Consent and Capacity Board

The appellant, diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the physician applied the wrong legal test, lacked corroborating evidence under the Evidence Act, and that the record did not support a finding of incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly concluded the physician applied the proper test, the evidence was sufficiently corroborated by other doctors and the appellant's own testimony, and the record supported the finding that the appellant's denial of any mental condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the consequences of treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding a finding that he was incapable of consenting to a Community Treatment Plan and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant argued that his capacity to consent to the plan should be assessed based only on his understanding of its administrative consequences, separate from his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

He also argued that the likelihood of substantial mental deterioration required for an order must occur within its six-month lifespan.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the therapeutic aspects of a plan cannot be ignored in the capacity test, and that the legislation does not require a precise temporality of within six months for the likelihood of mental deterioration.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her attending physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and mood stabilizing medication.

The appellant argued that a breakdown in the therapeutic relationship, rather than mental illness, caused her failure to appreciate the consequences of treatment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion regarding anti-psychotic medication, as there was evidence she suffered from bipolar disorder and could not apply treatment information to herself.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding mood stabilizing medication, finding no evidentiary basis for the Board's conclusion on that specific class of medication.

The appellant, suffering from schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

During the Board hearing, the appellant discharged his counsel and represented himself despite experiencing significant delusions.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the appellant had a constitutional right to represent himself, the Board denied him procedural fairness by failing to appoint his discharged counsel as amicus curiae to assist the Board in ensuring a fair hearing.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of making treatment decisions regarding antipsychotic and ancillary side effect medications.

The appellant argued the Board erred in finding that the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the treatment were that his condition would improve, and erred in finding him incapable regarding ancillary medications without specific evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's findings were reasonable and supported by the psychiatric evidence.

The court also confirmed that under section 23 of the Health Care Consent Act, a finding of incapacity for a primary treatment extends to necessary and ancillary treatments, including side effect medications.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued the issuing physician failed to consult with the named health practitioners and that the substitute decision-maker had not signed the required undertaking when the CTO was issued.

The Superior Court found the Board's conclusion regarding consultation was reasonable.

However, the court held that the Board erred in law by not requiring the substitute decision-maker's undertaking to be in place before the CTO was issued.

The appeal was allowed and the CTO was quashed.

The appellant, an inpatient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and incapable of managing his property.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence and reached unreasonable conclusions.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review to the Board's findings of mixed fact and law.

The court found that the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decisions, due to his denial of illness and paranoid delusions, were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant, who has a history of schizophrenia, wished to discontinue his medication.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's conclusion—that the appellant failed the 'appreciation test' for capacity because he did not accept his mental illness—was fully supported by the clinical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her attending psychiatrist's finding that she was incapable of consenting to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, who had a long-standing diagnosis of schizoaffective disorders and schizophrenia, did not believe she had a mental condition and maintained that the medication was harming her.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant was unable to apply relevant information to her circumstances or appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a decision regarding her treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party physician sought an order under s. 19 of the Health Care Consent Act to authorize treatment of the respondent with clozapine pending her appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

The respondent, who suffers from treatment-resistant schizophrenia and exhibits violent and hyper-sexual behaviour, opposed the motion.

The court addressed evidentiary issues, admitting some hearsay in medical records and accepting the treating psychiatrist as a participant expert.

The court found that the statutory criteria were met, as clozapine was likely to substantially improve her condition, the benefits outweighed the risks, it was the least restrictive option, and her deteriorating condition made treatment necessary before the appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its capacity finding and that the criteria for the order were not met, specifically alleging a failure to provide prompt rights advice.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the correctness standard to questions of law and reasonableness to mixed fact and law, ultimately finding no error in the Board's determinations.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, a patient at a mental health centre, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

A teleconference was scheduled to set dates for factums and the appeal hearing, but the self-represented appellant failed to attend.

The court ordered deadlines for the filing of factums and scheduled a motion requested by the respondent for an Interim Treatment Order under section 19 of the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and ancillary medications.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the test for capacity and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably applied the statutory test and Supreme Court jurisprudence in concluding the appellant's mental disorder prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his treating physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who had previously been found not criminally responsible for second-degree murder, argued the Board unfairly characterized his evidence and erred in applying the capacity test by focusing on his disagreement with the schizophrenia diagnosis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded the appellant lacked capacity because he was unable to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental illness, preventing him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decision.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to anti-psychotic medication and a Community Treatment Plan, and confirming a Community Treatment Order.

The Superior Court upheld the Board's finding on incapacity, noting the appellant's lack of insight into her condition.

However, the court granted the appeal regarding the Community Treatment Order, finding it invalid because the Community Treatment Plan was not 'entered into' by all required parties within 72 hours of the physician's examination, as required by the Mental Health Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found him incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant, who suffers from a primary psychotic disorder, argued he was capable.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the Board's application of the two-part test under the Health Care Consent Act.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the court upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked the ability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decision due to his lack of insight into his illness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment under the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant, who had been found NCR for First Degree Murder and diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, stopped taking his medication and his mental health deteriorated.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant lacked insight into his illness and could not appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her attending physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications.

The appellant argued the Board misapplied the statutory test for capacity, lacked evidentiary support, and relied on uncorroborated evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly applied the test from Starson v. Swayze, and its conclusion that the appellant lacked insight into her condition and could not appreciate the consequences of treatment was reasonable and supported by the record.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of a Community Treatment Order and her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal being heard, the Community Treatment Order expired and was not renewed.

The respondent moved to quash the appeals on the basis of mootness.

The court granted the motion and quashed the appeals, finding that there was no longer a live controversy and a decision would have no practical effect.