O. Benjamin Vincents

The accused was charged with attempted murder and related firearms offences following a shooting.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, as the accused was arrested shortly after the shooting in possession of the firearm used.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the shooter or a party to the offence.

However, the court found the accused knowingly assisted the shooter by fleeing with the weapon.

The court amended the indictment to conform to the evidence and convicted the accused of being an accessory after the fact to discharging a firearm with intent to wound.

The accused was charged with pointing a firearm at a police officer and various firearm possession offences following a foot pursuit.

The court admitted the hearsay statement of an unknown dog-walker who pointed out the fleeing suspect under the spontaneous utterance exception.

The court found the officer's identification of the accused and observation of the firearm to be reliable.

The accused was found guilty of pointing a firearm, possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, and breaching a prohibition order and recognizance.

The accused was charged with multiple firearms offences following a shooting and subsequent police pursuit.

At trial, the defence brought several Charter applications alleging excessive use of force by the Emergency Task Force during the arrest, an unlawful roadside strip search, excessive force during transport, and a delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court dismissed all applications, finding that the force used was necessary and reasonable given the accused's resistance and the dangerous circumstances.

The court also held that the roadside search was a lawful pat-down, not a strip search, and that the brief delay in advising the accused of his rights was justified by exigent circumstances including officer safety and the need for immediate medical assessment.

A minor breach of s. 10(b) occurred when officers asked questions before rights were given, but no evidence was excluded under s. 24(2).

In a trial for attempted murder and firearms offences, the Crown sought to introduce expert opinion evidence from a forensic firearms examiner to prove that spent shell casings found at the crime scene were fired by a handgun recovered near the accused.

The defence challenged the reliability of the expert's methodology, relying on a prior decision that rejected similar evidence.

The court admitted the expert evidence, finding the scientific foundation valid, the methodology reliable, and noting that the defence failed to put its critical literature to the expert during cross-examination.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of his Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by reading in a 'but for the CTO' requirement when assessing whether he met the criteria under the Mental Health Act, given he was currently asymptomatic due to medication compliance.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while words should not be read into the statute, a proper purposive interpretation of section 15(1.1) inherently accounts for the patient's history and the likelihood of deterioration if left untreated.

The applicant appealed a board decision confirming the validity of a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

By the time of the appeal, the CTO had expired and had not been renewed.

The court found the appeal was moot because a decision would have no practical effect on the parties' rights, and declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue.

The court also held that the board's decision was reasonable and its reasons were sufficient, even though it did not explicitly detail the requirement for 'continuing supervision,' as the evidence supported the finding.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his involuntary admission to a hospital.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the certificate of involuntary admission expired and the appellant was discharged.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion to declare the appeal moot.

The court granted the motion, finding no live controversy existed and declining to exercise its discretion to hear the case, as future proceedings based on the Board's findings were too speculative.

The accused, a designated long-term offender subject to a long‑term supervision order, was charged under s. 753.3(1) of the Criminal Code for breaching a condition prohibiting internet access except for employment purposes with written authorization.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that police and correctional officials had tampered with his cellphone and planted electronic evidence, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

The court rejected the allegations of evidence planting and found no Charter breach, concluding the defence failed to establish misconduct on a balance of probabilities.

Although certain cellphone browsing data was given no evidentiary weight due to uncertainty about its origin, other forensic evidence and witness testimony demonstrated that the accused accessed the internet to create and use an online dating profile during the prohibited period.

The court found the offence proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A mother appealed a Crown wardship and no-access order made following a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s findings regarding kinship placement with the maternal grandmother and alleged errors in weighing evidence, assessing the grandmother’s plan, and considering expert psychological evidence.

The court held that the trial judge applied the correct statutory framework under the CFSA, properly considered kinship placement, and made factual findings supported by the evidence.

The appellant failed to demonstrate palpable and overriding error or an error of law.

Fresh evidence regarding the grandmother’s post‑trial efforts did not justify disturbing the disposition given the child’s need for stability and permanency.