Kendra Naidoo

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his attending physician's finding that he was incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider evidence that his psychosis was drug-induced, ignored family dynamics, and failed to address a prior Board decision finding him capable.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test under the Health Care Consent Act and had ample cogent evidence to conclude the appellant lacked the capacity to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of a treatment decision.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision confirming his incapacity to consent to antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a 'new hearing' to assess his capacity as of the rehearing date, rather than reassessing his capacity as of the original 2018 hearing date as ordered by the court.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that a 'rehearing' under s. 80(10)(c) of the Health Care Consent Act requires a contemporaneous assessment of capacity, and admitting new evidence for that purpose was appropriate.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her treating physician's finding that she was incapable of consenting to electro-convulsive therapy (ECT).

The appellant also sought a declaration that ECT amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under section 12 of the Charter.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter claim exceeded the scope of the appeal and should be brought as a separate application.

The court upheld the Board's decision on capacity, concluding it was reasonable and supported by evidence that the appellant's mental condition rendered her unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of consenting to or refusing ECT.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication under the Health Care Consent Act, 1996.

The court considered whether the Board lacked jurisdiction due to panel composition, the proper legal test for capacity under s. 4(1) of the Act, the applicable standard of review, and whether the Board’s application of the test was reasonable.

The court held that tribunal expertise justified deference regardless of the individual qualifications of panel members and that the standard of review for the Board’s application of law to facts was reasonableness.

The Board reasonably concluded that although the appellant could understand relevant information, symptoms described as perseveration and grandiosity prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The Board’s decision fell within a range of defensible outcomes and was upheld.

A physician brought a motion under s. 19(2) of the Health Care Consent Act, 1996 seeking authorization to administer antipsychotic and related medications to a psychiatric patient pending the disposition of an appeal from a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding the patient incapable of consenting to treatment.

The patient opposed treatment and had appealed the Board’s incapacity determination.

The court considered whether the statutory criteria for interim treatment were satisfied, including whether the treatment would substantially improve the patient’s condition, whether deterioration would occur without treatment, whether the benefits outweighed the risks, and whether the proposed plan was the least restrictive alternative.

Based on medical evidence of severe deterioration, violent incidents, and the likelihood of improvement with medication, the court found all criteria met.

The physician was authorized to administer the proposed medications pending the final determination of the appeal.

The defendants sought to dismiss the plaintiffs' medical malpractice action for delay at a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The action was commenced in 2007, but the plaintiffs failed to advance the litigation, missing deadlines for documentary discovery and examinations for discovery.

The court found a complete lack of communication between the plaintiffs and their counsel, and no acceptable explanation for the delay.

The court also found that the defendants would suffer prejudice due to the passage of time, as the events occurred in 2005.

The action was dismissed for delay.