Julian N. Falconer

The applicant, sought by the United States for the attempted murder of a police officer in 1969, applied for a review of a detention order pending his extradition hearing.

He had previously jumped bail twice in the US and lived in Canada under an assumed name for 30 years.

The applicant proposed a revised release plan including electronic monitoring and supervision by his mother-in-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no error in principle in the application judge's conclusion that the applicant remained a significant flight risk and that electronic monitoring would not ensure his attendance in court.

The respondent, a young black single mother, was convicted of importing 733.4 grams of cocaine.

The trial judge imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, citing systemic racial and gender bias, delay, and the risk of deportation as mitigating factors.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in adjusting the cocaine's weight for purity to avoid the three-to-five-year sentencing range established in Madden.

The Court further held that systemic bias, delay, and deportation risk did not justify a conditional sentence in this case.

The sentence was varied to 20 months' incarceration, giving credit for time served on the conditional sentence.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family of a man fatally shot by police, brought actions for misfeasance in a public office and negligence against the involved officers, the Chief of Police, the Police Services Board, and the Province.

The claims arose from the officers' alleged failure to cooperate with the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigation.

The defendants moved to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the actions for misfeasance in a public office against the officers and the Chief, and the negligence action against the Chief, could proceed, as it was not plain and obvious they would fail.

However, the negligence actions against the Board and the Province were struck out because they did not owe a private law duty of care to the plaintiffs to ensure officers cooperated with the SIU.

At the opening of an application for judicial review regarding a coroner's inquest, the applicants brought a motion to remove the law firm representing the respondent Coroner.

The firm had previously done corporate legal work for a corporation that had standing at the inquest.

Although there was no actual conflict of interest, the Divisional Court granted the motion and removed the firm based on the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice and avoid any appearance of impropriety.

The applicant sought judicial review of a coroner's decision denying him standing at an ongoing inquest.

The coroner found the applicant did not meet the statutory requirements for standing under either the public law or private law tests.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the coroner's decision was entitled to curial deference and was not unreasonable.

The court emphasized the need to avoid interrupting the ongoing statutory hearing and found no serious error in principle that would justify interference.

The appellants appealed an order striking out their negligence claims against several police officers on the basis that the claims were initiated outside the six-month limitation period prescribed by the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appellants argued the motions judge erred in striking the claims and in failing to grant leave to amend the pleadings to allege negligent investigation and prosecution.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the original claims were statute-barred and that leave to amend had not been requested before the motions judge.

The Court also dismissed a motion to introduce fresh evidence and directed that any motion to amend the pleadings be brought before the case management master.

The appellant Fraser and two co-accused were tried for second-degree murder following a street fight.

Fraser admitted to stabbing the victim but raised defences of intoxication.

The co-accused were acquitted, while Fraser was convicted.

Fraser appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt, after-the-fact conduct, and intent.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the co-accused, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could not be convicted of manslaughter if Fraser was convicted of murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed Fraser's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on how to use evidence of Fraser's flight from the scene.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed because, although the trial judge erred in law regarding party liability for manslaughter, the Crown failed to show the error may well have affected the verdicts for the co-accused.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder arising from an armed robbery where the deceased was shot in the back of the head.

On appeal, the appellant raised several grounds, including errors regarding a potential Corbett application, the adequacy of a Vetrovec warning, comments on the right to silence, mischaracterization of defence positions, instructions on after-the-fact conduct, and the trial judge's suggestion that the deceased was on his knees when shot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors and concluding that any imperfections in the jury charge did not result in a miscarriage of justice.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment, the parties made written submissions regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the successful defendants, Woodhouse, Gerrits, and Ontario, their costs of the motion before the lower court and their motions for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court, in addition to their costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs and the remaining defendants agreed that no costs would be awarded among them due to divided success.

Appeals from rule 21 motions in an action arising from a fatal police shooting and the subsequent SIU investigation.

The majority held that the tort of misfeasance in public office requires abuse of statutory or administrative power, and that an alleged failure by police officers to co-operate with an SIU investigation under s. 113(9) of the Police Services Act was a breach of duty, not an abuse of power.

The majority struck the misfeasance claim against the officers and the negligent supervision claim against Ontario, but allowed the negligent supervision claim against the police chief to proceed.

The majority also held the Board could not be liable for negligent supervision because the Act confined it to policy functions and precluded operational direction.

A dissent would have permitted the misfeasance and broader negligent supervision claims to proceed.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of s. 810.1 of the Criminal Code, arguing that the child-protection recognizance regime created a status offence, was overbroad, and was impermissibly vague, and further challenged the availability of arrest and detention procedures in such proceedings.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 810.1 is preventive, not punitive, and is directed at assessing present risk of future harm to children rather than punishing status.

The court found the regime sufficiently tailored and procedurally safeguarded, upheld the reading down of 'shall' to 'may' in s. 810.1(2), and confirmed that ss. 507(4) and 515 apply to s. 810.1 proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge improperly allowed the Crown to reopen its case and then amend the indictment in a child sexual offence prosecution.

The majority held that once the defence had begun to answer the case by disclosing an intended alibi, the discretion to reopen was severely restricted and could be exercised only in the narrowest circumstances.

Reopening to correct the complainant's mother's evidence about the year of the alleged offences effectively changed the case the accused had committed to meet and indirectly violated the principle against self-incrimination.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal on the remaining count stood.

The appellant was involved in two motor vehicle accidents, the second resulting in a fatality.

At the hospital, blood and urine samples were taken for medical purposes with the appellant's consent.

A coroner subsequently seized the samples under the Coroners Act and turned them over to the police for analysis.

The results were used to convict the appellant of impaired driving causing death and other offences.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the police's appropriation of the samples constituted an unreasonable seizure violating s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because the samples existed independently of the breach, the authorities acted in good faith, and the evidence would have been discovered anyway.

The appeal was dismissed.

The corporate appellants, retail businesses, and their employees sought declarations that the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act was unconstitutional, alleging it infringed freedom of religion and equality rights under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the appellants lacked standing.

The Court found that while there was a serious issue as to the Act's validity and the appellants were directly affected, there were other reasonable and effective ways to bring the issue before the court, as evidenced by their reliance on the evidentiary record of another case.

The Court also held that the appellants could not claim their own religious rights were violated without specific factual evidence.