H.M. Pierce

The plaintiff sought leave to amend its statement of claim to add a new defendant, Wasaya Petroleum LP, to its action, and to compel answers to questions refused at discovery.

The proposed defendant and existing defendant objected on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

The court found that the plaintiff had sufficient information to discover the claim against the proposed defendant several years prior, based on band council resolutions and pleadings in a related action.

The motion to amend was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the motion to compel answers was dismissed as irrelevant.

The accused, an Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to manslaughter after fatally stabbing the victim once in the chest during an argument while heavily intoxicated.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the offence was near-murder, while the defence proposed four to seven years.

Applying Gladue principles and weighing the accused's remorse, guilty plea, and history of trauma against the aggravating factors of intoxication and use of a weapon, the court imposed a sentence of six years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The moving parties (respondents in the main application) brought a motion to strike out the responding party's application, arguing that the dispute over the interpretation of a business sale agreement should proceed by way of an action rather than an application.

The underlying dispute involved the location of a fourth sewage site to be developed under the contract.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that the application framework under Rule 14.05(3)(d) was appropriate for contractual interpretation, even if some factual context was required, and that it was not plain and obvious that the application could not succeed.

The applicant, charged with manslaughter, brought an application to exclude his clothing from evidence, arguing it was seized from his father's apartment during a warrantless search in violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his father's home based on his familial and cultural background.

The court held the search was unreasonable as there were no exigent circumstances and the father did not provide valid, informed consent.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), emphasizing the seriousness of the police conduct in entering a dwelling without a warrant and the negative impact on the Indigenous community's trust in police.

Following the dismissal of its application challenging a COVID-19 business closure order, the applicant argued it should not pay costs because it was a public interest litigant raising novel issues.

The court rejected this argument, finding the applicant litigated for its own financial interests and the statutory interpretation issues were not novel.

The court also held that the Health Unit, having been added as a party on consent, was entitled to costs.

The applicant was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $35,000 to the Attorney General and $20,000 to the Health Unit.

The offender, an 18-year-old male, threw a heavy trailer hitch from a moving vehicle, striking an Indigenous woman and hastening her death.

He pleaded guilty to the underlying act and was convicted of manslaughter.

The Crown sought 8 to 12 years, arguing high moral culpability and bias against sex workers.

The defence sought 4 years, citing youth, lack of record, and remorse.

The court found the attack was unprovoked, gratuitous, and motivated by bias against women (specifically sex workers).

The court sentenced the offender to 8 years in penitentiary, less 1 month for pre-sentence custody, plus ancillary orders.

The applicant, a medical cosmetic care business operated by a registered nurse, sought a declaration that it was exempt from COVID-19 shutdown regulations because it provided health care services.

The Thunder Bay District Health Unit had directed the business to close on the basis that it provided personal care services.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, applying principles of statutory interpretation to find that the applicant's services were aesthetic and cosmetic in nature, not medical.

The court held that the business did not share the common features of health care clinics and was therefore subject to the mandatory closure of personal care services under the shutdown regulations.

The applicants, directors and majority shareholders of two corporations, sought an order that the corporations indemnify them for legal costs incurred in a winding-up application and a related action.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the applicants did not act honestly and in good faith.

The court found the applicants acted honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporations, despite the respondents' active opposition to the winding-up.

The court granted the motion, ordering the corporations to indemnify the applicants for their reasonable legal costs, less unbilled amounts and costs thrown away, and awarded costs of the motion to the applicants.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her attending physicians' finding that she was incapable of managing her property.

The appellant argued the assessment was flawed and that her limited income negated the need for property management.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision.

The court found that the appellant's delusional beliefs regarding property ownership and marriage prevented her from understanding information relevant to her housing and discharge planning, thereby satisfying the test for incapacity.

The plaintiff, a 65-year-old general manager, was terminated without cause or notice after five years of employment when the defendant corporation was shut down.

The defendant abandoned its defence at trial.

The court awarded nine months' notice, equivalent to $48,749.94.

The court declined to deduct the plaintiff's post-termination earnings from inferior positions, finding he was forced to accept them to mitigate his damages.

The court also awarded $7,500 in exemplary damages due to the defendant's bad faith conduct in blackening the plaintiff's character in the community.

The applicant owns two adjacent lots used for aggregate extraction.

The Planning Board took the position that one of the lots was zoned Rural, prohibiting extraction.

The applicant applied for a declaration under the Aggregate Resources Act that no zoning by-law prohibits the operation of pits and quarries on the lot, arguing it had a legal non-conforming use.

The court found that the lot had been used continuously for aggregate extraction since 1952, prior to the zoning by-law, and that the use had not been abandoned or intensified.

The court granted the declaration, confirming the legal non-conforming use.

The applicant husband and respondent wife separated after a six-year marriage.

The husband sought a declaration of resulting trust over three properties registered solely in the wife's name, as well as funds in a joint bank account.

The court found that the presumption of resulting trust was not rebutted for the properties, granting the husband a beneficial half-interest in each.

The court also found the joint bank account funds were jointly owned.

The court resolved disputes over the valuation of the husband's business shares at the date of marriage, preferring the wife's expert valuator, and determined the value of various disputed chattels, including tools and an engagement ring.

The husband's claim for an unequal division of net family property under s. 5(6) of the Family Law Act was dismissed.

The wife was ordered to pay an equalization payment to the husband.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug (Zopiclone).

He argued that his sections 7 and 8 Charter rights were breached and that the trial judge erred in finding he had the requisite mens rea, as he was taking the medication on a doctor's recommendation.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge made no errors of law, reasonably concluded the appellant voluntarily ingested a sedative he knew could impair his driving, and properly dismissed the Charter motions.

The applicants, a municipality and its mayor, sought declaratory and injunctive relief against a resident who sent vexatious and abusive communications and engaged in unauthorized road maintenance.

The applicants argued the resident's conduct triggered the town's workplace harassment policy under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The court dismissed the application for a declaration, finding the policy did not apply to a non-employee harassing the mayor at her separate, full-time workplace.

The court also dismissed the request for an interlocutory injunction, applying the RJR-MacDonald test and concluding the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried or irreparable harm.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion to admit fingerprint evidence obtained during a prior investigation of a break-in for which the accused was previously acquitted.

The Crown argued the evidence was necessary for the narrative of the police investigation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the prejudicial effect of admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct far outweighed its probative value, as it risked the jury engaging in impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court permitted the Crown to lead only a neutral statement regarding the reopening of the investigation.

The defendants brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiff, who was suing for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff argued he was impecunious and that an order would deny him access to justice.

The court found the plaintiff was impecunious but that his claim was almost certain to fail because the underlying criminal proceedings did not terminate in his favour (he pleaded guilty to two charges).

The court ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs, but reduced the amount sought by the defendants to avoid blocking access to the courts, ordering $15,000 to each set of defendants payable in instalments.

The applicant estate trustee sought a declaration that a life insurance beneficiary designation was invalid, arguing that an attorney for property cannot make a testamentary disposition.

The deceased policyholder, who was mentally competent but physically disabled by multiple sclerosis, had directed his attorney for property to change the beneficiary designation.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the attorney acted as an amanuensis or agent (by procuration) rather than a substitute decision-maker.

The court held that the change was a valid declaration under the Insurance Act, and the newly designated beneficiaries were entitled to the proceeds.

The applicant, a minority shareholder and former employee of a closely-held corporation, sought an oppression remedy or winding up order against the majority shareholder.

The applicant alleged oppressive conduct regarding unilateral business expansion decisions and his subsequent exclusion from the company.

The court dismissed the oppression claim, finding the applicant's reasonable expectations were not breached and he had voluntarily withdrawn from the business.

However, finding that the relationship between the parties had irretrievably broken down, the court granted relief under the 'just and equitable' provisions of s. 207 of the Business Corporations Act, ordering a trial of an issue to determine the fair market value of the applicant's shares and the terms of their purchase.

The applicant father brought a motion to change an existing joint custody order, seeking sole custody and primary residence of the 12-year-old child.

The child had been living with the respondent mother in northwestern Ontario, while the father lived in southern Ontario.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the mother's inadequate care, her failure to facilitate access, and the child's strongly expressed wish to live with his father.

Applying the best interests of the child test under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court awarded sole custody to the father, finding he offered a more stable plan and was better able to meet the child's needs.

The access schedule was varied to provide fewer but longer visits, and no child support was ordered given the mother's low income and the costs of access.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking to vacate a scheduling order for the defendants' motion to strike, and seeking leave to amend his statement of claim.

The plaintiff had previously delivered an email abandoning an earlier motion but argued it was not abandoned because he did not file the notice.

The court held that Rule 37.09(1) only requires delivery, not filing, of a notice of abandonment, and alternatively, the motion was deemed abandoned under Rule 37.09(2) because the plaintiff failed to appear.

The plaintiff's current motion was dismissed as an abuse of process because he failed to provide a draft of the proposed amended pleading and had previously refused to attend the scheduling hearing he now sought to vacate.