Kenneth E. Jull

A ruling on a voir dire concerning the admissibility of Approximate Regulation Limit (A.R.L.) maps created by the Halton Region Conservation Authority.

The prosecution sought to admit these maps as evidence to establish the regulatory jurisdiction of the Authority over properties at 7459 Auburn Road, Milton, Ontario.

The defendants challenged admissibility on hearsay grounds.

The court determined that the A.R.L. maps, created pursuant to Ontario Regulation 162/06, constitute part of the regulation itself and are therefore admissible under section 25 of the Evidence Act as copies of regulations.

The plaintiff, having been awarded judgment for $687,639.50 CAD, sought prejudgment interest.

The court determined the applicable prejudgment interest rate under the Courts of Justice Act, s.127(1), to be 2.1%.

This rate was an average calculated over the lengthy period from the action's commencement in January 2006 to the date of judgment in April 2016, deemed a fairer rate given the fluctuations.

The court also specified the periods for which interest would be allowed on various components of the damages, distinguishing between "past pecuniary loss" and general damages as per s.128(3) of the Act.

The court determined the applicable exchange rate for damages previously awarded in U.S. dollars.

Pursuant to section 121(3) of the Courts of Justice Act, the court exercised its discretion to fix the exchange rates at the historical dates when the obligations to pay arose, rather than the date of payment or judgment delivery.

This approach ensured a fixed Canadian dollar judgment and placed the creditor in the position they would have been in had payments been made when due.

The total Canadian dollar award was calculated.

This decision addresses costs following a trial where the plaintiff, Mark Couper, was largely successful on a breach of contract claim, while most other claims and the defendants' counterclaim were dismissed.

The court considered principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, including the result, offers to settle, complexity, and conduct of parties.

It denied substantial indemnity costs for mutual allegations of fraud and discreditable conduct, treating them as offsetting.

However, substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff for the counterclaim due to the defendants' extraordinary non-disclosure of documents, and for the mistrial motion from the date of the plaintiff's unaccepted offer to settle under Rule 49.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs for the main action.

The defendants sought to amend the judge's prior reasons for dismissing their mistrial motion, specifically requesting the deletion of statements disapproving their reliance on midtrial conference discussions.

The judge had shared preliminary views during these conferences under an agreement and counsel's undertaking that such discussions would not be used as a basis for bias allegations.

The court found that the defendants and their counsel breached this agreement and undertaking by using the preliminary views as "context" for their bias claim.

The judge declined to amend the reasons, emphasizing the accountability of both judges and litigants/counsel regarding such agreements.

This is a ruling on a preliminary motion regarding the proper categorization of party liability offences under the Provincial Offences Act.

The defendants were charged with offences contrary to the Conservation Authorities Act, both as principal offenders and as parties to the offences.

The central issue was whether party liability offences based on aiding or abetting the commission of a regulatory strict liability offence should themselves be classified as strict liability offences or as mens rea offences.

The court examined the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in La Souveraine and concluded that party liability offences based on aiding (under paragraph 77(1)(b) of the POA) should be classified as strict liability offences, while those based on abetting (under paragraph 77(1)(c)) remain mens rea offences.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from a watershed enforcement officer regarding the freshness of topsoil observed at a property.

The officer opined that topsoil was "very fresh material" based on observations of construction equipment, lack of vegetation, and crisp bulldozer tracks.

The court applied the four-element test from Regina v. Graat to determine whether the lay opinion evidence was admissible.

The court found that all four elements were satisfied: the officer was in a better position than the trier of fact to form the conclusion; the conclusion was one that persons of ordinary experience could make when combined with the officer's experiential capacity; the officer had the necessary experiential capacity despite not being an expert; and the opinion was a compendious mode of stating complex facts.

The opinion was admitted into evidence.

The defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of portions of an oppression remedy claim on the basis that certain alleged acts were statute‑barred.

The claim arose from a long‑running business dispute in which the plaintiff alleged that the individual defendant conducted the affairs of several corporations in a manner oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the plaintiff’s interests.

The court held that the alleged acts formed part of a complex factual matrix concerning the parties’ ongoing business relationship and that determining when the limitation period began to run required detailed factual findings.

Because a full appreciation of the evidence could not be achieved on the motion record, summary judgment was inappropriate.

The motion was dismissed and the issues were left for determination at trial.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's alleged failure to intervene and enforce an approved waste management plan under s. 27 of the Waste Diversion Act, 2002.

The applicant argued that changes to tendering criteria constituted a 'material change' requiring the Minister's approval.

The Divisional Court quashed the application, finding that the Minister has no statutory duty to intervene or supervise operational decisions, and that the decision of what constitutes a 'material change' is a policy-laden function beyond the court's jurisdiction.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority appealed the sentencing decision imposed on the respondents for contravening the Conservation Authorities Act by undertaking unauthorized development in a designated erosion hazard zone.

The respondents had applied for permission to construct a lakeside addition to their property in Burlington, which was denied.

Despite the denial and subsequent stop work orders, they proceeded with construction and completed the addition.

The trial judge imposed fines of $5,000 each and a probation order requiring seawall reconstruction, but did not order removal of the unauthorized structure.

The appellate court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and allowed the appeal, setting aside the fines and imposing an order for removal of the lakeside addition at the respondents' expense.

A police officer appealed a decision of the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services (OCCPS) upholding his termination.

The officer had pleaded guilty to eight disciplinary offences related to purchasing and stealing cocaine while on duty, which he attributed to a cocaine addiction.

He argued the police service had a duty to accommodate his disability.

The Divisional Court held that while the OCCPS must be correct in its legal interpretation of the duty to accommodate, its application of that duty to the penalty was reviewable on a reasonableness standard.

The Court found the OCCPS reasonably concluded that accommodating the officer would cause undue hardship given the egregious nature of his misconduct and the destruction of his usefulness as a police officer.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant police officers sued the respondents for malicious prosecution after assault charges against them were stayed.

The respondent Bapoo counterclaimed for assault and breach of his s. 7 Charter rights.

The trial judge dismissed the malicious prosecution claim and awarded Bapoo damages under s. 24(1) of the Charter for the unauthorized use of force, despite finding the officers did not act with mala fides.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but set aside the Charter damages, holding that liability for a constitutional tort requires proof of wilfulness or mala fides.

The court also adjusted the costs awards, finding the trial judge's characterization of the appellants' testimony as perjury was inappropriate.

The moving party sought to quash the appeal on the basis that the responding parties' factum sought to overturn the reasons for judgment rather than the judgment itself.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, holding that the comprehensive Notice of Appeal governs the scope of the appeal.

The responding parties were granted leave to file a revised factum.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud, awarding damages and punitive damages, and granting an oppression remedy.

The appellants operated a petroleum supply business that became insolvent.

They continued to order gasoline from the respondent without intending to pay, using the proceeds to pay themselves and their lawyers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of fraud and the compensatory damages of $539,658.41 for gasoline delivered after January 9, 1997.

However, the Court struck the oppression declaration, the $300,000 punitive damages award, and the order subordinating the appellants' secured claims, allowing the appeal in part.

The grievor, a unit manager at a detention centre, filed a grievance alleging that he was targeted by the union and subjected to a campaign of harassment, including a withdrawn sexual harassment complaint and an abandoned disciplinary investigation.

He sought the removal of negative reports from his file, priority for future promotions, and financial compensation for lost vacation credits and legal costs.

The Public Service Grievance Board allowed the grievance in part, ordering the employer to purge the grievor's file of all references to the sexual harassment complaint and the abandoned disciplinary hearing.

The Board dismissed the claims for promotional priority and financial compensation, finding no wrongdoing by the employer that would justify such relief.