J.W. Quinn

The accused brought a pre-trial application challenging the validity of a search warrant executed at his residence, which resulted in the seizure of cocaine.

The accused argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained material non-disclosure and misrepresentations, specifically regarding a 'hand-to-hand transaction' and a non-existent criminal record.

The court found that the ITO was deficient and that, after excising the misleading information, there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrant.

The court concluded that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that its admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering him to repay student loans to the respondent bank.

The central issue was whether the loans were ordinary bank loans subject to a two-year limitation period, or government student loans exempt from limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court found the trial judge erred in concluding the loans were made under the Canada Student Loans Act, as that statute had been replaced by the Canada Student Financial Assistance Act at the relevant time.

Given the insufficient evidentiary record regarding the exact nature of the loans, the court allowed the appeal in part and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing her motion to set aside a default judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in law by requiring the appellant to show a 'meritorious' defence rather than an 'arguable' defence.

The court held that 'meritorious' sets a higher threshold than 'arguable', and the motion judge also erred in rejecting the appellant's explanation for the default based on customary court practice rather than the evidence.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his claim for a lost diamond.

At trial, the judge ordered both parties to take polygraph tests and relied on the results, which favoured the respondent, to assess credibility and dismiss the claim.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the results of polygraph tests are inadmissible to determine the truth of facts in dispute, as they usurp the function of the trier of fact, and a court cannot delegate its jurisdiction even on consent.

The plaintiff subcontractor sued the defendant contractor in Small Claims Court for unpaid invoices.

During closing arguments, the trial judge raised the issue of a trust claim under the Construction Lien Act, which had not been pleaded.

The trial judge found the defendant liable for breach of trust.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to hear trust claims within its monetary limits, it was unfair to the defendant to grant judgment on an unpleaded trust claim, as it deprived him of the opportunity to adduce evidence to discharge his burden as trustee.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The purchaser of a new home claimed compensation from the Ontario New Home Warranty Program, alleging she should have received legal title to a side yard rather than an easement.

The Program denied the claim, but the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal ordered compensation under s. 14(1)(a) of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act.

The Program appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that s. 14(1)(a) protects purchasers from financial loss when a vendor fails to complete a contract, and does not apply to alleged title deficiencies after a transaction has closed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that found the respondent was a 25% shareholder in the family cartage business and had been oppressed.

The trial judge had ordered the appellants to buy out the respondent's interest at fair market value without a minority discount.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were reasonable, the remedy showed no error in principle, and the costs award was a proper exercise of judicial discretion.