Chris Kinnear-Hunter

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that set aside a Registrar's administrative dismissal of the respondent's action for delay.

The respondent law firm had commenced an action alleging wrongful solicitation of clients by the appellants.

The action was dismissed five years later under Rule 48.14.

The Superior Court found that the Master made several legal and palpable and overriding errors in applying the Reid factors, including equating delay with the litigation not advancing at all, lowering the bar for what it means to prosecute an action, and improperly shifting the burden of proving prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's decision was set aside, and the Registrar's dismissal was upheld.

Following a 70-day medical malpractice jury trial where the plaintiff was awarded $3.75 million in damages, the court determined the appropriate quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought over $3.3 million in costs and disbursements, while the defendants argued for a significantly lower amount, citing proportionality and excessive hours.

The court analyzed the Rule 57 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the necessity of extensive preparation by plaintiff's counsel, and the fact that defence costs themselves exceeded $3.2 million.

The court fixed the plaintiff's costs at $2,404,765 for fees and $628,387 for disbursements, totaling $3,033,152.

During a medical malpractice jury trial, the defendant physicians sought leave under Rule 53.08 to file a supplementary expert report and to elicit testimony from their experts on matters not explicitly stated in their reports.

The court denied leave for the supplementary report, finding it failed to comply with Rule 53.03 by omitting the reasons for its conclusions, and its admission would cause undue prejudice to the plaintiffs.

The court also ruled on several evidentiary objections, narrowly interpreting the 'latency' principle.

The court held that experts cannot use conclusory statements in their reports to ambush opposing parties with new reasons or theories at trial, though exceptions were made where testimony directly responded to new developments during the trial.

Prior to a medical malpractice jury trial, the court ruled on several procedural and evidentiary motions.

The plaintiffs had entered into a Pierringer Agreement with the defendant hospital and nurses, leaving only the physicians as defendants.

The court ruled that both the plaintiffs and the physicians could cross-examine the settling nurses at trial.

The court also determined the sequencing and phrasing of jury questions, ruling that standard of care must be determined before causation, and permitting 'caused or contributed' language due to the presence of multiple tortfeasors.

Finally, the court allowed the plaintiffs to use photographs of the amputations in their opening address but restricted the experts' use of lengthy PowerPoint presentations.

The Vria Parties (defendants by counterclaim) moved to strike the Fresh as Amended Statement of Defence and Counterclaim against them, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action or was frivolous/vexatious.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was procedurally barred because the Vria Parties had already filed a defence to the original counterclaim, which contained the same causes of action.

The court also found the motion was not brought promptly, as required for Rule 21.01 motions, especially in a complex, case-managed proceeding.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking a declaration of oppression and the appointment of an inspector under ss. 161 and 248 of the OBCA to investigate the defendants' companies involved in two condominium development projects.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing under s. 161 as they were not beneficial shareholders, and failed to establish a prima facie case of oppression under s. 248.

The court also held that appointing an inspector was inappropriate as the costs would significantly outweigh the benefits, and the plaintiffs already had access to extensive financial information.

The moving party and respondent entered into a joint venture to develop condominiums.

After the moving party's family assets were frozen, he transferred his shares in the project companies to the respondent to allow the respondent to secure financing, executing a document styled as a 'trust agreement'.

The moving party later brought a motion seeking the return of the shares, arguing the agreement created a bare trust that could be collapsed under the rule in Saunders v. Vautier.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the document was a contractual agreement rather than a trust, and that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier would not apply regardless because the moving party did not have absolute beneficial ownership of the shares.