Suzan E. Fraser

The Plaintiffs' motion for a Mareva injunction and Norwich order against Defendant Jain was adjourned sine die due to significant procedural missteps by Plaintiffs' counsel.

These missteps included scheduling a long motion on a short motion date, failing to serve all parties as required by Rule 37.07(1), and providing inadequate notice and unhyperlinked materials.

The court found the alleged urgency was self-created and declined an interim order.

Costs were awarded against the Plaintiffs in favour of the appearing Defendants.

The parties were directed to attend Triage Court to schedule a long motion and consider civil case management.

The plaintiffs sued the tenants and the landlords after a child was bitten by the tenants' dog on the rented premises.

The landlords brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the Dog Owners' Liability Act (DOLA) places strict liability on the dog owners and precludes liability under the Occupiers' Liability Act (OLA) when the attack occurs on the dog owner's premises.

The court agreed, finding that DOLA applied exclusively and that the landlords owed no duty of care under the OLA or the Residential Tenancies Act.

Partial summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the landlords.

The Attorney General of Ontario brought a motion for a forfeiture order under s. 3 of the Civil Remedies Act for $79,220 in Canadian currency.

The funds were seized from the residence of an individual associated with drug trafficking and other criminal activity.

The court found, on a balance of probabilities, that the money constituted proceeds of illegal activity, citing various indicia such as the manner of bundling, the individual's criminal record, and his identification as a drug dealer.

No one came forward to claim the funds, and the court determined that forfeiture was in the interest of justice.

The motion for forfeiture was granted.

Trial of 12 issues concerning the estate of Nadia Wyszatko, which had remained unadministered for over a decade due to sibling disputes.

The applicant, Julia, sought repayment of loans made to the estate, compensation for acting as Litigation Administrator, and orders regarding the estate's assets, including a marina property.

The court found that Julia was entitled to repayment of her loans and compensation.

The court also held that the respondent, Richard, who had taken control of the marina business and co-mingled funds, was liable for occupation rent and was not entitled to executor compensation.

The court ordered the sale of the property to satisfy the estate's debts and directed the parties to propose an independent third-party estate trustee.

The defendant, Mordecai Gal, was charged with sexual exploitation under s. 153 of the Criminal Code involving a 16-year-old complainant from a Muslim youth group.

The central issue was whether the defendant, as an older and respected member of the group, stood in a position of trust towards the complainant.

The court found a 12-year age difference, the defendant's role as a mentor and confidant, and the complainant's vulnerability due to an isolated home life.

The defendant exploited this vulnerability by encouraging a "temporary marriage" with promises of financial and housing independence, despite parental disapproval.

The court concluded that the defendant occupied a position of trust and exploited the complainant, finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a psychiatrist, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board which found the respondent capable of consenting to treatment (antipsychotic medication).

The appellant argued the Board made a legal error by applying the wrong test for capacity and palpable and overriding errors of mixed law and fact by misapprehending crucial medical evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no legal error in the Board's application of the capacity test under the Health Care Consent Act, and no palpable and overriding error in its factual findings, including its assessment of the connection between the respondent's behavior and medication.

The applicant, Dawn McKenzie, acting as Power of Attorney for Property for Raymond Morgan, sought court approval to sell the Springdale property.

This property was subject to a life leasehold interest in favour of the respondent, Wendy Morgan, as per Mr. Morgan's will.

The applicant argued the sale was necessary to cover Mr. Morgan's caregiving fees and debts.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's financial assessments were unreliable and that other options for liquidity had not been adequately explored.

The court also expressed concerns about the applicant's management of Mr. Morgan's care and his isolation from other family members.

The City of Markham brought an application for declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against a homeowner who removed trees and built a concrete hockey rink in the backyard of his heritage-designated property without City approval.

The homeowner argued the Heritage Easement Agreement only applied to the building, not the grounds, and that the City's enforcement was unconscionable and violated his Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the agreement applied to the entire property and granted the City sole discretion to determine breaches and conduct remedial work.

The court dismissed the unconscionability and Charter arguments, issued the requested declarations, and granted a permanent injunction prohibiting further unauthorized work.

The defendant owner brought a motion for directions seeking to hold the proceeds of a statutory adjudication award in trust, rather than paying the co-defendant contractor, due to a perfected construction lien registered by the plaintiff subcontractor.

The owner argued that paying the award would expose him to paying twice.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction to vary or stay the adjudicator's order under the Construction Act outside of a judicial review application.

The court emphasized the Act's prompt payment scheme, noting that the owner must pay the award and the contractor would hold the funds in trust for the subcontractor.

The applicant sought a declaration of an interest in an abandoned, landlocked parcel of land adjacent to its property, and an order rectifying the land register.

The registered owner had not been seen or heard from since acquiring the property in 1938.

The court dispensed with service as the respondent could not be located.

While the court rejected the applicant's claim based on mutual mistake, it found that the applicant and its predecessors had established adverse possession by openly and continuously farming the land as their own for over 65 years.

The court ordered the land register to be rectified to show the applicant as the registered owner.

The plaintiffs and defendants brought cross-motions for relief under the oppression remedy provisions of the Business Corporations Act.

The dispute arose after the majority shareholders terminated the defendant from his role as Director of Operations and removed him as a director.

The court found that the defendant had acted oppressively by transferring over $700,000 of corporate funds to a company he solely controlled to protect his personal interests.

Applying the clean hands doctrine, the court denied the defendant's request for an oppression remedy and the appointment of an inspector, but granted the plaintiffs' motion to correct the shareholder register and restore their authority over the corporate bank accounts.

The applicants, estate and disability trustees, sought the court's assistance in interpreting a will.

The will created a disability trust for the testator's daughter, with the remainder to be divided among three beneficiaries upon her death.

One beneficiary survived the testator but predeceased the daughter, and the will was silent on this scenario.

Applying the armchair rule, the court interpreted the will to mean the deceased beneficiary's share passed to his issue.

The court also permitted the application to proceed without a representative for the deceased beneficiary's insolvent estate and allowed the minor issue's share to be paid into court.

The applicants brought an urgent motion for a writ of possession and a declaration that the respondent occupant had no legal right to occupy the premises, which had been ordered sold by the court.

The Landlord and Tenant Board had previously declined jurisdiction after the respondents claimed the occupant was a purchaser.

The court found it had jurisdiction, determined the occupant had no legal right to occupy as he had not fulfilled the deposit schedule or paid rent, and granted the writ of possession.

The court also ordered that the co-owner respondent's agreement to a reasonable market offer for the sale of the property be dispensed with if not provided within 48 hours of the applicant accepting it.