Myers

The parties settled a wrongful dismissal action for $15,000 but could not agree on costs.

The plaintiff sought costs, while the defendant argued no costs should be awarded due to the plaintiff's conduct and the small settlement amount.

The court found the defendant fought the case aggressively and that a plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action should reasonably expect partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff $30,000 in costs, inclusive of a $3,000 deduction for the defendant's costs of finalizing the settlement.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion for a preservation order and an Anton Piller order, alleging the defendant stole $15 million in digital assets.

The court found a strong prima facie case of conversion and noted the defendant's efforts to conceal his identity and transactions.

The court granted the preservation order to freeze the specific digital tokens and the Anton Piller order to allow search and seizure of the defendant's wallet passwords, emphasizing that the law applies to the internet and digital assets.

The plaintiff successfully resisted the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant had sought to enforce an alleged pre-litigation settlement but failed to establish that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of the motion on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $17,000, noting the strategic risk and power imbalance inherent in motion practice in wrongful dismissal actions.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming the renewal of his Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by reading in a 'but for the CTO' requirement when assessing whether he met the criteria under the Mental Health Act, given he was currently asymptomatic due to medication compliance.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while words should not be read into the statute, a proper purposive interpretation of section 15(1.1) inherently accounts for the patient's history and the likelihood of deterioration if left untreated.

The plaintiff, a U.S. business registered to collect HST, successfully appealed a $14 million CRA tax assessment but incurred over $1.4 million in interest and professional fees.

The plaintiff sued the government for indemnity and negligence, alleging the CRA acted in bad faith during the audit.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motion, finding that neither the common law nor the Excise Tax Act provides a right to indemnity for such costs, and that the CRA does not owe a private law duty of care to taxpayers or tax collection agents during an audit.

The patient, who was found not criminally responsible and detained in a high-security forensic hospital, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding he lacked capacity to consent to treatment.

The treating doctor brought a motion under section 19 of the Health Care Consent Act to authorize antipsychotic medication pending the appeal.

The court granted the motion, finding that the patient's condition was unstable, he suffered from severe delusions, and the proposed treatment was likely to substantially improve his condition with the benefits outweighing the risks.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowners for unpaid invoices related to a major home renovation.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was tolled due to mediation and the defendants' enrollment in the Tarion warranty process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the complex factual matrix and the interplay between the Tarion process and the construction contract could not be fairly and justly adjudicated on a summary record without a full trial.

The plaintiff commenced an action in 1989 alleging the defendants dumped coal tar waste that migrated onto its property.

After 25 years of litigation, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that while the initial 14 years of delay were excusable due to collaborative settlement efforts, the plaintiff's failure to advance the litigation after 2003 was inordinate and inexcusable.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, as it had not preserved the evidence of key witnesses who had since passed away.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that set aside an amended statement of claim delivered while the defendants' motion to strike was outstanding.

The plaintiff had aggressively sought default judgments without notice despite knowing the defendants were represented and actively defending.

The court upheld the Master's reliance on the established practice requiring leave or consent to amend a pleading in the face of a motion to strike.

The court also noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct must be read with the Principles of Civility, and adopting technical interpretations of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deny a represented defendant the right to be heard is not condoned.

The appeal was dismissed.