Abuse of process

The accused, M.B., was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against C.S., then age 15.

The case proceeded as a blended lost evidence application and trial.

The defence sought a stay of proceedings due to missing audio from the complainant's police interview, alleging a Charter breach.

The court found unacceptable negligence by the police but no abuse of process or irreparable prejudice to the right to make full answer and defence, thus denying the stay.

On the merits of the trial, the court found the complainant's credibility highly problematic, particularly regarding a second alleged incident which was found to be fabricated.

The court also considered the defence of mistake of age for the first incident, finding that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove M.B.'s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all four counts, and M.B. was acquitted.

The Vria Parties (defendants by counterclaim) moved to strike the Fresh as Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim against them, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action or was frivolous/vexatious.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was procedurally barred because the Vria Parties had already filed a defence to the original counterclaim, which contained the same causes of action.

The court also found the motion was not brought promptly, as required for Rule 21.01 motions, especially in a complex, case-managed proceeding.

The plaintiff's action, initiated in Small Claims Court and "transformed" to Superior Court, contained numerous allegations against Algonquin College and one of its representatives, including claims of racism, enhancing terrorism, and seeking billions in damages and imprisonment for the college president.

The court, acting on requisitions from the defendants under Rule 2.1.01(6), found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court ordered notice to the plaintiff regarding potential dismissal, stayed the action, and restricted further filings.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendant, who was counsel for opposing parties in a prior action, alleging fiduciary duty, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and obstruction of justice.

The court found that counsel owes no duty to an opposing party and that the factual basis for the claim, including allegations against judicial decisions and an "organized set up" with a judge, was legally unsustainable and frivolous.

The plaintiffs failed to deliver written submissions after being given notice under Rule 2.1.01(3).

The court, on its own initiative under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considered dismissing the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's submissions revealed that her underlying claim for wrongful dismissal had been resolved over a decade prior through Minutes of Settlement, which included a full release and indemnity.

The court found no basis for the defamation claim pursued and determined that any potential claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

The defendants Xytex Corporation, Xytex Cryo International Inc., Mary Hartley, and Dr. James Todd Spradlin brought a motion to dismiss the action based on res judicata, arguing that the plaintiffs' identical action in Georgia had already been dismissed on the merits.

The plaintiffs opposed, contending the Georgia decision was not on the merits due to a procedural dismissal of their appeal.

The court found that the Georgia Superior Court's dismissal was a decision on the merits, and the subsequent procedural dismissal of the appeal did not negate its finality.

Applying the principles of res judicata, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' action in Ontario, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial and no special circumstances to permit re-litigation.

The applicant mother moved to strike the respondent father's motion to change a final consent order, citing significant breaches of prior orders (especially costs) and arguing the motion was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

She also sought to have the father declared a vexatious litigant and required security for costs.

The court found the father was in breach of prior costs orders and had delayed compliance.

While not declaring the father a vexatious litigant or the proceeding an abuse of process at this stage, the court ordered the father to pay outstanding interest on trial costs and post $70,000 as security for the mother's costs.

The father's motion to change was stayed pending compliance with these conditions, and further motions were restricted without leave.

The applicant, Christopher Goulbourne, sought a stay of criminal proceedings for serious offences (robbery, use of imitation firearm, breaking and entering) based on alleged Charter breaches under sections 7 and 24(1).

He claimed he was assaulted by court officers and that police failed to investigate the incident.

The court found the applicant's evidence lacked credibility and that the force used by correctional officers was reasonable and necessary given his disruptive and aggressive conduct.

The court also found no intentional or malicious failure to investigate, but rather a miscommunication.

Ultimately, the court concluded that no Charter breach occurred, and therefore no remedy, including a stay of proceedings, was warranted.

The Bank of Nova Scotia Trust Company, as Estate Trustee for Lidia Iaboni, brought an application to pass accounts.

Carlo Iaboni filed a Notice of Objection, alleging exclusion of assets, wealth evaporation, and conflict of interest.

His siblings, Norma Moretto and Ferdinando Iaboni, moved to strike the Notice of Objection, arguing the grounds were without merit, time-barred, and an abuse of process, given prior litigation.

The court found Carlo Iaboni's objections lacked substance, were largely time-barred, and constituted an abuse of process, particularly as he failed to comply with prior settlement minutes and allowed a previous civil action raising similar issues to be dismissed for delay.

The court dismissed Carlo Iaboni's objections and struck his Notice of Objection.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction, citing enforceable forum selection clauses, a lack of real and substantial connection between the litigation and Ontario, and abuse of process due to prior arbitration and litigation in California concerning the same subject matter.

The plaintiffs, largely self-represented, opposed the motion.

The court found that the forum selection clauses were valid and enforceable, Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter as no presumptive connecting factors were established, and allowing the action to proceed would constitute an abuse of process given the prior resolutions in California.

The action was dismissed, and a sealing order was granted to protect confidential commercial information.

This motion, initiated by a request from the defendant's lawyers and referred by the Registrar under Rule 2.1.01(7), concerned the dismissal of the plaintiff's action.

The action had been previously stayed pending notice to the plaintiff regarding a potential dismissal under Rule 2.1.

Despite responding, the plaintiff failed to address the claim's similarity to prior dismissed actions.

The court found the claim frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, dismissing it under Rule 2.1 and awarding costs to the defendant.

The plaintiff, Gregory King, brought claims against Italian lawyers and their firm (the Italian Defendants) alleging conflict of interest and misconduct in prior Italian legal proceedings that resulted in a judgment against King.

The Italian Defendants moved to dismiss King's claims for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter and, alternatively, on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The court found no real and substantial connection between King's claims and Ontario, as the alleged conduct occurred in Italy, the defendants did not carry on business in Ontario, and any related contract was primarily Italian.

The court also determined that Italy was clearly the more convenient forum, given the location of witnesses, applicable Italian law, and the desirability of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions.

Consequently, the court dismissed King's entire action against the Italian Defendants.

The moving parties, Antonio Ferrara (in trust) and Astoria Homes Inc., sought to strike a third-party claim brought by the Marcheses against Antonio Ferrara in his personal capacity.

The third-party claim was issued without consent or leave of the court, contrary to Rule 29.02.

The court found that while an irregularity occurred, leave would have been granted had it been sought, as no prejudice to the plaintiffs was demonstrated.

Furthermore, the irregularity was cured by the moving parties taking fresh steps in the litigation after becoming aware of the third-party claim.

The application to strike was dismissed.

The court considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

After providing notice to the plaintiff and receiving no submissions, the court found the claim to be frivolous, bearing hallmarks of a querulent litigant.

The action was dismissed, and the defendants were entitled to costs.

The defendant, William Ndze Fuhgeh, brought a motion to strike two statements of claim filed by the plaintiff, Bruno Makoundi, in actions 16-68462 and 16-68824.

The defendant argued abuse of process, absolute privilege, and that the claims were time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court stayed action 16-68462, finding it largely an abuse of process attempting to relitigate matters already dealt with by the Federal Court and duplicative of action 16-68824.

In action 16-68824, the court allowed it to proceed but struck numerous paragraphs without leave to amend, including allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation, irrelevant facts, and time-barred defamation claims.

The plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended statement of claim in action 16-68824, incorporating non-repetitive elements from the stayed action, and was ordered to correct formatting and party names.

A corresponding counterclaim in a related action (15-64497) was prohibited to prevent duplication.

The Applicant sought certiorari to quash a stay of proceedings entered by the Attorney General in relation to private charges she proposed, and to return the matter for a pre-enquete hearing.

The core issue was whether the Attorney General could intervene and direct a stay under s. 504 of the Criminal Code prior to a pre-enquete.

The court dismissed the application, affirming the Attorney General's broad prosecutorial discretion to stay proceedings at any time after an information has been laid, provided there is no flagrant impropriety or abuse of process.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court, on its own motion, stayed the entire proceeding pursuant to s. 106 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that the plaintiff had initiated a second action for the same debt while an earlier, defended action was still pending.

The court deemed this an abuse of process, setting aside the default judgment and staying the current action in favour of the earlier one, reserving costs to be dealt with in the 2011 action.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man charged with sexual assault, sought a stay of proceedings due to a heart condition, arguing that continued prosecution violated his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) and constituted an abuse of process.

The court reviewed medical evidence, which indicated that while the applicant had serious health issues, his condition had stabilized, and he was physically able to attend trial with appropriate accommodations.

The court found that the applicant failed to demonstrate a substantial risk to his health or that the trial process would seriously imperil it.

Applying the tests from R. v. Hillier, R. v. Magomadova, and R. v. Babos, the court concluded that this was not one of the "clearest of cases" warranting a stay, especially considering the public interest in adjudicating serious offences involving child harm.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim due to her persistent non-compliance with court orders, including multiple costs awards, and her disruptive conduct.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, had a history of abusing the court process, making baseless allegations of judicial corruption, and failing to adhere to procedural rules.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's cross-motion to vary a prior order and, while acknowledging the need for accommodation for self-represented litigants, found that the plaintiff's conduct warranted firm action.

The court stayed the plaintiff's action and prohibited further motions without leave, conditionally dismissing the claim if outstanding costs orders were not paid within 30 days.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 to consider dismissing an action for damages, totaling over $970 million, against multiple defendants including a Children's Aid Society, a judge, and legal services.

The action was deemed potentially frivolous, vexatious, and an an abuse of process, given its similarity to previously dismissed claims and the immunity of some defendants.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice of intent to dismiss and stayed the action pending a written hearing.