this costs decision, the Master applied the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act by analogy.

Finding no reason to deviate from the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs under s. 137.1(7), the Master awarded the successful proposed defendant his requested costs of $15,000.

A case management conference was held regarding four defamation actions against the defendant, who failed to attend.

The defendant had previously failed to deliver motion materials for a stay and responding materials for summary judgment motions.

The court noted the defendant in default in one of the actions for failing to file a statement of defence as ordered.

Directions and deadlines were set for the plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment and default judgment.

The plaintiff law firm brought a motion for an order excluding the public from the trial of its action against the defendant and prohibiting disclosure of information relating to the action.

The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction preventing the defendant from publishing allegedly defamatory statements.

The court dismissed the request for an in camera trial, finding it was not necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice, as the allegations were already in the public domain.

Instead, the court ordered a limited publication ban directed at the defamatory statements and continued an existing sealing order.

The applicant commenced an application in the Superior Court seeking to declare previous Small Claims Court and Divisional Court decisions against her as nullities, alleging fraud.

The respondent submitted a requisition under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the application.

The court found that the applicant was attempting to re-litigate issues that had already been finally decided and for which she had exhausted all appeals.

The court dismissed the application under Rule 2.1 as a collateral attack, finding it to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought leave under section 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to commence a defamation claim against the respondents and raise constitutional issues.

The court found that the applicant failed to provide a coherent cause of action or evidentiary basis for the proposed claims.

Instead, the applicant improperly focused on challenging a previous order staying the proceedings.

The application for leave was dismissed as an abuse of process lacking reasonable grounds.

The defendants submitted a requisition to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff claimed defamation and intentional infliction of mental suffering arising from a television broadcast about mental health, seeking $11.1 million and a public broadcast of her own.

The court found the statement of claim lacked material facts, failed to identify how the plaintiff was harmed or named in the broadcast, and was an abuse of process.

The action was dismissed as frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiffs, a cable installation company and its director, sued the City of Brantford and its IT manager for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and abuse of public office.

The IT manager made false and malicious statements about the quality of the plaintiffs' work to a supplier and others, motivated by complaints the plaintiffs had made against him.

The court found the statements were defamatory and an abuse of public office, awarding $75,000 in general damages and $75,000 in punitive damages, but dismissed the claim for lost profits.