Kenneth Radnoff

The respondents originally brought an application for an oppression remedy under the Condominium Act, which was converted into an action by a consent order.

Years later, without delivering a statement of claim, the respondents returned the matter to a motion judge, seeking substantive monetary relief and alleging contempt.

The motion judge granted the monetary relief.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to grant substantive relief on a motion since the application had been converted to an action, and the relief could not be justified as a remedy for contempt.

The appellant appealed an order striking out his statement of claim, declaring him a vexatious litigant, and prohibiting further motions.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claim against one respondent for failing to articulate a valid cause of action.

However, the court set aside the vexatious litigant declaration because no notice was given, and set aside the prohibition on further motions as the appellant's conduct did not meet the threshold.

The court also granted the appellant leave to amend his statement of claim regarding alleged breaches of the Condominium Act and unjust enrichment, while upholding the striking of the remainder of the pleading.

The appellants appealed a decision regarding the effectiveness of a performance bond that was signed by the contractor and the bond company but never delivered to the owner.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which held that delivery is required to make the bond effective.

Appeal from an application judgment reducing the voting rights attached to 18 commercial condominium basement units from 18 votes to three.

The court held that condominiums are creatures of statute and that the voting scheme mandated by the Condominium Act could not be altered by unilateral undertakings, by-laws inconsistent with the declaration, settlement arrangements, or equitable doctrines absent compliance with the statutory amendment process.

The court further held that proprietary estoppel was unavailable because there was no inducement, reliance, or detriment as between the relevant parties, and any prior representation was not made to the respondent owner nor binding on successors in title.

The appeal was allowed, the judgment below was set aside, and the application was dismissed with costs to the appellant here and below.