Consent and Capacity Board

The appellant, diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding his treating psychiatrist's finding that he was incapable of making treatment decisions regarding anti-psychotic medication.

The appellant argued the physician applied the wrong legal test, lacked corroborating evidence under the Evidence Act, and that the record did not support a finding of incapacity.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly concluded the physician applied the proper test, the evidence was sufficiently corroborated by other doctors and the appellant's own testimony, and the record supported the finding that the appellant's denial of any mental condition rendered him incapable of appreciating the consequences of treatment.

The applicant sought an urgent injunction to prevent the respondent physician from performing an apnea test on the patient, who had suffered a severe brain injury, to determine neurological death.

The patient's mother, acting as substitute decision-maker, refused consent for the test and applied to the Consent and Capacity Board to determine if the test constituted 'treatment' under the Health Care Consent Act.

The physician argued the test was an assessment not requiring consent and that the Board lacked jurisdiction.

The court granted the injunction, holding that the Board is the appropriate body to determine at first instance whether an apnea test constitutes 'treatment' requiring consent under the Act, and that the RJR-MacDonald test for an interim injunction was met.

The parents of a one-year-old infant who suffered a catastrophic brain injury appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

The Board had found that the parents failed to comply with the principles of substitute decision-making under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 by refusing to consent to the withdrawal of life support proposed by the treating physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board made no error in its objective assessment that the withdrawal of life support was in the infant's best interests, given her irreversible condition and lack of any prospect of recovery.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment for schizophrenia and confirming his involuntary admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Board made palpable and overriding errors by concluding the appellant lacked capacity simply because he denied having schizophrenia, and by ignoring evidence that he appreciated the consequences of treatment.

The Court also found insufficient evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant's mental disorder would likely result in serious physical impairment due to missed dialysis appointments.

The appeal was allowed, the Board's decision was quashed, and the appellant was ordered released from hospital.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming she was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications for a schizoaffective condition.

The appellant, supported by amicus curiae, argued the initial capacity assessment was inadequate and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant could not recognize she was affected by manifestations of a mental condition and was therefore unable to appreciate the consequences of treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board upholding her attending physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic and mood stabilizing medication.

The appellant argued that a breakdown in the therapeutic relationship, rather than mental illness, caused her failure to appreciate the consequences of treatment.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion regarding anti-psychotic medication, as there was evidence she suffered from bipolar disorder and could not apply treatment information to herself.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding mood stabilizing medication, finding no evidentiary basis for the Board's conclusion on that specific class of medication.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his attending physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider evidence that his psychosis was drug-induced, ignored family dynamics, and failed to address a prior Board decision finding him capable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test under the Health Care Consent Act and had ample cogent evidence to conclude the appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to consent to a Community Treatment Plan and upholding the issuance of a Community Treatment Order.

The court first determined that although the CTO had expired, the appeal was only partially moot and should be heard on the merits.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found no error in the Board's dismissal of preliminary motions regarding the procedural requirements of the CTO.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, as she was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The self-represented appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming her incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The respondent requested the appointment of amicus curiae because the appellant had not taken steps to perfect the appeal.

The court directed Legal Aid Ontario to investigate the appellant's legal aid status and ordered the appointment of amicus curiae if a certificate could not be issued expeditiously.

The appellant, a 24-year-old man diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment and confirming a Community Treatment Order (CTO).

The appellant argued that he did better off the CTO and that his suicide attempt while on a previous CTO demonstrated that the CTO caused substantial mental deterioration.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decisions.

The court found that the Board reasonably concluded the appellant lacked insight into his illness and would likely suffer substantial mental deterioration without the CTO, given his history of decompensation and non-compliance with medication when not subject to an order.

The appellant, suffering from schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

During the Board hearing, the appellant discharged his counsel and represented himself despite experiencing significant delusions.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the appellant had a constitutional right to represent himself, the Board denied him procedural fairness by failing to appoint his discharged counsel as amicus curiae to assist the Board in ensuring a fair hearing.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her attending physicians' finding that she was incapable of managing her property.

The appellant argued the assessment was flawed and that her limited income negated the need for property management.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision.

The court found that the appellant's delusional beliefs regarding property ownership and marriage prevented her from understanding information relevant to her housing and discharge planning, thereby satisfying the test for incapacity.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and upholding a Community Treatment Order.

The appellant, who has a history of schizophrenia, wished to discontinue his medication.

The court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board's conclusion—that the appellant failed the 'appreciation test' for capacity because he did not accept his mental illness—was fully supported by the clinical evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming a psychiatrist’s finding that the patient was incapable of consenting to or refusing treatment with antipsychotic and related medications.

The appeal concerned the statutory test for incapacity under s. 4(1) of the Health Care Consent Act and whether the Board’s findings were reasonable.

Applying the reasonableness standard from Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court held the Board reasonably concluded that the patient could not understand relevant treatment information or appreciate the consequences of refusing treatment due to a mental disorder.

The Board was entitled to rely on the psychiatrist’s evidence and aspects of the patient’s testimony demonstrating lack of insight into the illness.

No basis existed for judicial interference.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming that he lacked capacity to consent to treatment for a mental disorder under the Health Care Consent Act.

The Board found the appellant incapable of consenting to treatment due to delusional beliefs preventing appreciation of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing medication.

The court held that the Board’s finding of incapacity with respect to anti‑psychotic medication and related side‑effect medication was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

However, the evidentiary record contained insufficient information regarding benzodiazepines and cholinergic medication.

The appeal was therefore allowed in part and the matter remitted to the Board for a rehearing on those medications before a differently constituted panel.

Appeal from two Consent and Capacity Board decisions confirming involuntary status and treatment incapacity for a psychiatric patient.

The court held the involuntary admission appeal was moot after the appellant's discharge under a Community Treatment Order and declined to exercise discretion to hear it.

On the treatment incapacity appeal, the court applied the s. 4 Health Care Consent Act, 1996 test and found the Board's conclusion on the first branch was unreasonable, but upheld the second branch for antipsychotic and mood stabilizing treatment.

The appeal succeeded only in relation to benzodiazepines and related side effect medication and lab tests because the evidentiary record was insufficient, and that issue was remitted to the Board for re-hearing.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court considered whether the Board lacked jurisdiction due to panel composition, the proper legal test for capacity under s. 4(1) of the Act, the applicable standard of review, and whether the Board’s application of the test was reasonable.

The court held that tribunal expertise justified deference regardless of the individual qualifications of panel members and that the standard of review for the Board’s application of law to facts was reasonableness.

The Board reasonably concluded that although the appellant could understand relevant information, symptoms described as perseveration and grandiosity prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of defensible outcomes and was upheld.

The appellant, who had been detained in psychiatric facilities since 1984, appealed a Superior Court decision upholding a Consent and Capacity Board finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.

Prior to the appeal hearing, the appellant was transferred to a new facility where his new treatment team implemented a successful non-pharmacological treatment program.

As no anti-psychotic medication was being proposed or anticipated, the amicus curiae suggested the appeal was moot.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant would suffer no prejudice as the statutory six-month bar for a new review application had expired, and a material change in circumstances would justify leave for a new application regardless.

The appeal was quashed as moot.