S. Vella

The applicant, a not-for-profit corporation, sought declarations validating the election of its board of directors and the subsequent removal of two former directors.

The respondent former directors challenged their removal, arguing that the board's temporary retirement at the annual general meeting left the corporation without members to re-elect them, and that they were denied procedural fairness.

The court rejected the respondents' literal interpretation of the by-laws to avoid commercial absurdity, finding the board was properly elected.

The court also held that the respondents received adequate notice and were not denied natural justice.

The applicant's application was granted.

The applicants sought a declaration that they were entitled to further coverage under the pandemic-related business income interruption provision of their insurance policy.

The insurer argued the coverage was restricted to an aggregate maximum limit of $50,000 for the policy period, while the insured argued the limit applied to each of their seven daycare locations.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the policy ambiguous but concluded that reading the policy as a whole supported the insured's interpretation.

The court granted the application, declaring the limit of liability is $50,000 for each of the seven scheduled risk locations, for a maximum aggregate coverage of $350,000.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for constructive dismissal after being temporarily laid off due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the plaintiff was an employee from the start of his tenure, despite initially being paid through a personal corporation.

The court also held that the employment contract signed mid-employment was void for lack of consideration.

The employer had no contractual right to lay off the plaintiff, resulting in a constructive dismissal.

The court awarded 15 months' reasonable notice and $25,000 in punitive damages due to the employer's failure to pay statutory minimums.

The defendants appealed a Master's decision declining to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 48.14 and instead imposing a timetable.

The underlying action involved a claim for indemnification from escrow funds following a share purchase agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the Master applied the correct two-part test from Kara v. Arnold, properly considered the contextual factors including the defendants' own delay in filing a statement of defence, and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the plaintiff had an adequate explanation for delay and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented for the first 33 months of the litigation, had delayed advancing the action because the defendants claimed they were conducting a forensic audit into alleged fraudulent activity implicating the plaintiff.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the plaintiff had a reasonable excuse due to settlement attempts and waiting for the audit, and the defendants failed to demonstrate actual prejudice.

The motion to dismiss for delay was dismissed.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief against the defendants and their counsel.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the motion was an attempt to re-litigate a contempt motion and a summary judgment motion that had already been dismissed and upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered that the plaintiff must seek leave before bringing any further motions in the proceeding.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant, an independent contractor, for funds stolen through a fraudulent cheque scheme.

The defendant did not appear at the hearing.

The court found that the defendant had altered cheques written in her favour and deposited them multiple times, stealing $38,139.15.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, dismissed the defendant's counterclaim for outstanding wages, and awarded prejudgment interest from the date the fraudulent activity commenced.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis due to the defendant's reprehensible conduct.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it for failure to provide notice within 10 days of the injury, as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2015 but did not notify the municipality until 2018, after retaining an expert who suggested a potential intersection design defect.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 42(8), as he had sufficient facts to investigate a potential claim against the municipality much earlier.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The moving party insurer brought a motion under section 128(5) of the Insurance Act for the appointment of an umpire after the parties' appraisers failed to agree on a candidate to value a water loss claim.

The court reviewed the candidates proposed by both the insurer and the insureds, considering their experience in valuation, impartiality, and prior experience as an umpire.

The court appointed George R. Milnes, finding his 30-year career representing both insurers and insureds demonstrated the necessary expertise and impartiality.

The client appealed an Assessment Certificate and a Costs of Assessment Certificate issued by an Assessment Officer regarding unpaid legal fees.

The solicitor brought a motion to quash the appeal on jurisdictional grounds, arguing the client failed to seek leave to appeal costs and failed to file objections.

The court granted the client an extension of time to appeal the Assessment Certificate and dispensed with the objection requirement.

On the merits, the court found the Assessment Officer did not err in concluding the solicitor's requisition for assessment under s. 3(c) of the Solicitors Act was not time-barred, as the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act applied.

The court also upheld the Assessment Officer's award of $39,000 in costs on a substantial indemnity basis to the self-represented solicitor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a Master's Order that granted leave for the plaintiff corporation's president, a non-lawyer, to represent it in the action.

The court found it had jurisdiction to set aside the order because one defendant received inadequate notice of the original motion and new facts had arisen.

Applying the test for non-lawyer representation of a corporation, the court concluded the non-lawyer was not reasonably capable of comprehending the complex legal issues involved in the litigation, which included copyright, trademark, and defamation claims.

The court revoked the leave and ordered the plaintiff to appoint a lawyer.

The applicant second mortgagee sought a determination of the legitimacy and priority of certain charges and an increased interest rate claimed by the respondent first mortgagee under a renewed first mortgage.

The court held that the disputed charges and the increased interest rate were enforceable and held priority over the second mortgage, as the second mortgagee was deemed to have notice of the standard charge terms permitting such increases.

However, the court adjourned the final allocation of funds to a trial of an issue to address the applicant's late allegations of fraud.

The plaintiff bank brought motions for an order amending the style of cause, summary judgment against one defendant, and default judgment against the other defendant.

The defendants had provided joint and several personal guarantees for corporate loans that went into default, leading to a receivership.

The court granted the amendment to the style of cause to include aliases.

The court granted summary judgment against the defending guarantor, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, and granted default judgment against the noted-in-default guarantor based on deemed admissions and affidavit evidence.

Judgment was granted for over $3 million plus full indemnity costs.

The moving parties (the Crosslinx Defendants) sought an order under Rule 49.09 to enforce a settlement reached with the plaintiff.

The parties disagreed on the scope and form of the release to be signed by the plaintiff.

The court held that without prejudice communications were admissible to determine the scope of the settlement.

The court further held that the parties bargained for a standard general release, which implicitly includes claims over and contribution/indemnity clauses, and ordered the plaintiff to execute the release with those terms included, subject to minor clarifying revisions.

The plaintiff's lawyers brought a motion to remove the defendants' lawyer of record, alleging an actual or perceived conflict of interest in her joint representation of all three defendants.

The plaintiff was never a client of the challenged lawyer.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a possibility of real mischief or that the proper administration of justice required the removal.

The court also found that the motion was brought for a tactical advantage, given the nearly two-year delay in bringing it after the issue was first raised.